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This case is an appeal of a highly technical decision by the Utah Department 
of Environmental Quality (UDEQ) and the Utah Division of Air Quality (UDAQ) 
to approve an expansion and modernization project at the Holly Refinery in Davis 
County. The agency made this decision in November of 2013 after a rigorous public 
comment, with almost 4,000 pages of comments submitted, and a subsequent 
administrative appeal. Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and FRIENDS of 
Great Salt Lake (Petitioners) now seek review of the decision made at the 
conclusion of the administrative proceedings, which approved Holly's project. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review a "dispositive action in a permit review 
adjudicative proceeding" under Utah Code, Sections 19-1-301.5(14) (2014), 
amended by 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 379 (S.B. 282), 630-4-403 (2015), and 78A-4-
103(2)(a)(i)(B) (2014), amended by 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 441 (S.B. 173). The 
dispositive action is the Executive Director's Order Adopting Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits (Final Order) dated 
March 31, 2015. [ADJ0I 1651-53.] 1 
1 ADJ refers to the adjudicative portion of the record, as explained in Section II.B., 
infra, pp. 10-11. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether Petitioners can meet their burden on appeal where they 
decline to challenge the Final Order, as required by Section 19-1-301.5(14) of the 
Utah Code. 
Standard of review: 
Where a lower tribunal could not have ruled on an issue, no standard of 
review applies. Cf Simmons Media Grp., LLC v. Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145, 
, 13,335 P.3d 885 (where claim does not require review of any district court ruling, 
~ no standard of review applies). 
Issue 2: Whether the Executive Director abused her discretion or otherwise 
erred in evaluating Petitioners' claims challenging UDAQ's determinations relating 
to PM25 emissions for the Modernization Project. 
2 
Standard of review:2 
Utah Code§ 19-1-301.5(14) governs judicial review of the Executive 
Director's final decision in a permit review adjudication. Utah Code § 19-1-
301.5(14 )( c) requires a reviewing court to "review all agency determinations in 
accordance with Subsection 63G-4-403( 4), under which Petitioners must show that 
they have been "substantially prejudiced" by the agency's action. Utah Code Ann.§ 
63G-4-403(4) (2014). Under Section 19-1-301.5(14)(c), the Court must accept the 
2 The Utah Legislature amended Section 19-1-301.5 during 2015 legislative session. 
See 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 379 (S.B. 282). The revisions became effective on May 
12, 2015. The prior version of the statute applies because the parties' substantive 
rights (UDAQ issuance of the approval order on November 28, 2014) and the 
parties' procedural rights (the filing of this appeal on April 27, 2015) each vested 
before the effective date of the new statute. See State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, 1112-
14, 251 P.3d 829.These revisions affect judicial standard of review. Cf Utah Code 
Ann.§ 19-1-301.5(15)(c)(ii) (2015) ("the appellate court shall: (ii) uphold all 
factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations that are not clearly 
erroneous based upon the petitioner's marshaling of the evidence") with Utah Code 
Ann.§ 19-1-301.5(14)(c)(ii) (2012) ("the appellate court shall: (ii) uphold all 
factual, technical and scientific determinations that are supported by substantial 
evidence viewed in light of the record as a whole"). Even were this Court to 
determine that the new statute applies on appeal, however, the application of the 
standard of review under either version of the statute is essentially the same. The 
new statutory language includes some changes to the language in the applicable 
judicial standards of review, including an express requirement for marshaling and 
the imposition of a clearly erroneous standard. However, because the ALJ required 
Petitioners to marshal below, and because a clearly erroneous standard of review 
still requires a determination on substantial evidence, there is no substantive 
difference in the application of the two standards. 
3 
Executive Director's factual determinations (including technical and scientific 
determinations) as long as "they are supported by substantial evidence taken from 
the record as a whole." Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-301.5(14 )( c ). "An administrative 
law decision meets the substantial evidence test when 'a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate' the evidence supporting the decision." Martinez v. Media-
Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, 135, 164 
P.3d 384 (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 776 P.2d 
63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)). The burden of challenging the agency's factual, 
scientific, and technical determinations lies with Petitioners. Utah Chapter of the 
Sierra Club v. Bd of Oil, Gas, & Mining, 2012 UT 73,110,289 P.3d 558 
~ [hereinafter Sierra Club] ("the appealing party bears the burden of demonstrating 
that the agency's factual determinations are not supported by substantial evidence"). 
This Court reviews legal determinations ofUDAQ's operative statutes and 
rules under the "clearly erroneous" standard because Section 19-1-301.5 expressly 
vests UDAQ with "substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and 
rules." Utah Code Ann.§ 19-l-301.5(14)(c); see e.g. Sierra Club, 2012 UT 73, 110 
(holding that where "[t]he Legislature has given the Board explicit authority and 
wide latitude in interpreting the operative provisions of the Mining Act," such legal 
4 
conclusions and interpretations can be set aside only if they are "based upon a 
clearly erroneous interpretation ... of the law."). 
The power to interpret the agency's governing laws under Section 19-1-301.5 
is a clear statutory delegation of discretion, in contrast to a statutory grant of power 
to "administer a statute," which most agencies have under their operating statutes. 3 
This Court reviews general interpretations of law for correctness, granting little 
deference to the Executive Director. See Sierra Club, 2012 UT 73, ,r 9. 
Mixed questions of law and fact arise "when an agency or lower court must 
apply 'a legal standard to a set of facts unique to a particular case.'" Murray v. Utah 
Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT 38, ,I 33, 308 P.3d 461 (quoting In re Adoption of Baby 
B., 2012 UT 35, ,r 42, 308 P.3d 382). The Executive Director's determinations on 
mixed questions "must be rationally based and are set aside only if they are 
3 This Court's analysis of the standard of review in Sevier Citizens for Clean Air 
and Water, Inc. v. Dep 't of Envtl. Quality, 2014 UT App 257, 338 P.3d 831 is 
distinguishable. In Sevier Citizens, the issue was whether a petitioner filed a petition 
to intervene under Section 19-1-301.5, which is a jurisdictional requirement. See id. 
at ,r 4. In ruling on intervention, this Court observed that the statutory grant of 
substantial discretion was a grant of authority to administer the statute, as opposed 
to authority to interpret the law. Id. at ,r 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
("[T]his grant of authority does not tum an agency's application or interpretation of 
the law into the type of action that would warrant an abuse of discretion standard."). 
In this case, the issues are technical and factual questions as opposed to 
jurisdictional determinations. 
5 
imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the tolerable limits of reason." 
Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, 118, 38 P.3d 
291 (quoting Williams v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Issue 3: Whether the Executive Director abused her discretion in upholding 
UDAQ's determination that Holly's approval order met all the applicable 
permitting requirements regarding the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS), National Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources (NSPS), 
~ and the applicability of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). 
Standard of review: 
The standard of review for Issue 3 is the same as for Issue 2. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann.§ 19-1-301.5(12), (13), (14); 
~ 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403; and 
3. Utah Admin. Coder. 307-401 (2015). 
~ 
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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioners appeal the Final Order,4 dismissing with prejudice each of 
Petitioners' claims. [ADJ0l 1652.] Petitioners' Request for Agency Action (RFAA) 
challenged an approval order issued by UDAQ under the state's minor source 
permitting program, which authorized changes to Holly's Davis County Refinery. 
[IR009223-54.] 
An administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewed the RF AA under Section 19-1-
30 l .5 and recommended dismissal of all of Petitioners' claims on multiple 
grounds-lack of preservation, failure to marshal the evidence, and failure to meet 
the burden of proof on the merits. [ADJ0l 1536-648.] The Executive Director 
adopted these findings and conclusions in her Final Order, now subject to this 
appeal. [ADJ0l 1651-53]; see also Opening Br. 1, 12. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By statute, the appellate record includes two sets: ( 1) the administrative 
record prepared by UDAQ as it reviewed Holly's permit application (Permitting 
4 The Final Order consists of two documents: (1) the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits, 
which the Executive Director adopted, [ADJ0l 1536-648], and (2) the Executive 
Director's Final Order of March 31, 2015. [ADJ0l 1651-53.] 
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Record), and (2) the adjudicative record prepared as the ALJ and the Executive 
~ Director completed their review of UDAQ's permitting decision (Adjudicative 
Record). See Utah Code Ann.§ 19-l-301.5(14)(b). 
A. Permitting Record 
In July 2012, Holly submitted a final permit application, or Notice of Intent 
(NOi), seeking permission to modernize certain equipment in order to increase the 
processing of black and yellow wax crude oil at its Davis County Refinery from 
40,000 barrels per day to 60,000 barrels per day. [IR002798-3590.] The upgrades 
~ will result in a number of overall emission decreases from the refinery, and are 
collectively referred to as the Modernization Project. [IR008482; IR007575; 
ADJOI 1540.] 
In April 2013, Holly submitted its final netting analysis to UDAQ. 
[IR008366-415.] The purpose of the netting analysis was to determine whether the 
Modernization Project would be a major or minor modification5 based on estimated 
5 Whether a modification is major or minor is determined on a pollutant-by-
pollutant basis by ascertaining whether there would be a significant net emissions 
increase over a specific threshold. See 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (2)(i); 40 C.F .R. § 
52.2l(b)(23). The pollutants requiring review under the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
include Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC), Sulfur Dioxide (S02), Carbon 
Monoxide (CO), Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Particulate Matter often microns or less 
(PM 10), Particulate Matter of 2.5 microns or less (PM25), and Greenhouse Gas 
8 
emissions from the modifications and other emission increases and decreases at the 
refinery. The only two pollutants that exceeded the thresholds were Carbon 
Monoxide (CO) and Greenhouse Gas emissions (GHGs), which are not at issue in 
this appeal. [Id.] The projected emissions for the remaining pollutants (including 
PM25) were reviewed under Utah's minor source program. [IR008566.] 
Additionally, the project is expected to result in significant decreases in various 
pollutants, including 150.69 tons per year (tpy) of SO2, 21.53 tpy ofNOx, and 17.02 
tpy of VOCs. [IR007575.] 
On June 5, 2013, UDAQ released a draft permit, or Intent to Approve (ITA) 
for public comment. [IR008449-79; IR008480-575 (UDAQ's Source Plan 
Review).] After the comment period closed, UDAQ consulted with Holly regarding 
issues raised in public comments. On November 6, 2013, UDAQ requested that 
Holly submit additional information in response to the public comments. 
[IR008021.] Holly did so the next day. [IR008022-52.] 
Upon evaluation of all permitting materials, public comments, and additional 
information submitted by Holly, UDAQ determined that Holly's NOi satisfied all 
emissions (GHG). Exceedance of the threshold for any of these pollutants triggers 
the more rigorous Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-
attainment New Source Review (NNSR) programs under the CAA. 
9 
applicable federal and state requirements. [IR00917 4-222.] On November 18, 2013, 
the Director issued approval order DAQE-AN101230041-13. [IR009223-54.] 
B. Adjudicative Record 
On December 18, 2013, Petitioners filed their RF AA, initiating a permit 
review adjudicative proceeding. [ADJ009257-373.] On January 16, 2014, the ALJ 
issued pre-hearing orders, including a requirement for Petitioners to marshal all 
record evidence. [ADJ009612-15.]6 On January 22, 2014, Petitioners requested a 
stay of the approval order. [ADJ009577-96.] The ALJ recommended that the 
(i; Executive Director deny this request, [ ADJ0 10798-820], and on May 8, 2014, the 
Executive Director adopted the ALJ' s proposed order and denied the request for 
stay. [ADJ0l 1035-39.] 
The parties briefed the merits of the case; and on February 26, 2014, the ALJ 
heard oral argument. [ADJ0l 1655.] As required by Section 19-1-301.5(12)(c), the 
ALJ issued a proposed dispositive action on March 11, 2015, finding that on each 
issue, Petitioners had failed to meet their burden on multiple grounds, including 
lack of preservation, lack of marshaling, and lack of meritorious arguments. 
[ADJ0l 1536-648.] The proposed action recommended that the Executive Director 
6 In a subsequent order, the ALJ waived the page limitation requirements for the 
parties' briefing. [ADJ009664-5.] 
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dismiss Petitioners' RFAA in its entirety. [ADJ0l 1642.] On March 31, 2015,7 the 
Executive Director 1ssued the Final Order adopting the ALJ' s recommended order, 
dismissing Petitioners' RFAA in its entirety. [ADJ0l 1651-53.] On April 27, 2015, 
Petitioners filed a petition for review in this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioners cannot meet their burden on appeal because they fail to challenge 
the Final Order, which by statute is the only dispositive action subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, their appeal must be dismissed. 
Moreover, even if the Court were to look beyond this substantive failure and 
address Petitioners' claims on the merits, the Court must still dismiss those claims 
because the Executive Director rationally determined that certain issues were not 
preserved, that UDAQ properly justified its decisions regarding the Modernization 
Project's PM2.5 increases, and that the Executive Director properly determined that 
both UDAQ's determinations relating to PM2.5 emissions and its compliance with 
the permitting requirements of the Utah Admin. Coder. 307-401-8 were reasonable 
and supported by the ~ecord as a whole. 
7 Petitioners incorrectly state the date of the Final Order as November 17, 2014. See 
Opening Br. 4. 
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I. 
ARGUMENT 
BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE FINAL ORDER, PETITIONERS 
CANNOT MEET THEIR BURDEN ON APPEAL 
Under Section 19-1-301.5(12)(c), the ALJ prepared a 113-page proposed 
~ order for the Executive Director's consideration. [ ADJ0 11536-648.] The Executive 
Director adopted the ALJ's recommended order in full. [ADJ0I 1651-53.] No party 
to this case disputes that the resulting Final Order is a "dispositive action." Utah 
Code Ann. § 19-1-301.5(1 )(a). Likewise, no party disputes that the only order 
subject to judicial review in this case is the Final Order. See Pet. for Review 2 
("Petitioners hereby appeal the March 31, 2015 Order Adopting Finding of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits in its entirety."8 
Consequently, because Section 19-1-301.5(14)(a) limits this Court's jurisdiction to 
a review of dispositive actions, and because the only dispositive action at issue in 
8 The Petition for Review also seeks review of "any final order on Petitioners' 
December 20, 2013 Motion and Memorandum Requesting a Stay of Approval 
Order and/or their January 22, 2013 Amended Motion and Memorandum 
Requesting a Stay of Approval Order." Pet. for Review 2. However, Petitioners 
never appealed the denial of the Motion for Stay within 30 days. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 19-1-301.5(15)( e ). In addition, despite claiming to challenge the denial of 
the stay, Opening Br. 12, at no point in their briefing do Petitioners actually 
challenge that decision. 
12 
this case is the Final Order, Petitioners must limit their arguments to showing that 
the Final Order is deficient. 
In addition, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) (Rule 24(a)(9)), 
requires Petitioners to marshal all record evidence in support of the findings they 
challenge in the Final Order, with analysis showing how the Executive Director 
abused her discretion. Despite acknowledging that the permit review adjudication 
proceeded as required by statute, with one minor exception, Petitioners fail to 
address the Final Order.9 Instead, they make superficial references to the Final 
Order in footnotes without any context or analysis. Opening Br. 31 n.17; 34 n.19; 
40 n.23; 45 n.28. 
This Court has held that "[ a ]n inadequately briefed claim is by definition 
insufficient to discharge an appellant's burden to demonstrate trial court error." 
Simmons, 2014 UT App 145, ,r 37. The Utah Supreme Court also recently ruled that 
"appellants who fail to follow rule 24's substantive requirements will likely fail to 
persuade the court of the validity of their position." State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ,r 
9 There is one instance in the entire Opening Brief where Petitioners attempt to 
address the Final Order. See Opening Br. 46-48 (addressing the Final Order's 
conclusions on the modeling issue). The Executive Director addresses that point in 
Section III.A, infra, pp. 50-52. 
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18, 345 P.3d 1226. If an appellant that fails to comply with Rule 24 will be unlikely 
~ to meet its burden of persuasion, surely an appellant who refuses to address the 
most pertinent aspect of the record on appeal cannot meet its burden of persuasion. 
In contrast to Roberts and consistent with Simmons, Petitioners' refusal to address 
the Final Order represents a substantive failure to meet their burden, and not a 
procedural misstep that this Court, in its Rule 24 discretion, may choose to ignore 
or tolerate. See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r,r 40-41, 326 P.3d 645 (noting Rule 
24(a)(9) is essential to a party's ability to meet its burden of persuasion on appeal, 
"as a party who fails to identify and deal with supportive evidence will never 
persuade an appellate court to reverse under the deferential standard that applies to 
Vi} such issues[]"). 
Seeking to justify its failure to undertake any meaningful analysis, Petitioners 
attempt to dismiss the relevance of the Final Order by claiming that the order is due 
no deference from this Court. Opening Br. 4. Petitioners wrongly claim that such 
deference is unnecessary because the Court can undertake its own review based on 
UDAQ's administrative record and the same standard of review applied by the ALJ. 
See id. Petitioners fail to acknowledge that by statute the record on appeal also 
contains the Adjudicative Record, which is "the record made by the administrative 
law judge and the executive director during the permit review adjudicative 
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proceeding." Utah Code Ann.§ 19-l-301.5(14)(b)(ii). By failing to address the 
complete record on review, Petitioners cannot meet their burden of persuasion. See 
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r,r 41, 45. 
By claiming that the Final Order is due no deference, Petitioners ask this 
Court to duplicate the review already undertaken by the Executive Director. 
However, such an approach would in effect be a direct appeal to this Court from 
UDAQ and would render Section 19-1-301.5's permit review adjudicative process 
meaningless. 10 Nothing in Sections 19-1-301.5 or 63G-4-403 permits the Court to 
evaluate. de novo the exact claims that Petitioners raised during the permit review 
adjudicative proceeding without regard to the lengthy and thorough review 
undertaken by the Executive Director. 
For these reasons, the Court should reject Petitioners' claims for their failure 
to address the Final Order. 
10 Utah courts interpret statutory provisions in harmony with other related statutes. 
See e.g., Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Robot Aided Mfg. Ctr., 2005 UT App 199, ,r 
13, 113 P .3d 1014 ("We also follow the rule that a statute should not be construed 
in a piecemeal fashion but as a comprehensive whole ... Thus, we ... interpret its 
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related 
chapters.") ( citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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II. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR REASONABLY EXERCISED HER 
DISCRETION IN EVALUATING PETITIONERS' CLAIMS 
RELATING TO PM2.5 EMISSIONS FOR THE MODERNIZATION 
PROJECT 
Should the Court decide to reach the merits of Petitioners' claims, those 
~ claims also fail on the merits. In Section I, Petitioners argue whether UDAQ 
adequately supported its determination that the Modernization Project did not 
constitute a major modification for PM2.5• Opening Br. 23-42. Specifically, 
Petitioners attack UDAQ's approval ofNEI emissions factors, its allowance of a 
2.19 tpy credit for the decommissioning of the propane pit flare, and its estimation 
of the FCCU25's 11 PM2.5 emissions. Id. The Executive Director addresses each in 
: .. :, 
'o.J!JI 
tum. 
A. The Executive Director Properly Upheld UDAQ's Approval of the 
NEI Emissions Factors as Adequately Justified and Supported by 
Substantial Evidence 
Petitioners first contend that UDAQ "improperly adopted a National 
Emissions Inventory (NEI) constant ... to estimate PM2.5 [potential to emit] for an 
arbitrary subset of Holly's heaters and boilers." Id. 24. Petitioners allege that the 
UDAQ Director did so by "deviat[ing] from his prior practice and arriv[ing] at an 
11 A Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU) is a piece of equipment used to break 
down crude molecules into different components. 
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emissions rate out-of-sync with sources he deemed reliable." Id. 25. Petitioners also 
claim that UDAQ "did not provide a fair or reasonable basis" for the use of the NEI 
factor. Id. 31. 
These arguments fail because the record on appeal shows that UDAQ did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing use of the NEI emission factors in the first instance, 
nor did the Executive Director abuse her discretion in affirming UDAQ's reliance 
on the NEI emission factors. Further, the record as a whole contains substantial, 
technical evidence that Petitioners failed to marshal before the Executive Director 
and likewise fail to marshal and address before this Court. 
1. Understanding Potential to Emit, AP-42, and NEI Emission 
Factors 
As a preliminary matter, UDAQ's approval of the NEI emission factor is a 
highly technical issue, requiring a brief foundational discussion of emission factors 
and their role in the air permitting process. 
"An emission factor attempts to estimate the quantity of a pollutant released 
into the atmosphere with an activity associated with the release of that pollutant." 
[ADJOl 1631 (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 52723-01, 52724 (Oct. 14, 2009)).] When 
reviewing a permit application, UDAQ employs an emission factor to verify the 
"maximum capacity," or potential of a source to emit a pollutant consistent with the 
source's "physical and operational design," and impose a corresponding emission 
17 r-:·, 
"1/)f 
limit. [ADJ0l 1637-38]; see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4) (2015); see also Utah 
Admin. Code r. 307-403-2( 1 )( d) (2015) (incorporating the same definition of PTE 
from 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(a)(l)(iii)); Utah Admin. Coder. 307-101-2 (same 
definition). 
This case addresses the differences between the EPA-published AP-42 12 
emission factors and the NEI-derived factors. The AP-42 factor was developed 
"using a 'stack test· impinger method,' which draws a gas sample through a heated 
filter and then a series of iced 'impingers."' [ADJ0l 1631; IR007240.] By contrast, 
viJ the NEI factors were developed using a newer dilution method "derived by EPA 
staff from data contained in GE EER's 13 comprehensive test reports published from 
~ 2002-2004," together with "detailed supporting test data." [ADJ0l 1635 (quoting 
IR008032).] 
2. The Executive Director's Review of UDAQ's Approval of the 
NEI Factor 
The Executive Director determined that Petitioners' claim that UDAQ 
mistakenly relied on the NEI emission factors instead of AP-42 to calculate PTE for 
12 
"AP-42" is an EPA report number and common shorthand for EPA's Compilation 
of Emission Factors. [IR007239.] 
13 GE EER stands for the Energy and Environmental Research Corporation (EER) 
that was later acquired by General Electric Company (GE). 
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Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers presented a mixed question of law and fact, 
[ADJ0l 1625], and determined that UDAQ's decision was supported by substantial 
evidence. [ADJ0I 1636-37.] Because whether UDAQ is authorized to use an 
emission factor other than AP-42 is a question of law and because UDAQ has 
statutory discretion to make such an interpretation, Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-
30 l.5(14 )( c )( i), the Executive Director determined that the clearly erroneous 
standard of review applied. [ADJ0l 1625-26.] 
Just as the question ofUDAQ's use of the NEI factor presents a mixed 
question of law and fact, so too does Petitioners' claim on appeal, Opening Br. 24, 
that UDAQ deviated from prior practice without an adequate justification when it 
approved use of the NEI factor. However, the questions of whether UDAQ deviated @ 
from prior practice and whether it was justified are subsumed in the question of 
whether UDAQ (and ultimately the Executive Director) reasonably approved the 
NEI factor in the first place. This is so because if the record as a whole supports 
UDAQ's technical determination~ Petitioners cannot show that they were 
substantially prejudiced as a factual matter. Additionally, because UDAQ has 
substantial discretion to interpret the requirements of the program it administers, 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-301.5(14)( c )(i), Petitioners cannot show substantial 
prejudice unless UDAQ's determination was unreasonable, regardless of any 
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previous agency practice. In both cases, Petitioners fail to show substantial 
prejudice. 
3. The Executive Director Properly Found That UDAQ's Approval 
of the NEI Emission Factor Was Reasonable 
In Subsection I.A.2. of their brief, Petitioners argue that UDAQ has not 
justified an alleged deviation from prior practice. Opening Br. 31. However, 
Petitioners can only show that they have been substantially prejudiced by a 
deviation from prior practice if they demonstrate that UDAQ did not provide "facts 
and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis" for its decision. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii). UDAQ's explanation for its reliance on the NEI 
factors must be considered in conjunction with the agency's substantial discretion to 
interpret the statues and rules governing the air permitting process. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 19-1-301.5(15)(c)(i). The Executive Director determined that regardless of any 
~ previous or concurrent use of AP-42, UDAQ had given a thorough explanation for 
the exercise of its statutory discretion to rely on the NEI emission factor. 
[ADJ0I 1627-38.] Consequently, Petitioners have not been substantially prejudiced 
by UDAQ's reliance on the NEI factor. 
For the newer heaters and boilers at issue in this case, Holly proposed and 
UDAQ ultimately approved the use of a PM2.5 emission factor derived from more 
accurate testing methodology, and imposed a PM2_5 emission limit based on the use 
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of that emission factor. [IR008558 ("Holly Refinery is proposing to utilize PMIO 
and PM25 emission factors for new (NSPS) combustion sources based on the 2006 
EPA published National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Information"); ADJ0 11622-
38.] The Executive Director determined that the data used to derive the NEI 
emission factor was more accurate than the AP-42 emission factor. [ADJ0l 1630-
38; see also ADJ008558, DAQ Source Plan Review ("the NEI documents state that 
EPA believes that the current AP-42 factors for condensable emissions are too high 
based on some limited data from a pilot-scale dilution sampling method that is 
similar to EPA's CTM 39").] 
Notwithstanding these findings in the Final Order, Petitioners argue that at 
the initial stage of the review process, UDAQ and Holly had fixed upon using the 
AP-42 emission factors for the Modernization Project. Opening Br. 27-28 ("Holly 
and the Director also decide[d] that EPA's AP-42 emission factor for natural gas 
boilers ... is the most appropriate emission rate for all the other Refinery boilers." 
Petitioners also point to UDAQ forms and guidance as evidence of what UDAQ 
"has long considered appropriate methods for calculating emissions," Opening Br. 
25, allegedly "directing" permit applicants to use either manufacturer's 
specifications or AP-42 factors. Id. 
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These broad assertions fail to answer the only pertinent question on appeal-
whether the Executive Director was reasonable in affirming UDAQ's reliance on 
the NEI factor. If that determination was reasonable and adequately explained in the 
record, then it constitutes a "fair and rational basis" for the agency's decision, Utah 
Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii), regardless of any prior or concurrent agency 
practice. Although Holly initially proposed use of the AP-42 emission factor, 
[IR008558], nothing in the record shows that UDAQ ever finally committed to the 
use of AP-42 for the newer NSPS heaters and boilers in this case by issuing the 
~ Holly approval order, which is the only evidence of final action by the agency. 
Instead, these revisions of the proposed project were part of the normal, evolving 
evaluation inherent in the administrative process. [ADJOl 1567-68 (ALJ discussing 
generally the dynamic nature of the administrative review process).] 
In any event, the choice of emission factors lies solely within the discretion 
ofUDAQ. See Utah Code Ann.§ 19-1-301.5(14)(c)(i); Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah 
Dep 't o/Transp., 2013 UT 39, ~ 16,310 P.3d 1204 (quoting Murray v. Utah Labor 
Comm 'n, 2013 UT 38, ~ 30,308 P.3d 461) (''the agency ... is free to choose from 
among [the] range [ of acceptable answers] without regard to what an appellate court 
thinks is the 'best' answer"); [ADJOl 1625-26; ADJOl 1629-30.] The Executive 
Director found that "nothing in Utah's minor source permitting regulations and 
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nothing in the federal PSD/NSR regulations requires the use of AP-42 emission 
factors. In fact, those regulations do not mention the AP-42 factors at all." 
[ADJ0I 1627.] Instead, EPA has merely recognized that AP-42 is one of potentially 
many other authorized methods that UDAQ, as a state agency, has discretion to 
employ, including emission factors from technical literature. [Id. (quoting EPA's 
New Source Review Workshop Manual at c.2).] 
Holly submitted two expert reports ( collectively England Reports, or England 
I and England II) that explain the technical basis for using the NEI emission factors. 
[ADJ0I 1622-23; IR007238-58 (England I); IR008024-44 (England II).] UDAQ 
reviewed the reports and determined that the NEI emission factors would result in 
more accurate estimation of PTE for PM25• [IR008558; IR009216-18.] On 
administrative review, the Executive Director stated that "the NEI emission factors 
are 'emissions from technical literature' that Holly used to calculate potential PM25 
emissions from its gas fired heaters and boilers." [ADJ0I 1627.] EPA has also 
acknowledged this state agency discretion because of the variability inherent in 
different facilities, "such as the raw materials used, temperature of combustion, and 
emission controls." 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/aqmportal/management/emissions_inventory/emissio 
n _ factor.htm (last visited October 28, 2015) ( emphasis added). These variations 
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"can significantly effect [sic] the emissions at an individual location." Id. 
Accordingly, EPA concluded that "[w]henever possible, the development of local 
emission factors is highly desirable." Id. Therefore, when appropriate, UDAQ has 
discretion to develop emission factors to suit the type of project proposed. 
Moreover, despite Petitioners' claim that UDAQ did not provide an adequate 
justification for its decision to rely on the NEI factor rather than AP-42, Opening 
Br. 31-34, UDAQ explained the basis for using the NEI factors in the Source Plan 
Review, [IR008558], and responded to each of the comments Petitioners submitted 
~ regarding the proposed use of the NEI factor. [IR009216-18.] Because UDAQ 
explained its reasoning both prior to and in response to public comments and 
~ because Section 19-1-301.5( 14 )( c )(i) grants UbAQ discretion to interpret the 
requirements of its own statutes and rules, UDAQ's determination was reasonable 
and not arbitrary. 14 The Executive Director further determined that regardless of any 
previous or concurrent use of AP-42, both the record evidence and UDAQ's 
explanation justified the use of the NEI Factor. [ADJOI 1634-35.] Petitioners do not 
rebut this determination in the Final Order. 
14 Petitioners' Opening Brief also does not claim that UDAQ did not respond 
adequately ( or at all) to the comments Petitioners made during the comment period. 
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In addition, Petitioners never address the significant analysis conducted by 
the Executive Director. In the Final Order, the Executive Director reviewed the 
England Reports and found that the NEI data had been subjected to a rigorous 
testing program including "extensive quality assurance measures," whose "results 
have been subject to peer review and have been corroborated by other independent 
scientific studies." [ADJ0I 1635-369; IR008032 (England II).] 
The Executive Director also found that EPA itself had recognized the 
problem with the stack test impinger method, which is that once a gas sample is 
drawn first through a heated filter and then through a series of iced impingers, the 
emissions condense and "particulate out as "pseudo-particulate' matter." 
[ADJ0l 1631-32 (quoting England II a{IR008027 and England I at IR007240, 
IR007242).] Even though "the gas emissions would not condense to form 
partic~late matter under normal operating conditions, the AP-42 factors 
nevertheless measure this pseudo-particulate matter as primary PM2.5." 
[ ADJ 0 1163 1-3 2.] The Final Order states that "the NEI factors, by contrast, were 
developed using a newer dilution method, which "does not create artificial pseudo-
particulate matter" and ''results in much more representative and accurate PM25 
measurements." [ ADJ0 11633 ( citing IR008027 (England II), IR008030-8032; 
IR007241 (England I)).] EPA itself has recognized the dilution-based sampling 
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method "for measuring direct PM2.5 eliminates essentially all artifact formation 
and provides the most accurate emissions quantification." [ADJ0I 1633 (quoting 72 
Fed. Reg. 20,586, 20,653 (Apr. 25, 2007) (emphasis added in original)).] 
.Petitioners also attack the NEI factor by contrasting it with 
manufacturer data and Holly's earlier proposals. Opening Br. 26-33. 
However, contrasting the forecasted results under AP-42 against the results 
obtained by employing the NEI emissions factor does not explain how the 
AP-42's stack test impinger method is technically preferable15 to the dilution-
(.&) based NEI emissions factor, and fails to overcome the discretion afforded 
UDAQ in the first instance and the Executive Director on review. 
4. The Record Contains Substantial Evidence to Support the 
Executive Director's Decision to Uphold UDAQ's Reliance on 
the NEI Emissions Factor 
Although the record on appeal in this case includes both the Permitting and 
Adjudicative Records, Petitioners ignore the Final Order on this issue. 
[ADJ0I 1622-38.] This omission is fatal to Petitioners' claim, because the only 
15 [ADJ0I 1634 ("In arguing that UDAQ must use the AP-42 emission factors, 
Petitioners do not defend the accuracy of the AP-42 factors on a technical basis. 
Nor do they address any of the criticisms, expressed by both EPA and the England 
Reports, about the inaccuracies of the stack test impinger methods on which the 
AP-42 factors are based").] 
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question for this Court is whether the Executive Director unreasonably approved 
UDAQ's reliance on the NEI emission factor. With no analysis of the Final Order, 
Petitioners cannot possibly show that the record does not support UDAQ's use of 
the NEI factor. 
Moreover, on appeal, Rule 24(a)(9) requires Petitioners to marshal the 
evidence supporting the Final Order on this issue. Petitioners omit much of 
UDAQ's analysis from the Permitting Record and omit the entire Adjudicative 
Record, other than a footnoted list of citations that purports to identify "Pertinent 
Record evidence" but is unaccompanied by any analysis. Opening Br. 31 n.17. This 
half-measure approach to marshaling violates Section 19-1-301.5(14)(b) and Rule 
24(a)(9), and therefore fails to meet Petitioners' burden of persuasion. See Nielsen, 
2014 UT 10, ~140-41. 
The evidence that Petitioners identify is merely a selective collection of 
references to the record that attempts to undermine UDAQ' s decision by pointing 
out the different results between the use of AP-42 and the NEI factor. Opening Br. 
29-33. In particular, Petitioners point to UDAQ's permitting forms 16 and guidance, 
16 Petitioners attach UDAQ NSR Form 19 to their brief as an example of the 
agency's alleged "command," Opening Br. 25, that permit applicants use AP-42 or 
manufacturer's data. Id. Ex. H, at p. 3. This document is not in the record and 
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manufacturer data, and possible AP-42 emissions scenarios in Holly's NOI and 
reviewed by UDAQ early in the permitting process. Id. 25-28. Finally, Petitioners 
point to an approval order that UDAQ previously issued to Holly. Id. 27, 29. 
However, these examples paint an incomplete picture of the record. The 
record contains the England Reports, which provide the technical basis for the NEI 
factor. Petitioners fail to address meaningfully the England Reports as a whole, and 
deliberately avoid any discussion of England II. Opening Br. 33 n.18. 
Not only do Petitioners fail to address the supporting information for the NEI 
~ factor, they also fail to acknowledge the record evidence explaining the 
considerable vulnerabilities of the AP-42 factors and the manufacturer data on 
,'~.\ 
VB/ 
which Petitioners rely, some of which is irrelevant because it does not apply to the 
type of heaters and boilers for which Holly used the NEI factor. [ ADJ0 11636 (ALJ 
discussing the incomplete and unexplained nature of the boiler sampling and 
manufacturer data Petitioners submitted and the dissimilarity of some of the heaters 
Petitioners' use of it is improper for two reasons. First, Petitioners never raised this 
argument below, even though the document was reasonably ascertainable during the 
time of the public comment period. Second, Form 19 is one guidance document 
among others that permit applicants may consult, but is not a permitting 
requirement. For example, UDAQ's NOI Guide states that AP-42 "may be used as a 
reference when applicable." [ADJ010221.] 
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and boilers).] The Executive Director concluded that "this data does not undermine 
use of the NEI emission factors." [Id.] 
Finally, the record contains UDAQ's Source Plan Review, [IR008558], and 
response to public comments on this issue, [IR0092 l 6-l 8 (responses 89-93)], which 
address Petitioners' comments regarding the NEI emission factors. Petitioners 
failed to confront thoroughly this evidence in the Permitting Record where the 
agency explains the use of NEI factors instead of AP-42 prior to issuing the permit. 
See Sierra Club, 2012 UT 73, ~12 (petitioner bears the burden of marshaling all of 
the evidence and "demonstrating that the agency's factual determinations are not 
supported by substantial evidence."). Therefore, Petitioners cannot show that the 
Executive Director's determination regarding the use of the NEI factors is not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
To conclude, the Executive Director provided a thorough review of the 
evidence in the case ( which Petitioners fail to challenge), and determined that the 
use ofNEI emission factor was supported by substantial evidence. [ADJOI 1635.] 
On the merits, the record in this case supports and adequately explains UDAQ's 
decision. Thus, regardless of any previous or concurrent agency use of AP-42, 
Petitioners have not been substantially prejudiced by UDAQ's reliance on the NEI 
factors. 
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5. Petitioners' Other Challenges to the NEI Factors Are 
Unavailing 
Having failed to meet their burden on their earlier arguments, 
Petitioners seek to discredit UDAQ's approval of the NEI factors by 
~ advancing three final arguments, 17 claiming that I) the stack testing 
requirements in the approval order are not enforceable; 2) EPA lacks 
confidence in the NEI factors, and 3) UDAQ's reliance on the NEI factor 
violates 42 U.S.C. § 7430. See Opening Br. 31-34. All three arguments are 
wrong and do not show that the Executive Director erred. 
17 In just three sentences of argument, Petitioners also claim that the record does not 
support a claim that the "heaters and boilers" subject to the NEI factor are newer, 
apparently because FCCU25 had already been used at a refinery in New Mexico. 
Opening Br. 33. Petitioners fail to acknowledge that although NEI emission factors 
were used for heaters and boilers, the only example they offer is the alleged 
previous use of the FCCU25, which is neither a heater nor a boiler. In any event, as 
UDAQ explained, whether the heaters and boilers are "new" for purposes of 
applying the NEI emission factor is driven by whether the equipment is subject to 
the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), not whether the equipment has 
previously been in service elsewhere. [IR008558 ("Holly Refinery is proposing to 
utilize PM IO and PM2.5 emission factors for new (NSPS) combustion sources 
based on the 2006 EPA published National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Information. 
Older equipment (non NSPS) emissions will still rely on AP-42 emission 
factors.").] Petitioners fail to acknowledge this critical distinction. 
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a. Stack Testing is an Enforcement Tool 
Petitioners contend that UDAQ's reliance on stack testing to demonstrate 
compliance with the emission limits calculated using the NEI emission factors is 
inappropriate because the stack testing will occur after the Modernization Project is 
complete. Opening Br. 31-32. However, Petitioners advance an enforcement 
argument that is not properly before this Court. 
Petitioners' argument is premised on the consequences of Holly's 
possible future failure to comply with its approval order, Opening Br. 32, yet 
Petitioners also acknowledge that Holly will be held to all limits in its 
approval order. [ADJOI 1637 ("[t]he AO imposes an enforceable limit on 
PM2.5 emissions from each of the emissions units for which the NEI 
emission factors were used in an amount equal to the NEI emission factors"; 
IR009218 (UDAQ response to comments) ("If the stack testing indicates that 
Holly Refinery cannot comply with these emission factors, it would be out of 
compliance with its AO .... ").] Petitioners fail to explain how the limits 
derived using the NEI factor will not be enforceable when the purpose of 
those stack test requirements is to provide an additional tool for UDAQ to 
verify compliance. [IR009218 (UDAQ response to comments) ("UDAQ is 
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requiring stack testing to verify these emission factors as any regulatory 
agency would to verify a BACT level that a source is proposing to meet").] 
If Holly fails to meet those limits, it will have to reevaluate its project 
for Major NSR applicability. [IR009218 (UDAQ response to comments) 
("UDAQ acknowledges emission factors have an effect on PSD/Major NSR 
applicability, and imposes stack testing as a way to ensure the source 
complies with the terms of the permit").] As the Executive Director 
concluded, "UDAQ was reasonable in relying on this limiting factor in its 
vi> determination that Holly's project would only be a minor modification for 
PM." [ADJ0I 1638.] Petitioners fail to show that these explanations in the 
record are unreasonable, or that they constitute anything other than a 
potential enforcement matter between UDAQ and Holly. 
b. Petitioners Erroneously Rely on Statements of EPA Staff 
Petitioners argue that the record "explains why EPA lacks faith in the NEI 
constants," offering as support two emails from "EPA experts" whose positions 
with and authority to speak for EPA are unidentified. 18 Opening Br. 32-33. 
18 The Executive Director made the following observation about the two EPA 
emails: "EPA staff members sent emails to an undisclosed Gmail account 
discussing the accuracy of the NEI emission factors and the ability of EPA to 
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Notwithstanding the dubious reliability of this evidence, Petitioners misconstrue its 
contents. The email from EPA staff member Ron Meyers does not state that the NEI 
factors were unreliable, but rather that if that data were to be used to generate an 
updated emission factor, EPA would like to have additional supporting information. 
[IR00891 l.] The other email that Petitioners cite, Opening Br. 32-33, does not 
discuss the NEI factors, but instead states generally that EPA would not develop an 
emission factor without being provided a test report for the underlying data. 
[IR009043.] The data underlying the NEI factors was accompanied by test reports. 
[IR008032.] Consequently, the emails from EPA do not undermine the quality of 
the NEI factors. 
In any event, the Executive Director found that "[t]he cautionary statements 
regarding the NEI emission factors upon which Petitioners rely, Opening Br. 33 
( quoting England Reports), 'do not suggest in any way that those factors are 
insufficiently supported by data or should not be used," [ADJ0I 1635-36; quoting 
England II at IR008033], and that "[s]uch cautionary language is generally found in 
all instances where emission factors are used. [Id.] Such statements therefore do not 
approve new emission factors generally. [IR008911-8922; IR009043.] Neither the 
attachments to these emails nor the complete emails were included with the 
comments. [Id.]" 
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undermine the substantial scientific evidence in the record supporting the accuracy 
~ of the factors that relied upon by UDAQ. Moreover, UDAQ provided a reasonable 
basis and explanation for its reliance on the NET factors, and this Court should defer 
to the agency's expert judgment pursuant to Section 19-1-301.5(14)(c). 
c. 42 U.S.C. § 7430 Does Not Apply to This Case 
Finally, Petitioners claim, without analysis, that UDAQ's reliance on the NEI 
factors violates 42 U.S.C. § 7430. Opening Br. 34. Specifically, in this unpreserved 
argument19 Petitioners insist that Section 7430 requires that EPA approve any 
@ emissions factor that EPA itself did not establish, and that because EPA did not 
approve the NEI factor used in this case, Petitioners have been denied the notice-
and-comment protections required for rulemaking. Id. 
The Executive Director rejected this argument because Section 7430 only 
applies to emission factors used "to estimate the quantity of emissions of carbon 
monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and oxides of nitrogen from sources of such 
19 Petitioners fail to acknowledge ( or rebut) that the Executive Director found that 
this legal argument was reasonably ascertainable during the comment period, but 
not preserved because it was raised for the first time in their briefing on a motion to 
stay the administrative proceedings. The Executive Director dismissed the claim not 
only because it was untimely raised, but also because Petitioners did not brief the 
issue until they filed their Reply before the ALJ. [ADJ0l 1624.] 
34 
air pollutants ... " 42 U.S.C. § 7430; see also [ADJOl 1628.] The statute says 
nothing about the use of emission factors to estimate the quantity of PM2_5 and 
PMrn-the only emissions for which Holly used NEI factors to estimate emissions 
from its heaters and boilers. [ ADJO 11628.] Petitioners did not then and do not now 
show that the Executive Director's legal interpretation of this federal statute is 
incorrect. 
Moreover, EPA has recognized that a state agency may use other 
methods without obtaining approval under Section 7430, provided the agency 
supports the method it chooses. [ ADJO 11629 ( citing Public Participation 
Procedures for EPA Emission Estimation Guidance Materials at-2 (May 
1997)).] The complete record contains substantial evidence in support of the 
NEI factors, and UDAQ reasonably determined that the use of such factors 
was justified. Petitioners offer no persuasive argument to the contrary. 
To conclude, UDAQ's decision to rely on the NEI factors to estimate 
PM2_5 emissions for Holly's new gas-fired heaters and boilers is reasonable 
and supported by substantial evidence. 
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B. The Executive Director Reasonably Determined That UDAQ 
Properly Calculated the Emission Decreases From the Closure of the 
Propane Pit Flare 
Petitioners make a number of arguments that the 2.19 tons per year (tpy) 
PM2.s credit UDAQ allowed Holly for the decommissioning of the propane pit flare 
(PPF) is unsupported. Opening Br. 34. The Executive Director addressed these 
arguments and found them unavailing because the emissions credit was based on 
actual historical inventory data from the flare, as required by applicable law. 
[ADJ0I 1638-42.] On appeal, Petitioners fail to show that the Executive Director's 
~ decision is unreasonable. 
As part of its claim, Petitioners allege that "the Record is devoid of any 
specific emission factors, conversions, equations, calculations, assumptions or 
monitoring data to substantiate Holly's claimed PPF emissions, id., and that 
"[a]lthough the Director insists that the PPF PM2.5 emissions were based on 'actual 
throughput data,' IR009128, neither he nor Holly provides those data." Opening Br. 
36. Petitioners fail to mention that they stipulated to the exclusion of the very 
calculations and data at issue. [ADJ0I 1642 (citing ADJ0I 1379 (Holly's Surreply); 
ADJ0I 1331 (Director's Surreply); ADJ0I 1411-412.] 
Petitioners raised this same issue during the adjudication, and the Executive 
Director found that "Petitioners may not now argue, without having asked to review 
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the calculations, that the lack of such evidence supports their claim." [ ADJ0 11642; 
see also ADJ0 113 7 4.] This same logic applies on appeal. Petitioners do not explain 
why they should be shielded from the consequence of a stipulation to which they 
were a party, and therefore contributed to the alleged lack of evidence of which they 
complain. 
In any event, the Executive Director determined that "for purposes of netting 
emissions in permit applications, the regulations expressly provide that historical 
inventory information may be used as a baseline for calculating emissions increases 
and decreases." [ADJ0I 1641 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(48)(ii)).] Utah Admin. 
Coder. 307-150 requires Holly to submit annually to UDAQ an emission inventory 
that reports actual emissions from its flares and other emission sources. As 
permitted by the applicable regulations, Holly used the 2008-09 emission inventory 
reports for the PM2.5 emissions from the propane pit flare when it netted its overall 
emissions from the Modernization Project, rather than re-calculating emissions 
using AP-42 or any other method, as Petitioners claim. [ADJ0l 1639.] 
Petitioners have presented nothing to the agency or on appeal that would 
undermine the deference owed to both UDAQ and the Executive Director on such a 
highly technical emission calculation, nor have they presented any technical 
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evidence to undermine the accuracy of the historical inventory information. 
vJ Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Final Order on this issue. 
C. The Executive Director Reasonably Upheld UDAQ's FCCU25 PM2.5 
Emissions Estimate 
@ Though partially unpreserved at the agency level, [ ADJ0 11612-13 ], 
Petitioners continue to assert that Holly's and UDAQ's calculation of a maximum 
coke burn rate of 6200 lbs/hr. resulted in a PTE of 8.15 tpy of PM2.s, Opening Br. 
39, but that the 8.15 tpy does not reflect the maximum capacity ofFCCU25 to emit 
PM2_5 because the approval order does not contain a limit on the amount of coke 
that FCCU25 may burn. Id. 
Despite the lack of preservation, the Executive Director determined that 
Petitioners had failed to show that UDAQ's emission calculations were flawed 
because Holly based its FCCU25 emission estimate on actual test data from a 
~ similar-operating FCCU at the Holly Refinery and because the approval order 
requires Holly to comply with the estimated limit as part of the PM emission caps in 
the Holly approval order. [ADJ0l 1614-15.] 
Utah. Admin. Coder. 307-401-2 defines potential to emit or PTE as "the 
maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit an air contaminant under its 
physical and operational design." Each installation of new equipment requires an 
estimate of PTE, and in this case, the installation of FCCU25 triggered the 
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requirement to estimate that FCCU' s PTE. The Executive Director determined that 
Holly "based its conclusion that the new FCC Unit 25 would bum coke at a rate of 
6200 lb/hr on empirical data it obtained from the FCC Unit 4 that was in current 
operation at the refinery." [ADJ0l 1614; IR008052; see also NSR Manual, 
ADJ0 I 085 ("Methods of estimating potential to emit may include ... performance 
test data on similar units").] This approach resulted in a conservative coke bum 
estimate of 6200 lbs/hr for the maximum capacity of 8500 barrels per day, for a 
total PM emission level of 8.15 tons per year. [IR008052; IR0028 l l; IR009227.] 
UDAQ reviewed Holly's calculation information and found that it justified 
the coke bum rate. [R009219, Response to Comments Memo ("Based on UDAQ's 
technical expertise and experience," UDAQ determined that "the 6200 lb/hr value is 
a fair and reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke bum in FCC Unit 25. "); 
IR008052, November 7, 2013 letter (Holly's emission calculations for PTE of the 
FCC Unit 25).] 
Petitioners claim that Holly's PTE estimate is improper because the FCCU25 
will allegedly process different crude than the FCCU4, and because that crude may 
have a higher coke load, it may mean that a 6200 lbs/hour coke bum rate and 
corresponding 0.3 lb PM 10/1000 lbs coke burned estimate is too low. Opening Br. 
39-41. However, the Executive Director acknowledged that the highly technical 
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factual nature of this claim required her to give deference to UDAQ's review and 
requires Petitioners to show that the record lacks substantial evidence to support 
UDAQ's PTE calculation. [ADJ0I 1614.] UDAQ reviewed the record evidence that 
supported Holly's calculations, including the information from the test data of the 
FCCU4 [IR008052], the maximum crude throughput capacity of the FCCU25 
[IR003160], and the fact that the FCCU4 had a larger capacity and emission 
potential. [IR009227.] This evidence constitutes substantial evidence to support 
UDAQ's reliance on the calculated PTE for the new FCCU25, as well as the 
~ Executive Director's determination.20 
Petitioners next complain that "there is no federally and practically 
enforceable limitation that restricts the coke-bum rate or the amount of coke/hr that 
20 Even though Petitioners now rely on Universal Oil Products data to support their 
claim that black wax crude will generate higher coke levels and consequently create 
more PM emissions, Opening Br. 3 8, they are foreclosed from doing so on appeal. 
The Executive Director determined below that Petitioners "provide[ d] no evidence 
contradicting Holly's certification that all of the numbers contained in the NOi were 
accurate," and despite having the opportunity during the comment period to provide 
technical evidence of alternate coke burn rates that it considered more appropriate, 
Petitioners failed to do so. [ ADJ0 11613-14; IR009219 (UDAQ noting in response 
to public comments that Petitioners referred to Universal Oil Products data but did 
not provide "documents or primary data to support or detail to which estimate, if 
any, was used to derive the suggested range of coke bum estimates" and did not 
provide "any specific technical information to UDAQ that would suggest a higher 
value is more appropriate.").] 
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Holly may bum" and that ''nothing in the AO constrains Holly from exceeding the 
6200-lb/hr coke-bum rate." Opening Br. 39, 40. However, as the Executive Director @ 
determined, "[t]he FCC Unit 25 emissions will not exceed the PTE because there is 
a finite capacity limit on the FCC Unit 25 that acts as a physical limitation on the 
amount of PM that can be emitted." [ ADJ0 11615.] Petitioners offer no rebuttal to 
this practical and physical reality. 
Even if FCCU25 's physical capacity allowed greater emissions, "the refinery 
is limited to an overall PMw emission cap of 47.5 tpy and 0.13 tpd for combustion 
sources. [IR0092 l 9, Response to Comments Memo.] "If these limitations are not 
met, the refinery will be out of compliance until it remedies the problem with 
additional control equipment or redesign of the system until it meets these limits." 
[Id.] Neither before the Executive Director nor on appeal do Petitioners provide any 
evidence or argument to refute these basic points, and therefore fail to show that the 
Executive Director's final determination on this issue is unreasonable. 
III. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION 
IN FINDING THAT UDAQ COMPLIED WITH ALL THE G;;, 
APPLICABLE PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE 
NAAQS, NSPS, AND THE APPLICABILITY OF BACT 
Petitioners argue that UDAQ failed to comply with the permitting 
requirements of Rule 307-401-8 of the Utah Administrative Code when it issued an 
approval order for the Modernization Project. See Opening Br. 42-55. Utah 
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Administrative Coder. 307-401-8 requires that the Director's approval order for a 
minor modification must ensure that (I) the proposed installation will meet the 
applicable requirements of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS),21 see Utah Admin. Coder. 307-401-8(l)(b)(vii); (2) the proposed 
installation will meet the National Standards of Performance for New Stationary 
Sources (NSPS),22 see id. (l)(b)(vi); and (3) the degree of pollution control for 
emissions is "at least best available control technology" (BACT),23 see id. (l)(a). 
Petitioners claim that the Holly approval order does not comply with any of these 
requirements. Opening Br. 42-55. The Executive Director addresses each argument 
below: Section A discusses the NAAQS requirements; Section B addresses NSPS; 
I,@ and Section C covers BACT. 
21 EPA must establish NAAQS for pollutants considered harmful to public health 
and environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409. 
22 The NSPS are technology-based standards that apply regardless of the air quality 
in any particular area. EPA specifies the NSPS by regulation. See generally 40 
C.F.R. §§ 60.1- 60.5483 (July 16, 2015). Subpart Ja applies to refineries 
constructed or modified after May 14, 2007. See 40 C.F .R. § 60.1 00a(b ). 
23 Rule 307-401-2(1)(d) of the Utah Administrative Code defines BACT as "an 
· emissions limitation ... based on the maximum degree of reduction for each air 
contaminant which would be emitted from any proposed stationary source or 
modification .... " 
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A. The Executive Director did not Abuse her Discretion in Finding That 
the Modernization Project Meets all the Applicable Requirements of 
theNAAQS 
1. Holly Refinery Flare Emission Limitations Comply With 
NAAQS 
Petitioners claim that the Director's approval order does not protect the short- '2J 
term NAAQS because (1) it does not limit emissions from flares,24 (2) it does not 
impose short-term emission limits by failing to account for "unregulated" flare 
emissions during upset conditions, and (3) and it is based on faulty modeling that 
does not reflect maximum short-term emission rates. See Opening Br. 44-51. 
The approval order does impose a number of emission limits regulating the 
routine emissions from the flares. [ADJ0I 1574.] This is accomplished by imposing 
source-wide caps instead of source-specific emission caps, [ADJ0I 1574], requiring 
compliance monitoring (i.e. Continuous Emission Monitoring System for SO2 
emission sources), [IR009245; ADJ0I 1583], and mandating tabulating and record 
keeping for PMw emissions for all sources based on the amount of fuel combusted 
[ADJ0I 1583; ADJ0l 1574-75.] The approval order additionally requires Holly "to 
24 
"Flaring is a high-temperature oxidation process used to bum combustible 
components ... of waste gases from industrial operations." [IR002852.] Emissions 
from flaring include unburdened hydrocarbons, CO, NOx, sulfur-containing 
material, and SO2• [See id.] 
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install flow meters and gas combustion monitors on the South Flare gas line to 
monitor flare combustion efficiency .... " [ ADJ0 115 83 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (internal citation omitted).] Petitioners fail to rebut these findings and 
conclusions. 
Petitioners next argue that the approval order does not protect short-term 
NAAQS25 because it excludes unregulated flare emissions and does not impose 
short-term emission limitations. See Opening Br. 44-45. In making these arguments, 
Petitioners assume that UDAQ must impose short-term emission limits on Holly's 
flares and include all upset conditions in calculating potential to emit (PTE) in order 
to impose emission limitations on the facility. See id. Both assumptions are 
~ incorrect. JJDAQ's obligation to impose short-term emission limits arises only 
when the agency finds there is a risk of exceedance of the NAAQS. [ADJ011583.] 
Although not required,26 a modeling analysis prepared by Holly and approved by 
25 Petitioners similarly allege that the Director "has neglected his duty to ensure that 
the Refinery emissions do not impeded attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS" 
because he did not impose short-term source-wide emission limits on the Holly 
Refinery. See Opening Br. 51. This argument fails for the same reasons discussed in 
this Subsection as applicable to the flares. 
26 Holly Refinery performed the modeling analysis even though the governing 
regulations did not require it for a minor modification. [ADJ0l 1589; ADJ0l 1589 
n.14]; see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(ii) ("The requirements of paragraphs G) 
through (r) of this section apply to ... the major modification of any existing major 
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UDAQ shows no impact on the NAAQS for CO, PMw, NO2, and SO2. 
[ ADJ0 11584; ( quoting IR009190-91, Response to Comment Memo); see also 
ADJ0I 1588 (citing IR003017, July 2012 NOi (Table 6-15)) (demonstrating no 
exceedance ofNAAQS).] The Executive Director will address Petitioners' 
challenges to the modeling analysis and its accuracy below. See infra, pp.50-52. 
Short-term emission limits are also not required for minor modifications. 27 
[ADJ0l 1586 (holding that EPA's guidance on implementing the I-hour SO2 
NAAQS in Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permits (major modifications) 
does not apply to minor modifications).] Whether a modification is major or minor 
is determined on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis by ascertaining whether there would 
be a significant net emissions increase over a specific threshold. [ADJ0I 1587.] 
Once a regulatory agency makes this determination, the major modification 
requirements apply only to those pollutants for which there would be a significant 
net emissions increase. [See id.] The Modernization Project "fell into the 'major' 
category for CO and GHG emissions, not for NOx, SO2, or PM." [Id.] 
stationary source"); Utah Admin. Coder. 307-403-3 ("Every ... major 
modification must be reviewed by the director to determine if a source will cause or 
contribute to a violation of the NAAQS."). 
27 See supra, n.26. 
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Turning to the merits of these claims, Holly and UDAQ correctly performed 
~ the PTE calculation for the flares by excluding malfunction emissions from the 
calculation. [ADJOl 1580.] The Executive Director observed, "[T]he law does not 
require the inclusion of upset emissions in a PTE calculation for flares because such 
upset emissions are not considered part of normal operation." [ See id.] Potential to 
emit does not contemplate the "worst conceivable operation," instead, it refers to 
"the maximum emissions that can be generated while operating the source as it is 
intended to be operated and as it is normally operated." [ See id. ( quoting United 
States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1141, 1158 (D. Colo. 1988)).] The 
courts made similar holdings in Sierra Club v. Wyoming Dep 't of Envtl. Quality, 
251 P.3d 310,314 (Wyo. 2011) and Alabama Power Co. v. Castle, 636 F.2d 323 
(D.C. Cir. 1979). [ ADJO 11580.] 
Further, because Holly assumed (and UDAQ agreed with) a limit of zero tons 
per year (tpy) for malfunction emissions when calculating PTE, any exceedances of 
the emission caps due to upset or malfunction will be violations of Holly's permit, 
and subject to enforcement action by UDAQ. [ADJl 1581.] As UDAQ explained in 
its Response to Comments, "All limits of the permit apply at all times, which 
includes periods of startup, shutdown and malfunction." [ ADJO 11581 ( quoting 
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IR009196, Response to Comments Memo).] The Executive Director adopted this 
statement as part of her findings of fact on the issue. (ADJ0l 1581.] 
Petitioners also fail to marshal important findings by the Executive Director 
regarding estimated annual emissions from upset conditions at the Holly Refinery. 
For example, the 240 tpy of S02 and 8 tpy of NOx projected malfunction emissions 
were "a conservative estimate of what malfunctions could be-not what they 
actually are." [ADJ0l 1582 (citing IR003780).] "In fact, the emission calculation 
documentation in the record demonstrates that actual recorded historic malfunction 
emissions from the flare averaged only 34 tpy of S02 28 from both flares combined." 
[ADJ0l 1582 (citing IR003780).] Additionally, even ifUDAQ included 34 tpy 
malfunction emissions into its PTE calculation, such addition would not have 
changed the netting analysis or made the Modernization Project major for S02, 
because the netting analysis showed an overall emission reduction in S02 of 150.69 
tpy. [ADJ0l 1582 (citing IR007574-75).] 
28 The figure of 34 tpy is an average of historic data from the Holly Refinery over a 
five-year period from 2005 to 2009. [See ADJ0l 1582, n.12 (citing IR003780).] The 
lowest malfunction emissions from both flares were 12. 7 tpy of S02 in 2009 and the 
highest were 91.0 tpy of S02 in 2007. The prediction utilized three standard 
deviations of the average 34 tpy. [See id.] 
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Thus, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the Final Order, 
~ which affirmed UDAQ's decisions to exclude malfunction flare emissions from the 
PTE calculation and not to impose short-term emission limitations on the flares. 
This Court should affirm these conclusions. 
Petitioners next challenge the modeling analysis, claiming that ( 1) it "omitted 
the considerable upset flare emission" ( at the same time Petitioners admit that this 
may not be required by law), see Opening Br. 46, and (2) it does not reflect 
maximum short-term emissions and fails to protect short-term NAAQS, see id. 46-
48. 
As a preliminary matter, the Executive Director found that Petitioners did not 
iJ; satisfy their burden of proof on the modeling issue. [ADJ0l 1585-86.] She 
concluded that Petitioners failed to marshal a critical portion of the record-the 
actual modeling evidence-that demonstrated short-term emissions calculations and 
showed how the NAAQS were being protected, regardless of whether the approval 
order imposed short-term emission limits. [ See id.] In this appeal, Petitioners again 
unsuccessfully attempt to marshal the relevant record evidence through a single 
footnote, containing a string of citations to the Executive Director's findings and 
other evidence in the Permitting Record. See Opening Br. 45 n.28. 
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Regardless, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the Executive 
Director's decision that the "[m]alfunction emissions were not considered in the 
modeling analysis because federal and state guidance exclude malfunction 
emissions from the modeling protocols." [ADJOl 1584-85; see also 40 C.F.R. 51, 
App'x W, § II.B.7.a.l.2(a)n.a (malfunction emissions are not normally included in 
modeling).] Malfunction operations are not part of the regular operations of a 
facility; they cannot be controlled in most instances ( unless resulting from poor 
maintenance or careless operations) and cannot be accurately predicted (historical 
data is usually used to predict these emissions). [IR0092 l 4, Response to Comments; 
see also ADJOl 1591-92.] Additionally, a 2011 EPA guidance document (addressing 
modeling for compliance with the I-hour (short-term) NAAQS) supports the 
exclusion of malfunction emissions from modeling. [ ADJO 11592, referencing 
Memorandum from Tyler Fox, Leader Air Quality Modeling group to Regional Air 
Division Directors, Additional Clarification Regarding Application of Appendix W 
Modeling Guidance for the I-Hour NO2 National Ambient Air Quality Standard 
(Fox Memorandum) (March 1, 2011).] EPA explained that the modeling should 
only "address emission scenarios that can logically be assumed to be relatively 
continuous or which occur frequently enough to contribute significantly to the 
annual distribution of daily maximum I-hour concentrations based on existing 
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modeling guidelines .... " [ADJ0I 1592 (citing Fox Memorandum at 2).] EPA then 
specifically advised to exclude "intermittent emissions from ... startup/shutdown 
operations from compliance demonstrations for the I-hour NO2 standard .... " [See 
id.] The Executive Director found that similar logic applied to the I-hour SO2 
standard and the modeling performed by Holly and UDAQ. [See id., n.15.] 
Furthermore, the Final Order concluded, "In light of UDAQ's technical conclusion, 
it was well within UDAQ's discretion to determine that the malfunction emissions 
should not be included in the modeling analysis." [ADJ0I 1593.] 
Petitioners' second challenge·is to the modeling itself, claiming that it does 
not reflect maximum short-term emissions and, therefore, fails to protect short-term 
~ NAAQS. See Opening Br. 46-48. Specifically, Petitioners criticize the Executive 
Director's conclusion that because "Holly's emission modeling analysis 
contemplated the maximum emissions that Holly could generate on a lb/hr basis," 
any "short-term spikes in emissions were accounted for in the modeling and would 
not cause exceedances." See id. 46; see also ADJ0l 1584. Petitioners contend that 
"[t]he emission rates Holly modeled do not represent 'maximum emissions' or 
'short-term' spikes at all." Opening Br. 46. Petitioners base their argument on a 
comparison of two tables from the July 2012 NOI for the Modernization Project-
Table 6-3 "Modeled PTE Emission rates and Stack Parameters for Proposed Holly 
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Heavy Crude Processing Project Sources - Short Term," [IR002994], and Table 6-5 
"Modeled PTE N02 - Annual Emission Rates and Stack Parameters for Proposed 
Holly Heavy Crude Processing Project Sources," [IR002997.] Petitioners compare 
the columns from each table listing NOx (g/s) numbers for various sources of NOx 
emissions at the Holly Refinery and conclude that "there is no difference between 
the NOx values used for the short-term and annual models." Opening Br. 47. 
Petitioners claim that this is erroneous because the "short-term model merely 
reflects annual emission rates, which smooth out any variability, and not the sharp 
increases in emissions that occur on a short-term basis." Id. 
Petitioners' arg~ment ignores that both the January 2012 Dispersion 
Modeling Protocol (Protocol) and the July 2012 NOi used hourly emission rates in 
the modeling, representing the maximum potential of each unit to emit. 
[ADJ0l 1584.] The Protocol prepared by Holly and approved by UDAQ modeling 
staff [id.], states that "[m]aximum hourly potential to emit (PTE) emissions for 
existing and proposed sources will be input to the model." [IR000041.] Similarly, 
the titles of the July 2012 NOi Tables 6-3 and 6-5 indicate that Holly's modeling is 
based on PTE. [IR002994; IR002997.] The July 2012 NOi additionally explains, 
"The stack parameters and PTE emission rates were used in AERMOD 
[atmospheric dispersion modeling system] to insure that emissions from Holly'[sic] 
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proposed crude processing project and existing operations would meet all 
applicable air quality standards." [IR002993.] 
PTE is defined as "the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a 
pollutant under its physical and operational design." 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (b )( 4 ). A 
source cannot emit any more than its maximum hourly PTE. Therefore, any spikes 
in emissions are included in the hourly rate. "Using the maximum capacity of each 
unit, MSI [Holly's technical consultant that performed modeling] determined the 
total emission the refinery co_uld generate in one hour of operation measured in 
terms of lbs/hr." [ADJOI 1589.] The Court should defer to the agency on this highly 
technical determination, especially because the record contains substantial evidence 
~ demonstrating the accuracy of the modeling analysis. 
2. Holly Refinery's Flares are Subject to the Unavoidable 
Breakdown Rule 
Petitioners claim that the approval order "allows unlimited 'upset' emissions 
from flares" and, therefore, does not set an emission limit for flares. Opening Br. 
51. Petitioners then infer that because there is no emission limit for flares, any 
malfunction events would not trigger the Unavoidable Breakdown Rule (UBR),29 
29 The UBR "sets forth criteria that must be met in the event of excess malfunction 
emissions to allow UDAQ the enforcement discretion to forgo monetary penalties." 
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Utah Admin. Coder. 307-107, and, in essence, such events would be completely 
unregulated by the agency, and violate the short-term NAAQS. See Opening Br. 50- Gr) 
51. 
As a threshold matter, Petitioners did not preserve the argument on 
"misapplication or noncompliance with the UBR" in the adjudicative proceedings. 
[ADJ0l 1577 (citing IR009056-57); IR008453).] Further, Petitioners did not satisfy 
the marshaling requirement because they "ignored multiple pieces of evidence that 
explain how Holly calculated the PTE for the flares in accordance with ... the 
UBR." [ADJ0l 1578.] They do not address these findings in this appeal and, 
consequently, have not met their burden of proof. 
On the merits of this claim, contrary to Petitioners' assertion that the 
approval order contains no emission limit on the flares, "The limit in the Holly AO 
for malfunction emission from the flare is zero tpy, which is accounted for in the 
overall SO2 and PM emission caps. Any violation of those limits due to an upset 
or malfunction subjects Holly to the enforcement discretion of UDAQ under the 
[ADJ0l 1579 (citing Utah Admin. Coder. 307-107-1 to -3).] The UBR "assumes 
that malfunction emissions are violations of the applicable approval order but 
affords to UDAQ enforcement discretion ... if a source is otherwise in compliance 
with the other requirements of the rule, including monitoring and good combustion 
practice." [Id.] 
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UBR." [ADJ0l 1579 (citing IR002857, July 2012 NOi) (internal citations omitted) 
( emphasis added).] Petitioners overlook the fact that the approval order imposes 
source-wide SO2 and PM emission caps on the Holly Refinery ( and the flares are 
subject to these caps), and any exceedance of these caps triggers a violation of the 
approval order and may subject Holly to the UBR. [ADJ0l 1581 ("If Holly exceeds 
its emission caps due to an upset or malfunction, Holly will be in violation of its 
permit and subject to enforcement by UDAQ. The UBR was put in place to deal 
with these very kinds of emissions.") (internal citation omitted); see also 
ADH0l 1576 ("The Holly AO does not contain exceptions for emissions due to 
malfunctions at the refinery; such excess emissions are subject to the UBR."); 
~ IR009196, Response to Comments Memo ("All limits of the permit apply at all 
times, which include periods of startup, shutdown and malfunction. The IT A 
contains no exclusion for these events.").] For these reasons, Petitioners' argument 
on this issue must fail. 
B. The Executive Director Did Not Abuse Her Discretion in Finding 
That UDAQ Properly Applied NSPS Subpart Ja to the Modernization 
Project ' 
In Subsection 11.C., Petitioners contend that the Holly approval order should 
be invalidated because it "does not specify that Subpa~ Ja applies to the flares." 
Opening Br. 52. Subpart Ja is a federal regulation that is one of many NSPS EPA 
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has promulgated for particular types of new or modified sources. See generally 42 
U.S.C. § 7411_. Applicability ofNSPS is determined separately from other Clean 
Air Act regulations, such as the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) 
program, which is implemented through individual pre-construction permits like the 
Holly approval order. See generally id.§§ 7475, 7503 (setting forth the pre-
construction permitting requirements). 
As a threshold matter, no party in this case disputes that NSPS Subpart Ja 
applies to Holly, regardless of whether the requirements are specified in the 
approval order. [IR009252; IR002866-87; IR002962; IR009183; ADJ0l 1564.] In 
fact, Petitioners concede that "[t]here are statements in the Record suggesting the 
Subpart Ja applies Refinery emission units, including the flares." Opening Br. 52 
n.33. Despite this lack of dispute, Petitioners contend that the approval order is 
invalid because "[t]he Director ... refuses to include in the AO the particular 
Subpart Ja terms and conditions applicable to the refinery." Id. 53. However, 
Petitioners fail to identify any legal requirement that UDAQ must do so. The only 
basis offered for such inclusion is that Petitioners are incapable of understanding 
the approval order in its current form and therefore believe they can neither 
comment effectively on the approval order, nor monitor Holly's compliance for 
purposes of filing a citizen suit. See id. 53-54. 
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The Executive Director determined that "whether Utah law requires the 
~ NSPS provisions to be listed in approval orders is a question of law that the agency 
has been given discretion to interpret and so shall be reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard." [ADJ0l 1562.] She found that UDAQ's interpretation of the 
requirements of Rule 307-401-8 was not clearly erroneous. 30 On appeal, the same 
standard applies under Section 19-1-301.5( 14 )( c )(i ). Although they refer to Utah 
Admin. Coder. 307-401-8, Petitioners do not explain why UDAQ's (and the 
Executive Director's) interpretation of the approval order requirements is clearly 
erroneous. 
Because Petitioners have failed to marshal the evidence and cannot show that 
~ the Final Order is unreasonable, the Final Order should be affirmed. 
30 Petitioners never explain what level of specificity would suf4ce. Rule 307-401-8 
does not specify th~ final format of an approval order. Accordingly, the agency has 
discretion to determine the best format for including the necessary requirements. If 
Petitioners desire greater specificity in the rule, they must petition the Utah Air 
Quality Board for rulemaking. 
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C. The Executive Director Properly Determined That the North Flare 
Was Not Modified and is Subject to Subpart Ja and is Not Subject to 
BACT 
Petitioners claim that "the record does not support the Director's 
determination that the North Flare has not been modified by the expansion or is 
exempt from BACT."31 Opening Br. 54. 
As explained, no party disputes that Subpart Ja applies to the North Flare. 
[ADJ0l 1567; ADJ0I 1568.] On appeal, Petitioners have now narrowed their 
argument to focus on whether a modification of the North Flare has taken place due 
to the re-routing of gasses to the North Flare, and if so, whether a BACT analysis is 
required. However, Petitioners confuse the definition of "modification" for 
purposes of BACT with the broader definition of "modification" for purposes of 
NSPS (and Subpart Ja). See e.g., Envt'l Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 
561, 577 (2007) ("The 1980 PSD regulations on 'modification' simply cannot be 
taken to track the Agency's regulatory definition under the NSPS."). 
As the Executive Director determined, a modification triggering a BACT 
analysis occurs when there is "(I) a planned change in an emissions unit that (2) is 
~ 
31 Rule 307-401-2(1)(d) of the Utah Administrative Code defines BACT as "an 
emissions limitation ... based on the maximum degree of reduction for each air 
contaminant which would be emitted from any proposed stationary source or 
modification .... " 
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reasonably expected to increase the amount or character of the emissions." 
tiJ [ADJ0I 1571 (ALJ summarizing requirements of Utah Admin. Coder. 307-401-
3(l)(a)'s definition of modification).] Holly's re-routing of gasses to the North 
Flare did not constitute a modification, because "[a] shift of emissions from one 
flare to the other does not result in increased emissions, only redistributed 
emissions." [ADJ0I 1572 (emphasis in original); see also IR009189, Response to 
Comments Memo ("Because neither the North Flare nor the SRU will undergo any 
physical change or experience an increase in emissions as a result of Holly 
Refinery's proposed project, the 'emission units' are not subject to the BACT 
analysis requirements in the PSD rules.").] Consequently, the re-routing of gasses 
~ will not result in increased emissions, and therefore no BACT analysis is necessary 
for the North Flare. 
Rather than directly confront these findings, Petitioners insist that because 
the South Flare "will be reconstructed and reconfigured as part of the heavy crude 
processing project," [IR002825], the re-routing of gasses to the North Flare must of 
necessity result in a modification of the North Flare. Opening Br. 54. However, the 
re-routing of gas to the North Flare had occurred prior to the permitting action for 
the Modernization Project, so even if the re-routing constituted a change in 
operation, "such a change occurred well before Holly initiated the current black 
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wax crude project." [ADJ0I 1572; see also ADJ0I 1570; IR08200 (Holly's first 
revised netting analysis) ("currently all gases are routed to the north flare").] 
Even if such re-routing had required a modification for which Holly had not 
sought authorization, such would constitute an enforcement matter for UDAQ, and 
is not a proper claim in a challenge to an approval order. Moreover, the Executive 
Director determined, "The North Flare is already subject to and in compliance with 
NSPS requirements." [ ADJ0 115 69; see also IR009183, Response to Comments 
Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally and to 
both the North and South Flares."); ADJ0l 1566 (ALJ discussing Holly's 
compliance with an EPA consent decree that requires compliance with Subpart Ja); 
IR004800 ( consent decree); IR007946, IR007951 (Holly's report to EPA of 
compliance with consent decree).] 
Petitioners ignore this critical evidence in the record, and insist that due to the 
alleged modification, UDAQ must apply BACT to the North Flare. Opening Br. 55. 
The Executive Director addressed this question as well, finding that "UDAQ 
determined that BACT for flares was compliance with Subpart Ja." [ADJ0I 1570; 
IR008516-l 7 (Source Plan Review) ("The only technically feasible control options 
for emissions of all pollutants from flares are: (I) equipment design specifications 
and good combustion work practices .... ; and (2) flare gas recovery systems ... 
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DAQ NSR recommends compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja 
as BACT.").] Petitioners fail to acknowledge that regardless of whether a 
modification to the North Flare had taken place as part of the Modernization 
Project, Subpart Ja represents BACT for the North Flare, and all parties agree that 
the North Flare is already subject to Subpart Ja. [IR009252; IR002866-87; 
IR002962; IR009183; ADJ0l 1564.]; see also Opening Br. 52 n.33. 
Finally, Petitioners' argument is moot because regardless of whether it is 
explicitly stated in the Holly approval order, Utah's PM2.5 State Implementation 
Plan32 (SIP) requires Holly to install flare gas recovery technology at the Refinery,33 
and Petitioners do not dispute that flare gas recovery is the most stringent pollution 
~ control device currently available for flares. [ ADJ0 11573-74; IR0085 l 6, Source 
Plan Review (referring to flare gas recover as "the top control technology").] Thus, 
any remand on this issue would be meaningless because it could not change the 
result. [Id.] 
32 A SIP is a plan that a state creates to reach attainment of EPA-derived NAAQS. 
42 u.s.c. §§ 7408, 7409. 
33 
"Flare gas recovery is a system that captures gases that would otherwise be 
combusted in the flare and redirects those gases as fuel sources for other refinery 
operations." [ADJ0l 1573 n.10.] The SIP requires "all major source petroleum 
refineries in or affecting a designated PM2_5 non-attainment area within the State 
shall install and operate a flare gas recovery system." Utah PM2.5 SIP, Section IX, 
Part H, p. 43. 
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In any event, UDAQ and the Executive Director have substantial discretion 
to interpret the regulations governing modifications and BACT requirements, and 
any such legal conclusions cannot be invalidated unless clearly erroneous. 
Petitioners have not shown that either UDAQ or the Executive Director erred, or 
that the Executive Director's determination is unreasonable with respect to the 
application of these regulations to the North Flare. 
Consequently, this Court should affirm the Final Order . 
. CONCLUSION 
This Court should dismiss Petitioners' appeal in its entirety because they 
have failed to address the Final Order. By ignoring the Final Order, Petitioners 
failed to carry their burden on any of their claims. Even if the Court were to 
disregard this erroneous omission, it should still affirm the Final Order because, 
based on the applicable standard of review, the Executive Director rationally and 
correctly analyzed all of the Petitioners' claims raised in this appeal. 
For these reasons, the Executive Director respectfully requests this Court to 
affirm the Executive Director's March 31, 2015 Final Order. 
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Respectfully submitted this 28th day of October 2015. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Detenninative Statutes. Rules, and Provisions 
§ 19-1-301.5. Permit review adjudicative proceedings, U.C.A. 1953 § 19-1-301.5 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 19. Environmental Quality Code 
Chapter 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annos) 
Part 3. Administration 
( l) As used in this section: 
U.C.A. 1953 § 19-1-301.5 
§ 19-1-301.5. Permit review adjudicative proceedings 
Currentness 
(a) "Dispositive action" means a final agency action that: 
(i) the executive director takes as part of a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and 
(ii) is subject to judicial review, in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(b) "Dispositive motion" means a motion that is equivalent to: 
(i) a motion to dismiss under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule l2(b)(6); 
(ii) a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(c); or 
(iii) a motion for summary judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. 
( c) "Party" means: 
(i) the director who issued the permit order being challenged in the permit review adjudicative proceeding; 
(ii) the permittee; 
(iii) the person who applied for the permit, if the permit was denied; or 
(iv) a person granted intervention by the administrative law judge. 
(d) '"Permit" means any of the following issued under this title: 
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(i) a pennit; 
(ii) a plan; 
(iii) a license; 
(iv) an approval order; or 
(v) another administrative authorization made by a director. 
(e)(i) "Pennit order" means an order issued by a director that: 
(A) approves a pennit; 
(8) renews a pennit; 
(C) denies a pennit; 
(D) modifies or amends a permit; or 
(E) revokes and reissues a permit. 
(ii) "Permit order" does not include an order terminating a permit. 
(t) "Permit review adjudicative proceeding" means a proceeding to resolve a challenge to a permit order. 
(2) This section governs pennit review adjudicative proceedings. 
(3) Except as expressly provided in this section, the provisions of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, do not 
apply to a pennit review adjudicative proceeding. 
(4) If a public comment period was provided during the permit application process, a person who challenges a pennit order, 
including the permit applicant, may only raise an issue or argument during the permit review adjudicative proceeding that: 
(a) the person raised during the public comment period; and 
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(b) was supported with sufficient information or documentation to enable the director to fully consider the substance and 
significance of the issue. 
(5) The executive director shall appoint an administrative law judge, in accordance with Subsections 19-1-30 l (5) and (6), to 
conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding. 
(6)(a) Only the following may file a request for agency action seeking review of a permit order: 
(i) a party; or 
(ii) a person who is seeking to intervene under Subsection (7). 
(b) A person who files a request for agency action seeking review of a permit order shall file the request: 
(i) within 30 days after the day on which the permit order is issued; and 
(ii) in accordance with Subsections 630-4-201(3)(a) through (c). 
( c) A person may not raise an issue or argument in a request for agency action unless the issue or argument: 
(i) was preserved in accordance with Subsection (4); or 
(ii) was not reasonably ascertainable before or during the public comment period. 
(d) The department may, in accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules allowing 
the extension of the filing deadline described in Subsection ( 6)(b )(i). 
(7)(a) A person who is not a party may not participate in a permit review adjudicative proceeding unless the person is granted 
the right to intervene under this Subsection (7). 
(b) A person who seeks to intervene in a permit review adjudicative proceeding under this section shall, within 30 days after 
the day on which the permit order being challenged was issued, file: 
(i) a petition to intervene that: 
(A) meets the requirements of Subsection 630-4-207( l ); and 
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(8) demonstrates that the person is entitled to intervention under Subsection (7)(c)(ii); and 
(ii) a timely request for agency action. 
(c) An administrative law judge shall grant a petition to intervene in a permit review adjudicative proceeding, if: 
(i) the petition to intervene is timely filed; and 
(ii) the petitioner: 
(A) demonstrates that the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the permit review adjudicative 
proceeding; 
(8) demonstrates that the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the pefl!}it review adjudicative 
proceeding will not be materially impaired by allowing the intervention; and 
(C) in the petitioner's request for agency action, raises issues or arguments that are preserved in accordance with 
Subsection ( 4 ). 
(d) An administrative law judge: 
(i) shall issue an order granting or denying a petition to intervene in accordance with Subsection 63G-4-207(3)(a); and 
(ii) may impose conditions on intervenors as described in Subsections 63G-4-207(3)(b) and (c). 
(e) The department may, in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules allowing 
the extension of the filing deadline described in Subsection (7)(b ). 
(8)(a) An administrative law judge shall conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding based only on the administrative 
record and not as a trial de novo. 
(b) To the extent relative to the issues and arguments raised in the request for agency action, the administrative record shall 
consist of the following items, if they exist: 
(i) the permit application, draft permit, and final permit; 
(ii) each statement of basis, fact sheet, engineering review, or other substantive explanation designated by the director as 
part of the basis for the decision relating to the permit order; 
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(iii) the notice and record of each public comment period; 
(iv) the notice and record of each public hearing, including oral comments made during the public hearing; 
(v) written comments submitted during the public comment period; 
(vi) responses to comments that are designated by the director as part of the basis for the decision relating to the permit 
order; 
(vii) any information that is: 
(A) requested by and submitted to the director; and 
(8) designated by the director as part of the basis for the decision relating to the permit order; 
(viii) any additional information specified by rule; 
(ix) any additional documents agreed to by the parties; and 
(x) information supplementing the record under Subsection (8)(c). 
(c)(i) There is a rebuttable presumption against supplementing the record. 
(ii) A party may move to supplement the record described in Subsection (8)(b) with technical or factual information. 
(iii) The administrative law judge may grant a motion to supplement the record described in Subsection (8)(b) with technical 
or factual information if the moving party proves that: 
(A) good cause exists for supplementing the record; 
(8) supplementing the record is in the interest of justice; and 
(C) supplementing the record is necessary for resolution of the issues. 
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(iv) The administrative law judge may supplement the record with technical or factual infonnation on the administrative 
law judge's own motion if the administrative law judge detennines that adequate grounds exist to supplement the record 
under Subsections (8)(c)(iii)(A) through (C). 
(v) In supplementing the record with testimonial evidence, the administrative law judge may administer an oath or take 
testimony as necessary. 
(vi) The department may, in accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules 
pennitting further supplementation of the record. 
(9)(a) The administrative law judge shall review and respond to a request for agency action in accordance with Subsections 
630-4-201(3)(d) and (e), following the relevant procedures for fonnal adjudicative proceedings. 
(b) The administrative law judge shall require the parties to file responsive pleadings in accordance with Section 630-4-204. 
( c) If an administrative law judge enters an order of default against a party, the administrative law jud~e shall enter the order 
of default in accordance with Section 630-4-209, following the relevant procedures for fonnal adjudicative proceedings. 
(d) The administrative law judge, in conducting a permit review adjudicative proceeding: 
(i) may not participate in an ex parte communication with a party to the permit review adjudicative proceeding regarding 
the merits of the permit review adjudicative proceeding unless notice and an opportunity to be heard are afforded to all 
parties; and 
(ii) shall, upon receiving an ex parte communication, place the communication in the public record of the proceeding and 
afford all parties an opportunity to comment on the information. 
( e) In conducting a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the administrative law judge may take judicial notice of matters 
not in the administrative record, in accordance with Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 20 I. 
(f) An administrative law judge may take any action in a permit review adjudicative proceeding that is not a dispositive action. 
( I O)(a) A person who files a request for agency action has the burden of demonstrating that an issue or argument raised in the 
request for agency action has been preserved in accordance with Subsection (4). 
(b) The administrative law judge shall dismiss, with prejudice, any issue or argument raised in a request for agency action 
that has not been preserved in accordance with Subsection (4). 
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( 11) In response to a dispositive motion, the administrative law judge may submit a proposed dispositive action to the executive 
director recommending full or partial resolution of the permit review adjudicative proceeding, that includes: 
(a) written findings of fact; 
(b) written conclusions of law; and 
( c) a recommended order. 
(12) For each issue or argument that is not dismissed or otherwise resolved under Subsection ( l0)(b) or ( 11), the administrative 
law judge shall: 
(a) provide the parties an opportunity for briefing and oral argument; 
(b) conduct a review of the director's determination, based on the record described in Subsections (8)(b ), (8)( c ), and (9)( e ); and 
( c) submit to the executive director a proposed dispositive action, that includes: 
(i) written findings of fact; 
(ii) written conclusions of law; and 
(iii) a recommended order. 
(13)(a) When the administrative law judge submits a proposed dispositive action to the executive director, the executive director 
may: 
(i) adopt, adopt with modifications, or reject the proposed dispositive action; or 
(ii) return the prpposed dispositive action to the administrative law judge for further action as directed. 
(b) On review of a proposed dispositive action, the executive director shall uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency 
determinations that are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a whole. 
(c)(i) The executive director may not participate in an ex parte communication with a party to the permit review adjudicative 
proceeding regarding the merits of the permit review adjudicative proceeding unless notice and an opportunity to be heard 
are afforded to all parties. 
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(ii) Upon receiving an ex parte communication, the executive director shall place the communication in the public record 
of the proceeding and afford all parties an opportunity to comment on the information. 
(d) In reviewing a proposed dispositive action during a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the executive director may 
take judicial notice of matters not in the record, in accordance with Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 20 I. 
(e) The executive director may use the executive director's technical expertise in making a determination. 
( 14 )(a) A party may seek judicial review in the Utah Court of Appeals of a dispositive action in a permit review adjudicative 
proceeding, in accordance with Sections 630-4-401, 630-4-403, and 630-4-405. 
(b) An appellate court shall limit its review of a dispositive action of a permit review adjudicative proceeding to: 
(i) the record described in Subsections (8)(b), (8)(c), (9)(e), and (13)(d); and 
(ii) the record made by the administrative law judge and the executive director during the permit review adjudicative 
proceeding. 
( c) During judicial review of a dispositive action, the appellate court shall: 
(i) review all agency determinations in accordance with Subsection 630-4-403(4), recognizing that the agency has been 
granted substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules; and 
(ii) uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations that are supported by substantial evidence viewed 
in light of the record as a whole. 
(15)(a) The filing of a request for agency action does not stay a permit or delay the effective date ofa permit. 
(b) A permit may not be stayed or delayed unless a stay is granted under this Subsection ( 15). 
(c) The administrative law judge shall: 
(i) consider a party's motion to stay a permit during a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and 
(ii) submit a proposed determination on the stay to the executive director. 
(d) The administrative law judge may not recommend to the executive director a stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit, 
unless: 
; •,,·-:,:t !_,;1 1, 'I f'•·J~:i: 
§ 19-1-301.5. Permit review adjudicative proceedings, U.C.A. 1953 § 19-1-301.5 
(i) all parties agree to the stay; or 
(ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that: 
(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm unless the stay is issued; 
(8) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs whatever damage the proposed stay is likely to cause 
the party restrained or enjoined; 
(C) the stay, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and 
(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or 
the case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further adjudication. 
(e) A party may appeal the executive director's decision regarding a stay of a permit to the Utah Court of Appeals, in 
accordance with Section 78A-4-l 03. 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 333, § 2, eff. May 8, 2012. 
HISTORICAL AND ST A TUTOR Y NOTES 
Laws 2012, c. 360, § 115(3), provides: 
"Section 115. Coordinating S.B. 21[c. 360] with S.B. 1 l[c. 333]--Substantive and technical amendments. 
"If this S.B. 21 and S.B. l l, Department of Environmental Quality Boards Adjudicative Proceedings, both pass and become 
law, the Legislature intends that the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel shall prepare the Utah Code database 
for publication as follows:" 
"(3) amend Section 19-1-301.5 to read as follows: 
" '19-1-301.5. Permit review adjudicative proceedings. 
"( l) As used in this section: 
"(a) "Dispositive action" means a final agency action that: 
·'( i) the executive director takes as part of a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and 
·-.if) "(ii) is subject to judicial review, in accordance with Subsection (14). 
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.. (b) "Dispositive motion" means a motion that is equivalent to: 
"(i) a motion to dismiss under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6); 
"(ii) a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule l2(c); or 
"(iii) a motion for summary judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. 
"(c) 'Party' means: 
"(i) the director who issued the permit order being challenged in the permit review adjudicative proceeding; 
"(ii) the permittee; 
'"(iii) the person who applied for the permit, if the permit was denied; or 
"(iv) a person granted intervention by the administrative law judge. 
"(d) "Permit" means any of the following issued under this title: 
"(i) a permit; 
"(ii) a plan; 
"( iii) a license; 
"(iv) an approval order; or 
"(v) another administrative authorization made by a director. 
"(e)(i) 'Permit order' means an order issued by a director that: 
"(A) approves a permit; 
"(8) renews a permit; 
"(C) denies a permit; 
"(D) modifies or amends a permit; or 
"(E) revokes and reissues a permit. 
"(ii) 'Permit order' does not include an order terminating a permit. 
"(t) 'Permit review adjudicative proceeding' means a proceeding to resolve a challenge to a permit order. 
"(2) This section governs permit review adjudicative proceedings. 
(.:·:, 
"(,;f/; 
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"(3) Except as expressly provided in this section, the provisions of Title 630, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, do 
not apply to a permit review adjudicative proceeding. 
••(4) lf a public comment period was provided during the permit application process, a person who challenges a permit order, 
including the permit applicant, may only raise an issue or argument during the permit review adjudicative proceeding that: 
'"(a) the person raised during the public comment period; and 
"(b) was supported with sufficient information or documentation to enable the director to fully consider the substance and 
significance of the issue. 
"(5) The executive director shall appoint an administrative law judge, in accordance with Subsections 19-1-301(5) and (6), to 
conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding. 
"(6)(a) Only the following may file a request for agency action seeking review of a permit order: 
"(i) a party; or 
'•(ii) a person who is seeking to intervene under Subsection (7). 
'·(b) A person who files a request for agency action seeking review of a permit order shall file the request: 
•'(i) within 30 days after the day on which the permit order is issued; and 
"(ii) in accordance with Subsections 630-4-20 l (3 )(a) through ( c ). 
••cc) A person may not raise an issue or argument in a request for agency action unless the issue or argument: 
'•(i) was preserved in accordance with Subsection (4); or 
(ii) was not reasonably ascertainable before or during the public comment period. 
"(d) The department may, in accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules allowing 
the extension of the filing deadline described in Subsection (6)(b)(i). 
'•(?)(a) A person who is not a party may not participate in a permit review adjudicative proceeding unless the person is granted 
the right to intervene under this Subsection (7). 
"(b) A person who seeks to intervene in a permit review adjudicative proceeding under this section shall, within 30 days after 
the day on which the permit order being challenged was issued, file: 
"(i) a petition to intervene that: 
'•(A) meets the requirements of Subsection 630-4-207( I); and 
"(B) demonstrates that the person is entitled to intervention under Subsection (7)(c){ii); and_ 
"(ii) a timely request for agency action. 
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"(c) An administrative law judge shall grant a petition to intervene in a permit review adjudicative proceeding, if: 
••(i) the petition to intervene is timely filed; and 
"( ii) the petitioner: 
"(A) demonstrates that the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the permit review adjudicative proceeding; 
"(8) demonstrates that the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the permit review adjudicative proceeding 
will not be materially impaired by allowing the intervention; and 
"(C) in the petitioner's request for agency action, raises issues or arguments that are preserved in accordance with Subsection (4). 
••(d) An administrative law judge: 
"(i) shall issue an order granting or denying a petition to intervene in accordance with Subsection 63G-4-207(3)(a); and 
"(ii) may impose conditions on intervenors as described in Subsections 63G-4-207(3)(b) and (c). 
'"(e) The department may, in accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules allowing 
the extension of the filing deadline described in Subsection (7)(b). 
"(8)(a) An administrative law judge shall conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding based only on the administrative 
record and not as a trial de novo. 
"(b) To the extent relative to the issues and arguments raised in the request for agency action, the administrative record shall 
consist of the following items, if they exist: 
"(i) the permit application, draft permit, and final permit; 
"(ii) each statement of basis, fact sheet, engineering review, or other substantive explanation designated by the director as part 
of the basis for the decision relating to the permit order; 
"(iii) the notice and record of each public comment period; 
"(iv) the notice and record of each public hearing, including oral comments made during the public hearing; 
"(v) written comments submitted during the public comment period; 
"(vi) responses to comments that are designated by the director as part of the basis for the decision relating to the permit order; 
"(vii) any information that is: 
••(A) requested by and submitted to the director; and 
"(B) designated by the director as part of the basis for the decision relating to the permit order; 
"(viii) any additional information specified by rule; 
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"(ix) any additional documents agreed to by the parties; and 
"(x) information supplementing the record under Subsection (8)(c). 
"(c)(i) There is a rebuttable presumption against supplementing the record. 
"(ii) A party may move to supplement the record described in Subsection (8)(b) with technical or factual information. 
'"(iii) The administrative law judge may grant a motion to supplement the record described in Subsection (8)(b) with technical 
or factual information if the moving party proves that: 
"(A) good cause exists for supplementing the record; 
"(8) supplementing the record is in the interest of justice; and 
"(C) supplementing the record is necessary for resolution of the issues. 
"(iv) The administrative law judge may supplement the record with technical or factual information on the administrative law 
judge's own motion if the administrative law judge determines that adequate grounds exist to supplement the record under 
Subsections (8)(c)(iii){A) through (C). 
'"(v) In supplementing the record with testimonial evidence, the administrative law judge may administer an oath or take 
testimony as necessary. 
"(vi) The department may, in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules permitting 
further supplementation of the record. 
"(9)(a) The administrative law judge shall review and respond to a request for agency action in accordance with Subsections 
630-4-201(3)(d) and (e), following the relevant procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings. 
"(b) The administrative law judge shall require the parties to file responsive pleadings in accordance with Section 630-4-204. 
"(c) If an administrative law judge enters an order of default against a party, the administrative law judge shall enter the order 
of default in accordance with Section 630-4-209, following the relevant procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings. 
"(d) The administrative law judge, in conducting a permit review adjudicative proceeding: 
"(i) may not participate in an ex parte communication with a party to the permit review adjudicative proceeding regarding the 
merits of the permit review adjudicative proceeding unless notice and an opportunity to be heard are afforded to all parties; and 
"(ii) shall, upon receiving an ex parte communication, place the communication in the public record of the proceeding and 
~ afford all parties an opportunity to comment on the information. 
"(e) In conducting a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the administrative law judge may take judicial notice of matters 
not in the administrative record, in accordance with Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201. 
"(f) An administrative law judge may take any action in a permit review adjudicative proceeding that is not a dispositive action. 
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"( l 0)(a) A person who files a request for agency action has the burden of demonstrating that an issue or argument raised in the 
request for agency action has been preserved in accordance with Subsection (4). 
"(b) The administrative law judge shall dismiss, with prejudice, any issue or argument raised in a request for agency action that 
has not been preserved in accordance with Subsection ( 4 ). 
"( l I) In response to a dispositive motion, the administrative law judge may submit a proposed dispositive action to the executive 
director recommending full or partial resolution of the permit review adjudicative proceeding, that includes: 
"(a) written findings of fact; 
"(b) written conclusions of law; and 
"( c) a recommended order. 
"( 12) For each issue or argument that is not dismissed or otherwise resolved under Subsection ( l0)(b) or( 11 ), the administrative 
law judge shall: 
"(a) provide the parties an opportunity for briefing and oral argument; 
"(b) conduct a review of the director's determination, based on the record described in Subsections (8)(b), (8)(c), and (9)(e); and 
"(c) submit to the executive director a proposed dispositive action, that includes: 
"(i) written findings of fact; 
"(ii) written conclusions of law; and 
"(iii) a recommended order. 
"(l3)(a) When the administrative law judge submits a proposed dispositive action to the executive director, the executive 
director may: 
"(i) adopt, adopt with modifications, or reject the proposed dispositive action; or 
"(ii) return the proposed dispositive action to the administrative law judge for further action as directed. 
"(b) On review of a proposed dispositive action, the executive director shall uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency 
determinations that are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a whole. 
'"(c)(i) The executive director may not participate in an ex parte communication with a party to the permit review adjudicative 
proceeding regarding the merits of the permit review adjudicative proceeding unless notice and an opportunity to be heard are 
afforded to all parties. 
"(ii) Upon receiving an ex parte communication, the executive director shall place the communication in the public record of 
the proceeding and afford all parties an opportunity to comment on the information. 
"(d) In reviewing a proposed dispositive action during a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the executive director may take 
judicial notice of matters not in the record, in accordance with Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201. 
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"(e) The executive director may use the executive director's technical expertise in making a determination. 
"(14)(a) A party may seek judicial review in the Utah Court of Appeals of a dispositive action in a permit review adjudicative 
proceeding, in accordance with Sections 630-4-40 l, 630-4-403, and 630-4-405. 
"(b) An appellate court shall limit its review of a dispositive action of a permit review adjudicative proceeding to: 
"(i) the record described in Subsections (8)(b), (8)(c), (9)(e), and (13)(d); and 
"(ii) the record made by the administrative law judge and the executive director during the permit review adjudicative 
proceeding. 
"( c) During judicial review of a dispositive action, the appellate court shall: 
'"(i) review all agency determinations in accordance with Subsection 630-4-403(4), recognizing that the agency has been granted 
substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules; and 
'"(ii) uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations that are supported by substantial evidence viewed in 
light of the record as a whole. 
'"(15)(a) The filing of a request for agency action does not stay a permit or delay the effective date of a permit. 
"(b) A permit may not be stayed or delayed unless a stay is granted under this Subsection ( 15). 
"(c) The administrative law judge shall: 
"(i) consider a party's motion to stay a permit during a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and 
'"(ii) submit a proposed determination on the stay to the executive director. 
'"(d) The administrative law judge may not recommend to the executive director a stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit, 
unless: 
'"(i) all parties agree to the stay; or 
"(ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that: 
'"(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm unless the stay is issued; 
"(B) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs whatever damage the proposed stay is likely to cause the 
(.(j) party restrained or enjoined; 
"(C) the stay, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and 
"(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the 
case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further adjudication. 
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"( e) A party may appeal the executive director's decision regarding a stay of a permit to the Utah Court of Appeals, in accordance 
with Section 78A-4-l03.'." 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 63g. General Government 
Chapter 4. Administrative Procedures Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 4. Judicial Review (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A 1953 § 63G-4-403 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 63-46b-16 
§ 63G-4-403. Judicial review--Formal adjudicative proceedings 
Currentness 
( 1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2)(a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file 
a petition for review of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the 
appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate 
court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
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(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
( d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
( e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 382, § 1393, eff May 5, 2008. 
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Utah Administrative Code Currentness 
Environmental Quality 
R307. Air Quality. 
U.A.C. R307-401 
· R307-401. Permit: New and Modified Sources. 
R307-401- l. Purpose. 
This rule establishes the application and permitting requirements for new installations and modifications to existing installations 
throughout the State of Utah. Additional permitting requirements apply to larger installations or installations located in 
nonattainment or maintenance areas. These additional requirements can be found in R307-403, R307-405, R307-406, R307-420, 
and R307-42l. Modeling requirements in R307-410 may also apply. Each of the permitting rules establishes independent 
requirements, and the owner or operator must comply with all of the requirements that apply to the installation. Exemptions 
under R307-401 do not affect applicability of the other permitting rules. 
R307-401-2. Definitions. 
(I) The following additional definitions apply to R307-40 l. 
'·Actual emissions" (a) means the actual rate of emissions of an air contaminant from an emissions unit, as determined in 
accordance with paragraphs (b) through ( d) below. 
(b) In general, actual emissions as of a particular date shall equal the average rate, in tons per year, at which the unit 
actually emitted the air contaminant during a consecutive 24-month period which precedes the particular date and which is 
representative of normal source operation. The director shall allow the use of a different time period upon a determination 
that it is more representative of normal source operation. Actual emissions shall be calculated using the unit's actual 
operating hours, production rates. and types of materials processed. stored, or combusted during the selected time period. 
(c) The director may presume that source-specific allowable emissions for the unit are equivalent to the actual emissions 
of the unit. 
(d) For any emissions unit that has not begun normal operations on the particular date, actual emissions shall equal the 
potential to emit of the unit on that date. 
"Best available control technology" means an emissions limitation (including a visible emissions standard) based on the 
maximum degree of reduction for each air contaminant which would be emitted from any proposed stationary source or 
modification which the director, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and 
other costs, determines is achievable for such source or modification through application of production processes or available 
methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control 
of such pollutant. In no event shall application of best available control technology result in emissions of any pollutant which 
would exceed the emissions allowed by any applicable standard under 40 CFR parts 60 and 61. If the director determines that 
technological or economic limitations on the application of measurement methodology to a particular emissions unit would make 
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the imposition of an emissions standard infeasible, a design, equipment, work practice, operational standard or combination 
thereof, may be prescribed instead to satisfy the requirement for the application of best available control technology. Such 
standard shall, to the degree possible, set forth the emissions reduction achievable by implementation of such design, equipment, 
work practice or operation, and shall provide for compliance by means which achieve equivalent results. 
"Building, structure, facility, or installation" means all of the pollutant-emitting activities which belong to the same industrial 
grouping, are located on one or more contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under the control of the same person (or persons 
under common control) except the activities of any vessel. Pollutant-emitting activities shall be considered as part of the same 
industrial grouping if they belong to the same Major Group (i.e., which have the same two-digit code) as described in the 
Standard Industrial Classification Manual, 1972, as amended by the 1977 Supplement (U.S. Government Printing Office stock 
numbers 4101-0066 and 003-005-00176-0, respectively). 
'"Construction" means any physical change or change in the method of operation (including fabrication, erection, installation, 
demolition, or modification of an emissions unit) that would result in a change in emissions. 
"Emissi.ons unit" means any part of a stationary source that emits or would have the potential to emit any air contaminant. 
"Fugitive emissions" means those emissions which could not reasonably pass through a stack, chimney, vent, or other 
functionally equivalent opening. 
"Indirect source" means a building, structure, facility or installation which attracts or may attract mobile source activity that 
results in emission of a pollutant for which there is a national standard. 
"Potential to emit" means the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit an air contaminant under its physical and 
operational design. Any physical or operational limitation on the capacity of the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution 
control equipment and restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted, stored, or processed, 
shall be treated as part of its design if the limitation or the effect it would have on emissions is enforceable. Secondary emissions 
do not count in determining the potential to emit of a stationary source. 
"Secondary emissions" means emissions which occur as a result of the construction or operation of a major stationary source 
or major modification, but do not come from the major stationary source or major modification itself. Secondary emissions 
include emissions from any offsite support facility which would not be constructed or increase its emissions except as a result 
of the construction or operation of the major stationary source or major modification. Secondary emissions do not include any 
emissions which come directly from a mobile source, such as emissions from the tailpipe of a motor vehicle, from a train, or 
from a vessel. 
"Stationary source" means any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit an air contaminant. 
R307-401-3. Applicability. 
( l) R307-40 l applies to any person intending to: 
(a) construct a new installation which will or might reasonably be expected to become a source or an indirect source of 
air pollution, or 
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(b) make modifications or relocate an existing installation which will or might reasonably be expected to increase the 
amount or change the effect of, or the character of, air contaminants discharged, so that such installation may be expected 
to become a source or indirect source of air pollution, or 
(c) install a control apparatus or other equipment intended to control emissions of air contaminants. 
(2) R307-403, R307-405 and R307-406 may establish additional permitting requirements for new or modified sources. 
(a) Exemptions contained in R307-40 l do not affect applicability or other requirements under R307-403, R307-405 or 
R307-406. 
(b) Exemptions contained in R307-403, R307-405 or R307-406 do not affect applicability or other requirements under 
R307-40 I, unless specifically authorized in this rule. 
R307-401-4. General Requirements. 
The general requirements in (I) through (3) below apply to all new and modified installations, including installations that are 
exempt from the requirement to obtain an approval order. 
(I) Any control apparatus installed on an installation shall be adequately and properly maintained. 
(2) If the director determines that an exempted installation is not meeting an approval order or State Implementation Plan 
limitation, is creating an adverse impact to the environment, or would be injurious to human health or welfare, then the director 
may require the owner or operator to submit a notice of intent and obtain an approval order in accordance with R307-40l-5 
through R307-401-8. The director will complete an appropriate analysis and evaluation in consultation with the owner or 
operator before determining that an approval order is required. 
(3) Low Oxides of Nitrogen Burner Technology. 
(a) Except as provided in (b) below, whenever existing fuel combustion burners are replaced, the owner or operator shall 
install low oxides of nitrogen burners or equivalent oxides of nitrogen controls, as determined by the director, unless 
such equipment is not physically practical or cost effective. The owner or operator shall submit a demonstration that 
the equipment is not physically practical or cost effective to the director for review and approval prior to beginning 
construction. 
(b) The provisions of (a) above do not apply to non-commercial, residential buildings. 
R307-401-5. Notice of Intent. 
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( l) Except as provided in R307-401-9 through R307-401-17, any person subject to R307-40 I shall submit a notice of intent 
to the director and receive an approval order prior to initiation of construction, modification or relocation. The notice of intent 
shall be in a format specified by the director. 
(2) The notice of intent shall include the following information: 
(a) A description of the nature of the processes involved; the nature, procedures for handling and quantities ofraw materials; 
the type and quantity of fuels employed; and the nature and quantity of finished product. 
(b) Expected composition and physical characteristics of effluent stream both before and after treatment by any control 
apparatus, including emission rates, volume, temperature, air contaminant types, and concentration of air contaminants. 
( c) Size, type and performance characteristics of any control apparatus. 
(d) An analysis of best available control technology for the proposed source or modification. When determining best 
available control technology for a new or modified source in an ozone nonattainment or maintenance area that will emit 
volatile organic compounds or nitrogen oxides, the owner or operator of the source shall consider EPA Control Technique 
Guidance (CTG) documents and Alternative Control Technique documents that are applicable to the source. Best available 
control technology shall be at least as stringent as any published CTG that is applicable to the source. 
(e) Location and elevation of the emission point and other factors relating to dispersion and diffusion of the air contaminant 
in relation to nearby structures and window openings, and other information necessary to appraise the possible effects 
of the effluent. 
(f) The location of planned sampling points and the tests of the completed installation to be made by the owner or operator 
when necessary to ascertain compliance. 
(g) The typical operating schedule. 
(h) A schedule for construction. 
(i) Any plans, specifications and related information that are in final form at the time of submission of notice of intent. 
(i) Any additional information required by: 
(i) R307-403, Permits: New and Modified Sources in Nonattainment Areas and Maintenance Areas; 
(ii) R307-405, Permits: Major Sources in Attainment or Unclassified Areas (PSD); 
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(iii) R307-406, Visibility; 
(iv) R307-410, Emissions Impact Analysis; 
(v) R307-420, Permits: Ozone Offset Requirements in Davis and Salt Lake Counties; or 
(vi) R307-421, Permits: PMI0 Offset Requirements in Salt Lake County and Utah County. 
(k) Any other information necessary to determine if the proposed source or modification will be in compliance with Title 
R307. 
(3) Notwithstanding the exemption in R307-401-9 through 16, any person that is subject to R307-403, R307-405, or R307-406 
shall submit a notice of intent to the director and receive an approval order prior to intiation of construction, modification, or 
relocation. 
R307-401-6. Review Period. 
(I) Completeness Determination. Within 30 days after receipt of a notice of intent, or any additional information necessary to 
the review, the director will advise the applicant of any deficiency in the notice of intent or the information submitted. 
(2) Within 90 days of receipt of a complete application including all the information described in R307-40 l-5, the director will 
(a) issue an approval order for the proposed construction, installation, modification, relocation, or establishment pursuant 
to the requirements of R307-401-8, or 
(b) issue an order prohibiting the proposed construction, installation, modification, relocation or establishment if it is 
deemed that any part of the proposal is inadequate to meet the applicable requirements of R307. 
(3) The review period under (2) above may be extended by up to three 30-day extensions if more time is needed to review 
the proposal. 
R307-401-7. Public Notice. 
( 1) Issuing the Notice. Prior to issuing an approval or disapproval order, the director will advertise intent to approve or 
disapprove in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality of the proposed construction, installation, modification, 
relocation or establishment. 
(2) Opportunity for Review and Comment. 
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(a) At least one location will be provided where the information submitted by the owner or operator, the director's analysis 
of the notice of intent proposal, and the proposed approval order conditions will be available for public inspection. 
(b) Public Comment. 
(i) A 30-day public comment period will be established. 
(ii) A request to extend the length of the comment period, up to 30 days, may be submitted to the director within 15 
days of the date the notice in R307-401-7( l) is published. 
(iii) Public Hearing. A request for a hearing on the proposed approval or disapproval order may be submitted to the 
director within 15 days of the date the notice in R307-40l-7(l) is published. 
(iv) The hearing will be held in the area of the proposed construction, installation, modification, relocation or 
establishment. 
(v) The public comment and hearing procedure shall not be required when an order is issued for the purpose of 
extending the time required by the director to review plans and specifications. 
(3) The director will consider all comments received during the public comment period and at the public hearing and, if 
appropriate, will make changes to the proposal in response to comments before issuing an approval order or disapproval order. 
R307-401-8. Approval Order. 
( l) The director will issue an approval order if the following conditions have been met: 
(a) The degree of pollution control for emissions, to include fugitive emissions and fugitive dust, is at least best available 
control technology. When determining best available control technology for a new or modified source in an ozone 
nonattainment or maintenance area that will emit volatile organic compounds or nitrogen oxides, best available control 
technology shall be at least as stringent as any Control Technique Guidance document that has been published by EPA 
that is applicable to the source. 
(b) The proposed installation will meet the applicable requirements of: 
(i) R307-403, Permits: New and Modified Sources in Nonattainment Areas and Maintenance Areas; 
(ii) R307-405, Permits: Major Sources in Attainment or Unclassified Areas (PSD); 
(iii) R307-406, Visibility; 
c--. 
'i/!iil 
R307-401. Permit: New and Modified Sources., UT ADC R307-401 
(iv) R307-4 l 0, Emissions Impact Analysis; 
(v) R307-420, Pennits: Ozone Offset Requirements in Davis and Salt Lake Counties; 
(vi) R307-2 l0, National Standards of Perfonnance for New Stationary Sources; 
(vii) National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards; 
(viii) R307-214, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; 
(ix) R307-l l0, Utah State Implementation Plan; and 
(x) all other provisions of R307. 
(2) The approval order will require that all pollution control equipment be adequately and properly maintained. 
(3) Receipt of an approval order does not relieve any owner or operator of the responsibility to comply with the provisions of 
R307 or the State Implementation Plan. 
(4) To accommodate staged construction of a large source, the director may issue an order authorizing construction of an initial 
stage prior to receipt of detailed plans for the entire proposal provided that, through a review of general plans, engineering 
reports and other infonnation the proposal is determined feasible by the director under the intent of R307. Subsequent detailed 
plans will then be processed as prescribed in this paragraph. For staged construction projects the previous determination under 
R307-401-8( 1) and (2) will be reviewed and modified as appropriate at the earliest reasonable time prior to commencement of 
construction of each independent phase of the proposed source or modification. 
(5) If the director detennines that a proposed stationary source, modification or relocation does not meet the conditions 
established in ( 1) above, the director will not issue an approval order. 
R307-401-9. Small Source Exemption. 
( l) A small stationary source is exempted from the requirement to obtain an approval order in R307-401-5 through 8 if the 
following conditions are met. 
(a) its actual emissions are less than 5 tons per year per air contaminant of any of the following air contaminants: sulfur 
dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, PM10, ozone, or volatile organic compounds; 
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(b) its actual emissions are less than 500 pounds per year of any hazardous air pollutant and less than 2000 pounds per 
year of any combination of hazardous air poll utan ts; 
(c) its actual emissions are less than 500 pounds per year of any air contaminant not listed in (a)( or (b) above and less 
than 2000 pounds per year of any combination of air contaminants not listed in (a) or (b) above. 
(d) Air contaminants that are drawn from the environment through equipment in intake air and then are released back to the 
environment without chemical change, as well as carbon dioxide, nitrogen, oxygen, argon, neon, helium, krypton, xenon 
should not be included in emission calculations when determining applicability under (a) through (c) above. 
(2) The owner or operator of a source that is exempted from the requirement to obtain an approval order under (I) above shall 
no longer be exempt if actual emissions in any subsequent year exceed the emission thresholds in ( l) above. The owner or 
operator shall submit a notice of intent under R307-40 l-5 no later than 180 days after the end of the calendar year in which 
·the source exceeded the emission threshold. 
(3) Small Source Exemption-Registration. The director will maintain a registry of sources that are claiming an exemption 
under R307-401-9. The owner or operator of a stationary source that is claiming an exemption under R307-40 l-9 may submit 
a written registration notice to the director. The notice shall include the following minimum information: 
(a) identifying information, _including company name and address, location of source, telephone number, and name of 
plant site manager or point of contact; 
(b) a description of the nature of the processes involved, equipment, anticipated quantities of materials used, the type and 
quantity of fuel employed and nature and quantity of the finished product; 
(c) identification of expected emissions; 
(d) estimated annual emission rates; 
( e) any control apparatus used; and 
( 0 typical operating schedule. 
(4) An exemption under R307-40l-9 does not affect the requirements of R307-40l-l 7, Temporary Relocation. 
(5) A stationary source that is not required to obtain a permit under R307-405 for greenhouse gases, as defined in R307-405-3(9) 
(a), is not required to obtain an approval order for greenhouse gases under R307-40 I. This exemption does not affect the 
requirement to obtain an approval order for any other air contaminant emitted by the stationary source. 
R307-401- l 0. Source Category Exemptions. 
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The following source categories described in ( l) through (5) below are exempted from the requirement to obtain an approval 
order. The general provisions in R307-40l-4 shall apply to these sources. 
( l) Fuel-burning equipment in which combustion takes place at no greater pressure than one inch of mercury above ambient 
pressure with a rated capacity of less than five million BTU per hour using no other fuel than natur~l gas or LPG or other mixed 
gas that meets the standards of gas distributed by a utility in accordance with the rules of the Public Service Commission of the 
State of Utah, unless there are emissions other than combustion products. 
(2) Comfort heating equipment such as boilers, water heaters, air heaters and steam generators with a rated capacity of less than 
one million BTU per hour if fueled only by fuel oil numbers l-6, 
(3) Emergency heating equipment, using coal or wood for fuel, with a rated capacity less than 50,000 BTU per hour. 
(4) Exhaust systems for controlling steam and heat that do not contain combustion products. 
R307-401-l l. Replacement-in-Kind Equipment. 
( l) Applicability. Existing process equipment or pollution control equipment that is covered by an existing approval order or 
State Implementation Plan requirement may be replaced using the procedures in (2) below if: 
(a) the potential to emit of the process equipment is the same or lower; 
(b) the number of emission points or emitting units is the same or lower; 
(c) no additional types of air contaminants are emitted as a result of the replacement; 
(d) the process equipment or pollution control equipment is identical to or functionally equivalent to the replaced 
equipment; 
(e) the replacement does not change the basic design parameters of the process unit or pollution control equipment; 
(f) the replaced process equipment or pollution control equipment is permanently removed from the stationary source, 
otherwise permanently disabled, or permanently barred from operation; 
(g) the replacement process equipment or pollution control equipment does not trigger New Source Performance Standards 
or National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants under 42 U .S.C. 7411 or 74 l 2; and 
(h) the replacement of the control apparatus or process equipment does not violate any other provision of Title R307. 
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(2) Replacement-in-Kind Procedures. 
(a) In lieu of filing a notice of intent under R307-401-5, the owner or operator of a stationary source shall submit a written 
notification to the director before replacing the equipment. The notification shall contain a description of the replacement-
in-kind equipment, including the control capability of any control apparatus and a demonstration that the conditions of 
( l ) above are met. 
(b) If the replacement-in-kind meets the conditions of (l) above, the director will update the source's approval order and 
notify the owner or operator. Public review under R307-401-7 is not required for the update to the approval order. 
(3) If the replaced process equipment or pollution control equipment is brought back into operation, it shall constitute a new 
emissions unit. 
R307-401-12. Reduction in Air Contaminants. 
( l) Applicability. The owner or operator of a stationary source of air contaminants that reduces or eliminates air contaminants 
is exempt from the requirement to submit a notice of intent and obtain an approval order prior to construction if: 
(a) the project does not increase the potential to emit of any air contaminant or cause emissions of any new air contaminant, 
and 
(b) the director is notified of the change and the reduction of air contaminants is made enforceable through an approval 
order in accordance with (2) below. 
(2) Notification. The owner or operator shall submit a written description of the project to the director no later than 60 days 
after the changes are made. The director will update the source's approval order or issue a new approval order to include the 
project and to make the emission reductions enforceable. Public review under R307-40 I-7 is not required for the update to 
the approval order. 
R307-401-13. Plantwide Applicability Limits. 
A plantwide applicability limit under R307-405-2 l does not exempt a stationary source from the requirements of R307-40 I. 
R307-401-14. Used Oil Fuel Burned for Energy Recovery. 
( l) Definitions. 
"Boiler" means boiler as defined in R3 l5-l-l(b). 
'"Used Oil" is defined as any oil that has been refined from crude oil, used, and, as a result of such use contaminated by physical 
or chemical impurities. 
,:, 
Viii' 
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(2) Boilers burning used oil for energy recovery are exempted from the requirement to obtain an approval order in R307-401-5 
through 8 if the following requirements are met: 
(a) the heat input design is less than one million BTU/hr; 
(b) contamination levels of all used oil to be burned do not exceed any of the following values: 
(i) arsenic-5 ppm by weight, 
(ii) cadmium-2 ppm by weight, 
(iii) chromium-IO ppm by weight, 
(iv) lead-100 ppm by weight, 
(v) total halogens-1,000 ppm by weight, 
(vi) Sulfur-0.50% by weight; and 
( c) the flash point of all used oil to be burned is at least l 00 degrees Fahrenheit. 
(3) Testing. The owner or operator shall test each load of used oil received or generated as directed by the director to ensure it 
meets these requirements. Testing may be performed by the owner/operator or documented by test reports from the used fuel 
oil vendor. The flash point shall be measured using the appropriate ASTM method as required by the director. Records for 
used oil consumption and test reports are to be kept for all periods when fuel-burning equipment is in operation. The records 
shall be kept on site and made available to the director or the director's representative upon request. Records must be kept for 
a three-year period. 
R307-401-15. Air Strippers and Soil Venting Projects. 
(I) The owner or operator of an air stripper or soil venting system that is used to remediate contaminated groundwater or soil is 
exempt from the notice of intent and approval order requirements of R307-401-5 through 8 if the following conditions are met: 
(a) the estimated total air emissions of volatile organic compounds from a given project are less than the de minimis 
emissions listed in R307-401-9(l)(a). and 
(b) the level of any one hazardous air pollutant or any combination of hazardous air pollutants is below the levels listed 
in R307-4 l 0-5( I )(c)(i)(C). 
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(2) The owner or operator shall submit documentation that the project meets the exemption requirements in R307-40 l-15( I) 
to the director prior to beginning the remediation project. 
(3) After beginning the soi I remediation project, the owner or operator shall submit emissions information to the director to verify 
that the emission rates of the volatile organic compounds and hazardous air pollutants in R307-401-15( l) are not exceeded. 
(a) Emissions estimates of volatile organic compounds shall be based on test data obtained in accordance with the test 
method in the EPA document SW-846, Test #8260c or 8261a, or the most recent EPA revision of either test method if 
approved by the director. 
(b) Emissions estimates of hazardous air pollutants shall be based on test data obtained in accordance with the test method 
in EPA document SW-846, Test #8021 B or the most recent EPA revision of the test method if approved by the director. 
(c) Results of the test and calculated annual quantity of emissions of volatile organic compounds and hazardous air 
pollutants shall be submitted to the director within one month of sampling. 
(d) The test samples shall be drawn on intervals of no less than twenty-eight days and no more than thirty-one days (i.e., 
monthly) for the first quarter, quarterly for the first year, and semi-annually thereafter or as determined necessary by the 
director. 
(4) The following control devices do not require a notice of intent or approval order when used in relation to an air stripper or 
soil venting project exempted under R307-401-15: 
(a) thermodestruction unit with a rated input capacity of less than five million BTU per hour using no other auxiliary fuel 
than natural gas or LPG, or 
(b) carbon adsorption unit. 
R307-401-16. De minimis Emissions From Soil Aeration Projects. 
An owner or operator of a soil remediation project is not subject to the notice of intent and approval order requirements of 
R307-401-5 through 8 when soil aeration or land farming is used to conduct a soil remediation, if the owner or operator submits 
the following information to the director prior to beginning the remediation project: 
( l) documentation that the estimated total air emissions of volatile organic compounds, using an appropriate sampling method, 
from the project are less than the de minimis emissions listed in R307-40l-9(l)(a); 
(2) documentation that the levels of any one hazardous air pollutant or any combination of hazardous air pollutants are less 
than the levels in R307-4 I 0-5( I )(d); and 
(3) the location of the remediation and where the remediated material originated. 
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R307-40 l-17. Temporary Relocation. 
The owner or operator of a stationary source previously approved under R307-40 l may temporarily relocate and operate the 
stationary source at any site for up to 180 working days in any calendar year not to exceed 365 consecutive days, starting from 
the initial relocation date. The director will evaluate the expected emissions impact at the site and compliance with applicable 
Title R307 rules as the bases for determining if approval for temporary relocation may be granted. Records of the working days 
at each site, consecutive days at each site, and actual production rate shall be submitted to the director at the end of each 180 
calendar days. These records shall also be kept on site by the owner or operator for the entire project, and be made available for 
review to the director as requested. R307-40 l-7, Public Notice, does not apply to temporary relocations under R307-401-17. 
R307-401-18. Eighteen Month Review. 
Approval orders issued by the director in accordance with the provisions of R307-401 will be reviewed eighteen months after the 
date of issuance to determine the status of construction, installation, modification, relocation or establishment. If a continuous 
program of construction, installation, modification, relocation or establishment is not proceeding, the director may revoke the 
approval order. 
R307-401-1 9. General Approval Order. 
{l) The director may issue a general approval order that would establish conditions for similar new or modified sources of the 
same type or for specific types of equipment. The general approval order may apply throughout the state or in a specific area. 
(a) A major source or major modification as defined in R307-403, R307-405, or R307-420 for each respective area is not 
eligible for coverage under a general approval order. 
(b) A source that is subject to the requirements of R307-403-5 is not eligible for coverage under a general approval order. 
( c) A source that is subject to the requirements of R307-4 l 0-4 is not eligible for coverage under a general approval order 
unless a demonstration that meets the requirements of R307-4 l 0-4 was conducted. 
(d) A source that is subject to the requirements of R307-4 l0-5( I )(c)(ii) or (iii) is not eligible for coverage under a general 
approval order. 
(2) A general approval order shall meet all applicable requirements of R307-401-8. 
(3) The public notice requirements in R307-40l-7 shall apply to a general approval order except that the director will advertise 
the notice of intent in a newspaper of statewide circulation. 
( 4) Application. 
(a) After a general approval order has been issued, the owner or operator of a proposed new or modified source may apply 
to be covered under the conditions of the general approval order. 
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(b) The owner or operator shall submit the application on forms provided by the director in lieu of the notice of intent 
requirements in R307-40 l-5 for all equipment covered by the general approval order. 
(c) The owner or operator may request that an existing, individual approval order for the source be revoked, and that it 
be covered by the general approval order. 
( d) The owner or operator that has applied to be covered by a general approval order shall not initiate construction, 
modification, or relocation until the application has been approved by the director. 
(5) Approval. 
(a) The director will review the application and approve or deny the request based on criteria specified in the general 
approval order for that type of source. If approved, the director will issue an authorization to the applicant to operate under 
the general approval order. 
(b) The public notice requirements in R307-401-7 do not apply to the approval of an application to be covered under the 
general approval order. 
(c) The director will maintain a record of all stationary sources that are covered by a specific general approval order and 
this record will be available for public review. 
(6) Exclusions and Revocation. 
(a) The director may require any source that has applied for or is authorized by a general approval order to submit a notice 
of intent and obtain an individual approval order under R307-401-8. Cases where an individual approval order will be 
required include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(i) the director determines that the source does not meet the criteria specified in the general approval order; 
(ii) the director determines that the application for the general approval order did not contain all necessary information 
to evaluate applicability under the general approval order; 
(iii) modifications were made to the source that were not authorized by the general approval order or an individual 
approval order; 
(iv) the director determines the source may cause a violation of a national ambient air quality standard; or 
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(v) the director determines that one is required based on the compliance history and current compliance status of the 
source or applicant. 
(b)(i) Any source authorized by a general approval order may request to be excluded from the coverage of the general 
approval order by submitting a notice of intent under R307-40l-5 and receiving an individual approval order under 
R307-401-8. 
(ii) When the director issues an individual approval order to a source subject to a general approval order, the 
applicability of the general approval order to the individual source is revoked on the effective date of the individual 
approval order. 
(7) Modification of General Approval Order. The director may modify, replace, or discontinue the general approval order. 
(a) Administrative corrections may be made to the existing version of the general approval order. These corrections are to 
correct typographical errors or similar minor administrative changes. 
(b) All other modifications or the discontinuation of a general approval order shall not apply to any source authorized 
under previous versions of the general approval order unless the owner or operator submits an application to be covered 
under the new version of the general approval order. Modifications under R307-40 l- l 9(7)(b) shall meet the public notice 
requirements in R307-401-l 9(3). 
(c) A general approval order shall be reviewed at least every three year. The review of the general approval order shall 
follow the public notice requirements of R307-401-19(3 ). 
(8) Modifications at a source covered by a general approval order. A source may make modifications only as authorized 
by the approved general approval order. Modifications outside the scope authorized by the approved general approval order 
shall require a new application for either an individual approval order under R307-401-8 or a general approval order under 
R307-401-l 9. 
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ADDENDUMB 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order Regarding Petitioners' 
Motion Requesting Stay of Approval Order 
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE 
UT AH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AL QUALITY 
In the Matter of: 
Approval Order No. DAQE-ANI0l230041-13 
Holly Refining & Marketing Company -
Woods Cross, LLC 
Heavy Crude Processing Project 
Project No. NI 0 I 23-004 I 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND PROPOSED ORDER 
REGARDING PETITIONERS' 
MOTION REQUESTING ST A Y OF 
APPROVAL ORDER 
Administrative Law Judge Bret F. Randall 
March 25, 2014 
This matter is before me pursuant to appointment by the Executive Director of the Utah 
Department of Environmental Quality dated January 9, 2014. The appointment charges me to 
conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann.,§ 19-1-301.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7. 
Procedural Background 
On November 18, 2013, the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality ("Director") 
issued approval order DAQE-AN 101230041- I 3 (Project Number N 10123-0041) (the "AO" or 
""Permit") to Holly Refining and Marketing Company, Woods Cross LLC ('"Holly"), authorizing 
the construction of the Heavy Black Waxy Crude Processing Project ("'Expansion Project"). 
On December 18, 2013, Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and FRIENDS of 
Great Salt Lake (collectively "Utah Physicians") filed a Request for Agency Action seeking 
administrative review of the AO, pursuant to Utah Code§§ 19-1-301.5 and 63G-4-201(1)(b), (3) 
and Utah Adm in. Code R305-7-203. 
On December 24, 2013, Utah Physicians filed a motion and supporting memorandum 
requesting a stay of the AO. pursuant to Utah Admin. Code R305-7-2l 7 and Utah Code Ann.§ 
I 9-1-301.5. However, because Utah Physicians had not been granted party status and no ALJ 
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had yet been appointed to this matter, the time for responding to the motion to stay did not begin 
to run at that time. 
On January 16, 2014, I entered an Order on Petition to Intervene, provisionally granting 
intervention to Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and Friends of Great Salt Lake 
( collectively, "Petitioners"). On the same date, I entered a Notice of Further Proceedings. 
Petitioners filed a Corrected Motion and Memorandum Requesting Stay on January 21, 
2014 ("Stay Motion"). I deemed that the date of the filing of the corrected motion for stay 
triggered a new response period for Respondents. The Stay Motion is the subject of the present 
Proposed Order. 
Pursuant to the Utah Code, whenever a motion to stay is filed in a permit review 
adjudicative proceeding, "'the administrative law judge shall: (i) consider a party's motion to 
stay a permit during a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and (ii) submit a proposed 
determination on the stay to the executive director." Section 19-1-301.5(15)(c), Utah Code Ann. 
Following briefing on the Stay Motion, I granted Respondents' motion for oral argument, 
with oral argument being held on March 6, 2014. All parties appeared and participated in oral 
argument, which was of record through a court reporter. 
Having heard argument on the Stay Motion, and being fully advised in the premises, and 
pursuant to Section 19-1-301.5( 15)( c ), Utah Code Ann., this tribunal enters the following 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and proposed determination that the 
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Environmental Quality ('~DEQ") deny Petitioners' 
Stay Motion for the reasons set forth herein. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
Regulatory Background 
I. Air pollution is harmful to human health and to the environment. [IR at 009140-
48; IR at 009139-45; IR at 009144-45; IR at 009145-47.] 
2. In enacting the Utah Air Conservation Act. the Utah Legislature declared: "It is 
the policy of this state and the purpose of [the Utah Air Conservation Act] to achieve and 
maintain levels of air quality which will protect human health and safety, and to the greatest 
degree practicable, prevent injury to plant and animal life and property, foster the comfort and 
convenience of the people. promote the economic and social development of this state, and 
facilitate the enjoyment of the natural attractions of this state:' Section 19-2-10 I (2), Utah Code 
Ann. 
3. The Utah Legislature further declared that the ··purpose·' of the Utah Air 
Conservation Act is to ··(a) provide for a coordinated statewide program of air pollution 
prevention. abatement. and control; (b) provide for an appropriate distribution of responsibilities 
among the state and local units of government; (c) facilitate cooperation across jurisdictional 
lines in dealing with problems of air pollution not confined within single jurisdictions~ and (d) 
provide a framework within which air quality may be protected and consideration given to the 
public interest at all levels of planning and development within the state." Section 19-2-10 l (4), 
Utah Code Ann. 
4. Similarly, in enacting the Clean Air Act, the Congress found, among other things: 
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by 
urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, 
has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, including 
3 
ADJ010800 
injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of 
property, and hazards to air and ground transportation; [and] 
(3) that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or elimination, through any 
measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the source) and air 
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local 
governments .... 
42 U.S.C. § 7401(a). 
5. Congress also stated that the "primary goal" of the Clean Air Act is to "encourage 
or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions ... for pollution 
prevention." 42 U.S.C. § 740 I (c). 
Permit Chronology 
6. In May of 2012, Holly Refining & Marketing Company- Woods Cross, LLC 
("Holly") submitted a notice of intent ("NOT") to DAQ requesting an approval order to expand 
its Woods Cross refinery and modernize certain equipment in a way that allowed Holly to 
process an additional 20,000 barrels per day of black wax crude from the Uintah Basin in eastern 
Utah ('"May NOi"). [May NOi at IR000049-001108.] 
7. In response to DAQ's request to provide additional information, Holly re-
submitted its NOT in July of 2012 ("July NOi"). [July NOi at IR002798-003590.] 
8. Following its technical and legal evaluation of the July NOT and related evidence, 
DAQ released for public comment an Intent to Approve ("First IT A"), dated November 28, 
2012. The First ITA included a draft Approval Order. [First ITA at IR001967-001996.] 
9. During the initial 60-day public comment period, DAQ received comments from 
Western Resource Advocates on behalf of Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment ("UPHE") 
and Friends of Great Salt Lake (''Friends") [IR004007-004035], Blaine Rawson on behalf of 
Mark J. Hall [IR004202-004217], Alexander Sagady on behalf of UPHE [IR009046-009135], 
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the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") [IR004001-004005], and Holly [IR003757-
00391 O]. 
l 0. In April 2013, Holly submitted a new netting analysis in a revised NOL [Revised 
NOi at IR007335-007395.] 
11. In addition to certain other changes, the Revised NOi estimated PM2.s emissions 
from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers based on the EPA's National Emission Inventory 
("NEI") data. [Id] 
12. Following its technical and legal evaluation of the Revised NOi and related 
evidence, DAQ released, on June 5, 2013, for a second public comment period an Intent to 
Approve document ("Second IT A") and a Source Plan Review C'SPR"). [Second IT A at 
IR007498-007499, SPR at IR008480-008575.] 
13. On July 25, 2013, DAQ received comments on the draft approval order from 
Western Resource Advocates on behalfUPHE [IR007842-007997], Blaine Rawson on behalf of 
Mark J. Hall [IR008579-008602], Alexander Sagady on behalf of Petitioners [IR009046-
009135], the EPA [IR007840-00784 I], and Holly [IR007613-007836]. 
14. Following its review and evaluation of the foregoing information and comments, 
on November 6, 2013, DAQ requested additional information from Holly that DAQ believed 
was necessary in order to fully consider the pending comments and evidence. Holly responded 
to DAQ' s request for additional information on November 7, 2013. [IR00802 l, IR008022-
0052.] 
15. After considering the supplemental information provided by Holly, on November 
18, 2013, DAQ issued Holly a new approval order authorizing the construction of the 
Modernization Project C'Holly AO"). [Holly AO at IR009223-009254.] 
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16. Concurrently therewith, DAQ issued a Response to Comments Memorandum 
(""Response Memorandum") that addressed the comments made during the public comment 
periods, explained DAQ's response to those comments, and, where appropriate, described how 
the comments had been incorporated into the Holly AO. [Response Memorandum at IR009 I 74-
009222.] 
17. On December 18, 2013, Petitioners filed their Request for Agency Action. On 
January 22, 2014, Petitioners filed their Amended Motion and Memorandum Requesting a Stay 
of the Approval Order. Oral argument was held on the Stay Motion on March 6, 2014. 
DAO's Permit Review 
18. In their Stay Motion, Petitioners challenge three portions of the Holly AO: (I) the 
µse of the NEI emission factors to estimate PM2_5 emissions from Holly's new gas-fired heaters 
and boilers; (2) the calculated coke bum rate for Holly's proposed Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit 
("FCC Unit 25"), and (3) the calculated reduction of PM2_5 emissions from the removal of 
Holly's existing propane pit flare. [Stay Motion, p. 15-37.] 
19. DAQ determined that use of the NEI emission factors to calculate PM2s 
emissions from the new heaters and boilers was appropriate because (1) there was substantial 
evidence in the record supporting the accuracy of these emission factors to estimate PM 
emissions from gas-fired heaters and boilers, as explained in the two reports from Glenn England 
[See Glen England Reports at IR007238-007258, IR008024-008044; see also Response 
Memorandum at IR009215-0092 l 6]; (2) DAQ had imposed a stack testing requirement in the 
Holly AO to verify that the emission factors were an accurate representation of actual emissions 
[Response Memorandum at IR008129-008 l 31 ]; and (3) DAQ imposed a limit derived from the 
NEI factors into the final Holly AO that is binding on Holly during all operations of the Woods 
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Cross refinery [Holly AO, Section 11.B.7.a.2 at IR009248; see also Response Memorandum at 
IR009217]. 
20. DAQ determined that regardless of whether there were other alternative emission 
factor calculations for heaters and boilers that yielded higher estimates, Holly would be subject 
to an enforceable PM 10 emission limit of 0.00051 lb/MMBtu, derived from the NEI emission 
factors. [See Response Memorandum IR008130.] DAQ reasoned that any failure by Holly to 
comply with that emission limit would result in compliance violations, which would ensure that 
Holly would not contribute a significant increase of PM as a result of the expansion. [Id.] 
21. DAQ determined that 40 C.F.R. § 60.14 did not require the use of the older AP-42 
emission factors, as Petitioners argued, to calculate Holly's PM2 5 emissions from the heaters and 
boilers because that regulation only applies to determining applicability of the New Source 
Performance Standards, "which [is] separate from the New Source Review regulations that are 
relevant to this permitting process." [Response Memorandum at IR008l30.] Moreover "EPA 
guidance states that sources other than the AP-42 emission factors may be used in determining 
emissions for PSD/NSR emissions ... including '[e]mission factors from technical literature."' 
[Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting EPA New Source Review Workshop Manual, 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting, draft dated October 
1990 at A.22).] 
22. With respect to the PM2_5 emission reduction of2. I 9 tons per year (""tpy") from 
the decommissioning of Holly's propane pit flare, which Petitioners claimed was inaccurately 
high, the Revised NOi reflects that Holly and DAQ calculated this emission reduction using the 
actual emission inventory data on file at DAQ for the years 2008 and 2009. [Revised NOi at 
IR007339; Response Memorandum at IR0092 I 8 ('"flare emissions came from the UDAQ 
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inventory record for reported actual emissions from 2008-2009 based on 259 MMBtu/hr and 
actual throughput data").] 
23. As to the coke bum rate for Holly's proposed FCC Unit 25, which Petitioners 
claimed was inaccurately low, the emission calculations Holly provided to DAQ indicate that the 
rate was calculated based on actual emission data from the current FCC Unit 4, a larger unit than 
the proposed FCC Unit 25, and thus was a conservatively high estimate of expected emissions 
from the FCC Unit 25. [IR008052; see also Holly AO at IR009227-009229 (The FCC Unit 4 
processes 8,880 barrels per day ("'bpd") while the proposed FCC Unit 25 can only process 8,500 
bpd.] 
24. Regardless of the coke bum rate, DAQ concluded that the FCC Unit 25 is subject 
to a specific PM 10 limit of 0.301b/1000 lb. of coke burned, which is limited by the 8,500 bpd 
operating capacity, and is also subject to the overall PM 10 emission cap of 47.5 tpy and 0.13 tons 
per day ("tpd") for combustion sources. [Response Memorandum at IR009219.] "If these 
limitations are not met, the refinery will be out of compliance until it remedies the problem with 
additional control equipment or redesign of the system until it meets these limits." [Id.] 
25. DAQ rejected Petitioners' calculation of coke bum based on the Universal Oil 
Products yield estimates because they "provided no documents or primary data to support or 
detail [] which estimate, if any, was used to derive the suggested range of coke bum estimates." 
[Response Memorandum at IR009219.] "Based on UDAQ's technical experience and 
expertise," DAQ determined that ""the 6200 lb/hr value is a fair and reasonable estimate of the 
quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25." [Id.] 
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Impacts of Modernization Proiect Construction 
26. The Conrad Jenson Declaration submitted with Holly's opposition to the Stay 
Motion C'Jenson Declaration") is the most recent evidence of Holly's present construction 
schedule. In light of the procedural history recited above, the earlier construction timetable 
estimates are deemed to be updated by the facts as set forth in the Jenson Declaration, which are 
credited and treated as true for the purposes of this proposed order. 
27. According to the Jenson Declaration, Holly's first phase of construction will not 
be fully installed and operational until the fall of 2015. [Exhibit A to Holly's Opposition to 
Petitioners Motion Requesting Stay of Approval Order ,I 9.] 
28. "[D]uring the construction of Phase I, there will not be any increase in emissions 
until completion of Phase I in the fall of2015." [Id. ,I 10.] 
29. As confirmed by the parties during oral argument, this permit review adjudicative 
proceeding is expected to be fully briefed by July 9, 2014. [See Corrected Stipulated Order 
Regarding Response to Request for Agency Action and Subsequent Deadlines, dated February 
19.2014.] Oral argument likely will be scheduled before the end of July 2014 and a 
recommended order will likely be prepared for the Executive Director as soon as possible after 
oral argument, certainly by the end of September 2014. [ See Stay Motion Hearing Transcript at 
p. 14-16.] During this time, it is undisputed that there will be no increase in emissions from the 
Holly refinery due to the Modernization Project, and no emissions for at least a year beyond the 
proposed adjudicative proceeding timeline. [Jenson Declaration ,I IO.] 
30. Holly has already incurred approximately $48,000,000 in costs for preliminary 
activities in preparation for construction. [Id. ,I 6.] 
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31 . Holly commenced construction on the Expansion Project after receiving the Holly 
AO. [Id. 17.] 
32. The overall costs of the Modernization Project are anticipated to be approximately 
$700 to $800 million, with approximately $300 million allocated to Phase I and the remaining 
approximate $400 to $500 million allocated to Phase II. These estimated costs represent 
design/engineering, materials, and construction costs. [Id. 1 11.] 
33. If the Holly AO is stayed and construction stopped, it is undisputed that Holly 
'Yould experience significant demobilization and remobilization costs. According to the Jenson 
Declaration, the demobilization costs include hourly pay rates for the remaining contract workers 
who will need to secure construction equipment and the construction site safely during the stay 
period. It also includes costs of equipment storage. Remobilization costs would include similar 
expenses for restarting work that had been stopped. If construction is stayed, Holly's main 
contractor would charge a minimum of$625,000 per month for such delays. These figures do 
not account for lost profits or additional harm of furth~r delay on the overall project schedule. 
[Id. 1 13.] 
34. Delays in the Project are directly correlated with lost revenue that Holly would 
have generated if it were able to process the increased number of barrels of crude on schedule. 
For every month Holly is unable to process additional crude, it anticipates a loss of 
approximately $10,000,000. [Id. 1 15.] 
35. During Phase I and Phase II of construction, Holly anticipates up to 500 people at 
any given time on site fulfilling construction jobs related to the project. [Id. 1 17.] 
36. After Phase I of the Modernization Project is completed, Holly anticipates a 25% 
increase in permanent jobs at the Woods Cross refinery. After completion of Phase II, Holly 
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anticipates another 25% increase in permanent jobs. This is a 50% overall increase in permanent 
jobs at the refinery. [Id 1 18.] 
37. Overall, the Modernization Project will create a public benefit through job 
creation, increased state and local taxes, and capital infusion and investment in Davis County, as 
well as benefits from increased crude production within the state of Utah. These benefits will be 
delayed or may be lost if Holly is forced to stop construction on the Project. [Id. 1 19.] 
38. The Modernization Project may also result in a number of calculated emission 
reductions at the Holly refinery, including a reduction in NOx by 21.53 tpy, a reduction in SO2 by 
150.69 tpy, and a reduction in VOC by 17.02 tpy. [IR007575.] DAQ has determined that these 
pollutants are precursors to PM2.5 and major contributors to wintertime inversions in the Salt 
Lake Valley. [Utah State Implementation Plan, § IX.A, dated December 4, 2013, § 1.6.] 
According to the recent Utah State Implementation Plan for PM2.s, reductions in these pollutants 
would have the secondary effect ofreducing wintertime PM2.s levels. [Id.] 
39. Based on the evidence, these emission reductions are the result of voluntary 
pollution control strategies that Holly has proposed for the Modernization Project and that are 
incorporated in the Holly AO. [See SPR at IR008564, IR008568-008569; see also IR007335.] 
These reductions fall into five different categories: 
a. Holly will install a new wet gas scrubber as part of the new FCC Unit 25 and 
will route its existing gas streams that presently are emitted after treatment in 
an existing sulfur recovery unit ('"SRU") through that wet gas scrubber, 
reducing overall SO2 emissions [See July NOi IR002812, 002821, 002823-
002824.]; 
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b. Holly will remove both its propane pit flare and the frozen earth propane pit 
storage facility, which will reduce NOx and VOC emissions, respectively [See 
July NOi at IR002828, 003035]; 
c. Holly will replace four gas-driven compressor engines with electric engines, 
which will reduce NOx emissions [See Revised NOi at IR007335]; 
d. Holly will add selective catalytic reduction technology to three current heaters 
and boilers, further reducing NOx emissions [See Source Plan Review at 
IR00855 l; Holly AO at IR009248]; and 
e. Holly will be subject to overall, refinery-wide emissions limitation reductions 
for PM10, NOx, and SO2. [See Holly AO at IR009225.] 
40. Based on the evidence of record, if the Holly AO is stayed or remanded, these 
emission control strategies will either be delayed or will not be implemented because they are 
approved and authorized by the Holly AO. [See SPR at IR008564, IR008568-008569; see also 
IR007335.] 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. This is a permit review adjudicative proceeding pursuant to Utah Code § 19-1-
301.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7. 
2. The Stay Motion is governed by Section 19-1-301 .5( 15), Utah Code Ann., 
providing: 
(a) The filing of a request for agency action does not stay a permit or delay the 
effective date of a perm it. 
(b) A permit may not be stayed or delayed unless a stay is granted under this 
Subsection ( 15). 
(c) The administrative law judge shall: 
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(i) consider a party's motion to stay a permit during a permit review 
adjudicative proceeding~ and 
(ii) submit a proposed determination on the stay to the executive director. 
(d) The administrative law judge may not recommend to the executive director a 
stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit, unless: 
3. 
(i) all parties agree to the stay; or 
(ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that: 
(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm unless 
the stay is issued; 
(8) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs 
whatever damage the proposed stay is likely to cause the party restrained 
or enjoined; 
(C) the stay, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; 
and 
(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay 
will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents 
serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further 
adjudication. 
In order to prevail on the Stay Motion, Petitioners must satisfy all four of the 
statutory elements listed above. Failure to satisfy even one element is fatal to the Stay Motion. 
See Utah Med. Prods. Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah 1998). 
4. Petitioners' burden to satisfy the four factors listed above is more stringent under 
Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 than under the analogous state ( or federal) procedural stay 
standards. Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 represents statutory language enacted by the Utah 
Legislature. By contrast, the law governing interlocutory relief in state and federal courts is 
primarily judge-made common law, guided by procedural rules. In Utah, the rules of civil 
procedure do not rise to the level of statutory law but are promulgated and regulated by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Section 78A-3-103, Utah Code Ann. The express statutory language provides 
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governing stays in permit review adjudicative proceedings states that the ALJ "may not" 
recommend a stay of a permit "unless" the moving party establishes all four statutory elements. 
By contrast, Rule 65A of the Utah Rule o/Civil Procedure begins with a neutral presumption 
and simply provides that a court "may issue" an injunction upon a showing of four elements. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e) ("A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a 
showing that .... "). This permissive language is consistent with the touchstone of interlocutory 
relief in state and federal courts: the broad discretion afforded state and federal judges. See 
Southwest Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582 F.3d 1176, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009) ('"The district 
court's discretion in [granting an injunction] is necessarily broad .... "); Purkey v. Roberts, 2012 
UT App 241,121, 285 P.3d 1242 ("Ultimately, the decision of whether to issue an injunction 
remains within the discretion of the trial court."). It is also worth noting that the federal courts 
of appeals have articulated differing versions of the discretionary, balancing tests applicable to 
interlocutory orders. However, these legal tests relate to a trial judge's discretion and are 
therefore not directly applicable here in light of the clear and unambiguous requirement in the 
Utah Code that the moving party prove the application of all four statutory standards. 
5. Based on the foregoing and without limiting the potential discretion of the 
Executive Director in granting preliminary injunctive relief in permit review adjudicative 
proceedings, it is clear that the Utah Legislature employed mandatory language that is not found 
in the analogous federal and state procedural rules and case law. As a result, the state and federal 
cases governing stays and injunctive relief, while important to consider. also apply less stringent 
legal standards than the Utah Legislature has directed be applied to the Stay Motion. Analysis of 
the following factors is therefore undertaken in light of the more stringent statutory standard 
established by the Utah Legislature. 
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Irreparable Harm 
6. Irreparable harm being the sine qua non of interlocutory relief, the moving party 
has a particularly heavy burden to prove it. Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite 
Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the irreparable harm factor is the "single 
most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction") (internal quotations and 
citation omitted); accord, Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983); see also New 
York v. NRC, 550 F.2d 745, 753 (2d Cir. 1977). Irreparable harm must be non-speculative and 
imminent: there must be evidence supporting a conclusion that irreparable harm will, in fact, 
occur if the relief is not granted. See Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Medical Corp., 952 F.2d 
8Q2(4th Cir.1991). 
7. In the context of a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the irreparable harm 
must necessarily relate to the period of time between the date of the motion for stay and the final 
determination on the merits. This conclusion is particularly important in the instant proceeding, 
where no evidentiary hearing or trial is provided. In an analogous situation, Judge Posner wrote: 
"When persons harmed by administrative action bring a suit for injunction in a federal district 
court, it is not because they want, or are entitled to, a trial." Cronin v. United States Dep 't of 
Agriculture, 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990). Rather, he continued, such persons are entitled 
to judicial review of the agency action, applying the standard touchstones of administrative law. 
Id. After considering the legal standards that might be applied to that case, involving a Forest 
Service decision to allow for the cutting of timber on federal land. Judge Posner concluded: 
"But all this assumes that the decision whether to grant or deny the preliminary injunction is 
preliminary to a full hearing on the plaintiffs claim. If it is not[, then] the two stages are 
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collapsed into one because there will never be a fuller hearing .... " Id. at 445. See also 
Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F .3d 227, 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that a 
petitioner must show that "the harm ... [is] so imminent as to be irreparable if a court waits until 
the end of trial to resolve the harm."). Stated differently, "if a trial on the merits can be 
conducted before the injury would occur there is no need for interlocutory relief." 11 A Charles 
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948. l, at 129 
(3d ed. 2013). Such is certainly the case in these proceedings: the decision on the merits will be 
rendered prior to the time that the Expansion Project begins operation. 
8. Petitioners have failed to carry their burden of proof that they will suffer 
irreparable harm if the Permit is not stayed prior to the time that the review on the merits is 
completed in this matter. The record supports the finding that hearing and determination on the 
merits in this case will be completed by the end of the summer of 2014, long before the 
Expansion Project is operational, being the fall of 2015 at the earliest. [Jenson Declaration ,r 10.] 
If Petitioners are successful on their claims on the merits, then the proper remedy would be to 
remand to the Director to reconsider the Perm it. In that event, the Petitioner would not have the 
Permit necessary to operate the Expansion Project as required by the Utah Air Conservation Act 
and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). The requested injunctive relief would therefore be self-
enforcing and no claimed irreparable harm could result.' If Petitioners' claims fail on the merits, 
then injunctive relief would not be warranted in any event. 
1 This conclusion is an important consideration here because the case law cited by Petitioners supporting the Stay 
Motion is distinguishable from the case at bar. Here, success on the merits would itself result in a self-enforcing 
injunction, inasmuch as the Permit is required in order for Holly to operate the Expansion Project in the first 
instance. Thus, this matter is distinguishable from Davis v. Mine ta, 302 F3d 1104 ( I 01h Cir. 2002), where 
construction of the highway project in question without proper wetland fill permits under the Clean Water Act may 
have caused irreparable harm. 
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9. Petitioners have failed to carry their burden of proof that "·bureaucratic 
momentum" will result in irreparable harm prior to the time that hearing on the merits is 
completed. There is no evidence to support any such conclusion. Moreover, the instant permit 
review adjudicative proceeding is easily distinguishable from the cases cited by Petitioners, 
supporting their "bureaucratic momentum" argument for irreparable harm. Here, the provisions 
of the CAA impose substantive requirements on Holly within the permitting process or upon a 
remand. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F .2d 497, 503 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that where a 
statute substantively "require[s}the agency to change direction," such as the Clean Water Act at 
issue in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 ( 1982), or the Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act in Amoco Prod Co. v. Village of Gambell. 480 U.S.531 (I 987), 
"bureaucratic commitment to a project" does not constitute irreparable harm). Indeed, the one 
case to address the ''bureaucratic commitment" theory in the context of the CAA permitting 
process expressly rejected the argument. Sierra Club v. Larsen, 769 F. Supp. 420 (D. Mass. 
1991 ), aff'd 2 F.3d 462 ( I st Cir. 1993). The National Environmental Protection Act (""NEPA") 
case law upon which Petitioners rely for their ··bureaucratic momentum" argument is simply 
inapplicable in this case. See Marsh, 872 F.2d at 503; 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(l) ("No action taken 
under the CAA shall be deemed a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act."). Stated 
differently, under the CAA, Holly is required to have, maintain, and follow a legal and valid 
permit in order to operate the Expansion Project. This scenario is easily distinguishable from a 
NEPA situation, where the law requires. and only requires. that full consideration of the 
environmental impacts of all applicable options be undertaken and completed before the "federal 
action" can be initiated. More specifically, the principle in Sierra Club that a violation of NEPA 
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constitutes an irreparable injury rests on NEPA's purpose to foster informed decision-making. 
Sierra Club, 872 F.2d at 500. In the context ofNEPA, irreparable harm to the environment, 
almost by definition, occurs because uninformed decisionmakers commit themselves to a course 
of action that rarely can be undone given "a chain of bureaucratic commitment that will become 
progressively harder to undo the longer it continues." Id Such considerations are not applicable 
here, where the substantive requirements of the CAA will continue to have prospective 
application. 
I 0. Petitioners' failure to carry their burden of proof as to irreparable harm is 
dispositive to the Stay Motion. However, analysis of the remaining factors is warranted. 
Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
11. Petitioners raise three issues in their Stay Motion regarding the merits: (I) the 
assertion that DAQ erred in allowing the use of the NEI emission factors to calculate PM25 
emissions from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers; (2) the assertion that Holly overestimated 
the PM2_5 emission reductions that will be realized through the decommissioning of the propane 
pit flare; and (3) the assertion that DAQ underestimated the coke bum rate from the FCC Unit 
25, which Petitioners argue will result in higher PM2.5 emissions. [Stay Motion pp. 15-37.] 
12. The merits have not yet been fully briefed and argued by the parties. 
13. DAQ is granted substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules. 
See Utah Code § 19-1-3 0 1 . 5 ( l 4 )( c) ( express I y "'recognizing that [DA Q] has been granted 
substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules"). Moreover, Section 19- 1-
301.5 instructs that DA Q's factual, technical and scientific determinations should be upheld if 
they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Utah Code § 19-1-301.5( 14 )( c ). 
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14. Solely for purposes of this Recommended Order, I conclude that Petitioners have 
failed to carry their burden of showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits, or that the 
case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further adjudication. 
Carrying this burden here requires a showing that DAQ abused its discretion or lacked 
substantial evidence to support its factual, technical and scientific determinations in connection 
with the Pennit. 
15. In reaching Conclusion No. 14, I rely in large part on the independent 
detennination of EPA that the Permit is acceptable, notwithstanding Petitioners' objections. See 
EPA Comment Letters [IR004001-004005; IR007840-007841]. In Alaska Dep 't of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461. 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
EPA is entitled to review the reasonableness of state pennitting authorities' BACT 
determinations under the PSD program and has authority to issue stop construction orders if it 
reasonably believes that a BACT designation is erroneous or unreasonable. The CAA also 
provides EPA with concurrent enforcement authority that is directly applicable to the present 
proceeding. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7477, 7413(a)(5)(A) (describing the enforcement options available to 
the EPA when it finds that a state is not complying with any requirement of the CAA with 
respect to construction of a new source or modification of an existing source). See Jennifer A. 
Davis Foster, Note, EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology: The 
Supreme Court Determines the Proper Scope of Enforcement, 69 Missouri L. Rev., Issue 4, at 1 
(Fall 2004). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that if in EPA's independent judgment, any of the 
objections and issues Petitioners have raised on the merits were deserving of further evaluation, 
comment, or reconsideration, EPA had an independent duty and authority to pursue such issues. 
EPA declined to do so even after being given the opportunity in connection with the Pennit. 
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16. In this permit review adjudicative proceeding, we have a somewhat unusual 
situation in administrative law where not one but two regulatory agencies with significant 
technical expertise and concurrent (and somewhat overlapping) legal jurisdiction have been 
involved in the procedural and substantive process that led to the issuance of the Permit. This 
situation provides a second layer ofregulatory oversight to ensure that the applicable procedural 
and substantive requirements of the CAA, as adopted and enforced through the Utah Air 
Conservation Act in the spirit of ~-cooperative federalism," have been met. Solely for purposes 
of the Stay Motion, therefore, I conclude that EPA's independent review and acceptance of the 
Permit demonstrates that Petitioners do not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits 
or that the case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further 
adjudication 
17. Petitioners' failure to carry their burden of proof as to success on the merits 
should, standing alone, be dispositive of the Stay Motion. 
Public Interest 
18. Air pollution is harmful to humans and ecological receptors. Thus, it is self-
evident that the public interest is served by reduction and elimination of air pollution. Under our 
system, however, a source's compliance with the requirements set forth in the CAA, as 
implemented through the Utah Air Conservation Act and related rules and regulations, satisfies, 
as a matter of law, the public policy of protection of human health and the environment from 
exposures to air pollution. 
19. Petitioners have failed to make a showing of cognizable harm that will occur 
during the pendency of these proceedings unless the Holly AO is stayed. As a result, they have 
failed to show that the public interest favors a stay. 
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20. To the extent that a violation of the CAA and other applicable law may have 
occurred in connection with the Permit, the instant proceedings will be concluded prior to the 
time that the Expansion Project begins operation. And in the event that Petitioners are successful 
on the merits, injunctive relief, in a sense, would be self-executing since a valid permit is 
required to operate the Expansion Project in the first instance. Hence, I find that the public 
interest is adequately protected by compliance with the existing permitting requirements set forth 
in the Utah Air Conservation Act and the CAA. 
21. The record also shows that the Holly AO will result in substantial emission 
reductions in SO2, NOx, and VOCs, which are precursors to PM pollution along the Wasatch 
Front. The Holly AO will also lower refinery-wide emissions limits for PM 10, NOx, and SO2. 
Staying the Holly AO will delay implementation of pollution control technologies that will result 
in these emission reductions, harming the public interest. 
22. Finally, the public interest also extends to the economic activity, including jobs 
the Modernization Project design and construction will generate. This undisputed factor weighs 
against the Stay Motion. 
23. Petitioners' failure to establish that the Stay Motion is in the public interest should 
be dispositive of the Stay Motion. 
Balance of Harms 
24. Petitioners have failed to carry their burden to show that the balance of harms tips 
in their favor. 
25. The increased emissions about which Petitioners complain will not occur until 
after construction is completed in 2015, long after determination on the merits is completed. By 
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contrast, a stay would result in the immediate cessation of design and construction activities for 
the Expansion Project, resulting in the undisputed harms that are of record. 
26. Finally, if Petitioners are successful on the merits, injunctive relief would be self-
executing as discussed above. The balance of the harms, therefore, does not tip in Petitioners' 
favor. 
27. Petitioners' failure to carry their burden to demonstrate that the balance of harms 
tips in their favor should be dispositive of the Stay Motion. 
PROPOSED ORDER 
Based on the forgoing, I recommend that the Executive Director deny the Stay Motion. 
DA TED this 25th day of March, 2014. 
BRET F. RANDALL 
Administrative Law Judge 
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ADDENDUMC 
Order Adopting AJL' s Proposed Order and Denying Petitioners' Request for Stay 
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
In the Matter of: 
Approval Order No. 
DAQE-AN101230041-13 
Holly Refining & Marketing Company-
Woods Cross, LLC 
Heavy Crude Processing Project 
Project Number: Nl0123-0041 
ORDER ADOPTING ALJ'S PROPOSED 
ORDER 
and 
DENYINGPETITIONERS'REQUEST 
FORSTAY 
Amanda Smith 
Executive Director 
Department of Environmental Quality 
May8,2014 
1bis matter is before me based on the Administrative Law Judge's proposed 
determination on a motion for stay in this matter. For the reasons set forth herein, I hereby adopt 
the March 25, 2014 Proposed Order regarding Petitioners' Motion Requesting Stay of Approval 
Order. 
Findings of Fact 
1. On November 18, 2013, the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality issued 
Approval Order DAQE-AN101230041-13 (Project Number Nl0123-0041) (hereafter "AO") to 
Holly Refining and Marketing Company, for the construction of the Heavy Black Waxy Crude 
Processing Project 
2. On December 18, 2013, Petitioners Utah Physicians for a Health Environment and 
Friends of the Great Salt Lake (hereinafter "Utah Physicians") filed a Request for Agency Action 
(RFAA) seeking a review of the AO pursuant to Utah Code §§19-1-301.5 and 63G-4-201(1)(b) 
and Utah Admin. Code RJ0S-7-203. 
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3. On January 9, 2014, I appointed Bret F. Randall as the Administrative Law Judge 
(AIJ) in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §19-1-301.5(5). I charged the ALJ to conduct 
a permit review adjudicative proceeding in accordance with Utah Code Ann., §19-1-301.5 and 
Utah Admin. Code R305-7. 
4. On December 21, 2013, Utah Physicians filed a motion and supporting memorandum 
requesting a stay of the AO pending a full hearing on the merits pursuant to Utah Code ~, 
§19-1-301.5(15) and Utah Admin. Code R305-7-217. Petitioners filed a Corrected Motion and 
Memorandum Requesting Stay on January 21, 2014. 
5. Following extensive briefing on the motion to stay by the Parties, the ALJ heard oral 
argument on March 6, 2014. The hearing was transcribed by a comt reporter. 
6. On March 25, 2014, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §19-1-301.5(15)(c), the AU 
issued proposed findings of fact (including references to the initial administrative record) 
conclusions of law and a proposed order recommending that the Executive Director deny the 
petitioners' motion to stay. 
7. The ALJ's findings of fact (including references to the initial administrative record) 
address the: regulatory background; permit chronology; DAQ's permit review; and impacts of 
modernization project construction. The AL.J's conclusions of law address each of the four 
statutory elements required for a stay. The required statutory elements were briefed and argued 
by the parties at the March 6, 2014 hearing. 
8. On April 8, 2014, Utah Physicians submitted comments on the ALJ's proposed order. 
The following memoranda were subsequently filed on April 15, 2014 in response to Utah 
Physicians' comments: Holly's Response to Utah Physicians' Comments on ALJ's 
Recommended Order Re: Petitioners' Request for a Stay of Approval Order; and the Utah 
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Division of Air Quality's Response to Utah Physicians' Comments on AU's Recommended 
Order Regarding Stay of Approval Order. 
9. The points raised by Holly and DAQ in response to Utah Physicians' comments 
confirm that the comments repeat points previously briefed and argued at the time of the hearing 
on the stay. The AU has addressed each of those points in his proposed order. 
Conclusions of Law 
10. Whenever a motion to stay is filed in a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the 
ALJ shall: (i) consider a party's motion to stay a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and (ii) 
submit a proposed determination on the stay to the Executive Director. Utah Code Ann., § 19-1-
301.5(15)( C ). 
11. Utah Code Ann., §191-301.S(lS)(d) provides that the AU may not recommend to 
the executive director a stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit, unless: (i) all parties agree to 
the stay; or (ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that: 
(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm ~ess the stay is issued; 
(B) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed stay is likely to cause the party restrained or enjoined; 
(C) the stay, if issued would not be adverse to the public interest; and 
(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the 
merits of the underlying cl~ or the case presents serious issues on the merits, which 
should be the subject of further adjudication. 
The Parties did not stipulate to a stay and the Petitioners must, therefore, demonstrate 
compliance with all of the four statutory elements. 
12. The AU' s findings of fact and conclusions of law address each of the elements 
necessary for a stay and establish that based on the record then before the AU, the Petitioners 
have failed to carry their burden of proof on the statutory elements required for a stay. 
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-Order 
I have reviewed the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and proposed 
determination. I have also reviewed the comments and responses to comments submitted by the 
parties regarding the AU' s proposed determination. Based on the ALJ's review and evaluation, I 
am persuaded that the petitioners have failed to meet the statutory elements required for a stay. I 
therefore adopt the AIJ's findings of fact, conclusions oflaw and proposed order, and I deny the 
Petitioners' motion for stay. 
Dated this 8th day of May, 2014 
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Amanda Smith, Executive Director 
Department of Environmental Quality 
195 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-4810 
amandasmith@utab.gov 
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ADDENDUMD 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits 
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE 
UT AH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AL QUALITY 
In the Matter of: 
Approval Order No. DAQE-AN101230041-13 
Holly Refining & Marketing Company-
Woods Cross, LLC 
Heavy Crude Processing Project 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDED 
ORDER ON THE MERITS 
Administrative Law Judge Bret F. Randall 
March I 1, 20 15 
This matter is before me pursuant to appointment by the Executive Director of the Utah 
Department of Environmental Quality dated January 9, 2014. The appointment charges me to 
conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann.,§ 19-1-301.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7. Following are my Findings ofFact, 1 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits. 
1 While the Utah Code directs me to provide "findings of fact," I note that my review of this matter is in an appellate 
capacity. There was no trial, no witnesses were called, no testimony was heard, and no evidence was presented to 
me as a trier of fact. Thus, the legislature's requirement that the ALJ provide "findings of fact" and a proposed 
dispositive action should not be read to suggest that I have weighed evidence, except in an appellate-like role, 
applying the standards of review as discussed below. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This matter came before me for oral argument on September 17, 2014 at 9:30 am. 
Present at the argument was Joro Walker and Rob Dubuc on behalf of Petitioners; Christian 
Stephens for Respondent Division of Air Quality; and Steve Christiansen, David Reymann, 
Cheylynn Hayman, and Megan Houdeshel for Respondent Holly. Having reviewed the briefing 
in this matter and heard oral argument, I propose that Petitioners' Request for Agency Action 
and all claims asserted therein be rejected. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. In May of 2012, Holly Refining & Marketing Company- Woods Cross, LLC 
("Holly") submitted a notice of intent ('"May NOi") to the Utah Division of Environmental 
Quality ("UDAQ") requesting an approval order to expand its Woods Cross refinery ("Holly 
Refinery") and modernize certain equipment in a way that would allow Holly to process an 
additional 20,000 barrels per day of black wax crude from the Uintah Basin in eastern Utah 
("·Modernization Project"). [May NOi, IR000049-001108]. 
2. In July of 2012, Holly re-submitted its May NOi with revisions in response to 
UDAQ's request for additional information ("July NOi"). [July NOi, IR002798-003590]. 
3. On November 28, 2012, UDAQ released for public comment an Intent to 
Approve document ("First IT A") containing a draft approval order. [First IT A, IR00 1967-
001996]. 
4. During the initial 60-day public comment period, UDAQ received comments 
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") [IR00400l-004005]; Western 
Resource Advocates on behalf of Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and Friends of 
Great Salt Lake (collectively '"Petitioners") [IR004007-004035]; Blaine Rawson on behalf of 
5 
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Mark J. Hall [IR004202-0042 I 7]; Alexander Sagady on behalf of Petitioners [IR009046-
009 I 35]; and Holly [IR003757-00391 O]. 
5. In February and March of 2013, Holly provided a detailed response to EPA 
relating to the EPA's comments referenced above, which objected (among other things) to 
Holly's original netting analysis. [IR008245-008259]. 
6. In March 2013, Holly submitted a new netting analysis partly in response to a 
specific request made by UDAQ in February of2013 and partly in response to EPA's comments 
referenced above [IR008198-008259]. 
7. In April 2013, Holly formally submitted a revised NOi (''Revised NOi'') to 
UDAQ that also included the new netting analysis. [Revised NOi at IR007335-007395]. 
8. In addition to certain other changes, the Revised NOi estimated PM2.s emissions 
from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers based on the EPA 's National Emission Inventory 
("NE I") data. [Id.] 
9. On June 5, 2013, UDAQ released for a second public comment period an Intent to 
Approve document ('"Second IT A") and a Source Plan Review. [Second IT A, IR00008449-
008479; SPR, IR008480-008575]. 
I 0. On July 25.2013, UDAQ received comments on the draft approval order in the 
Second ITA from EPA ("EPA's Second Comment Letter") [IR007840-007841]; Western 
Resource Advocates on behalf Petitioners (''Petitioners' Second Comment Letter") [IR007842-
007997]; Blaine Rawson on behalf of Mark J. Hall ("Rawson's Second Comment Letter") 
[IR008579-008602]; Alexander Sagady on behalf of Petitioners ('"Sagady's Second Comment 
Letter") [IR009046-009 l 35]; and Holly ("'Holly's Second Comment Letter") [IR0076 l 3-
007836]. 
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11. On November 6, 2013, UDAQ requested additional information from Holly 
pertaining to certain comments raising questions about the Second IT A and Holly responded to 
this request for supplemental information on November 7, 2013. [IR00802 I, IR008022-0052]. 
12. On November 18, 2013, UDAQ issued a Response to Comments Memorandum 
("Response to Comments Memo") addressing all of the comments made during the second 
public comment period, explained UDAQ's response to those comments, and, where appropriate, 
described how the comments had been incorporated into the Holly AO. [Response to Comments 
Memo, IR0091 74-009222]. 
13. UDAQ, having considered and answered all of the comments received during the 
public comment period, issued Holly a new approval order authorizing the construction of the 
Modernization Project C~Holly AO"), on November 18, 2013. [Holly AO, IR009223-009254]. 
14. On December 18, 2013, Petitioners filed their Request for Agency Action 
contesting UDAQ's issuance of the Holly AO ("RAA''). 
15. In January 9, 2014, the Executive Director ofUDAQ appointed me as the 
administrative law judge ("ALJ") to conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this 
matter in accordance with Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 and Utah Adm in. Code R305-7. 
16. On January 16, 2014, I issued a Notice of Further Proceedings, in which, among 
other things, ordered that the party with the burden of proof on any issue would be held to a 
stringent marshaling requirement ('"Marshaling Requirement"). 
17. On January 22, 2014, Petitioners filed an Amended Motion and Memorandum 
Requesting a Stay of the Approval Order ('"Motion for Stay"). Oral argument was held on the 
Motion for Stay on March 6, 2014. 
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18. On March 25, 2014, I recommended to the Executive Director of the Department 
of Environmental Quality ("Executive Director") deny the Motion for Stay finding that 
Petitioners had not satisfied the four factors required for issuance of a stay of an environmental 
permit. 
19. On May 8, 2014, the Executive Director of the Department of Environmental 
Quality adopted my proposed order and denied the Motion for Stay. 
20. Prior to briefing the merits, Holly and UDAQ submitted Motions to Dismiss 
certain issues in Petitioners' RAA. 
21. On April 2, 2014, I denied without prejudice the Motions to Dismiss, finding at 
that time that "preservation issues would be most efficiently addressed in connection with 
briefing on the merits," which would afford a reviewing court "a more complete record for 
appellate review." [Order on Motions to Dismiss at 6-7]. 
22. On April 16, 2014, the Petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification Regarding 
Notice of Further Proceedings, in which they asked me to clarify the Marshaling Requirement 
imposed by the Notice of Further Proceedings. 
23. On April 17, 2014, I issued an Order Clarifying the Marshaling Requirement 
(''Clarification Order") reiterating that the Petitioners bear the burden to marshal all of the 
evidence in the administrative record, both supportive of and contrary to their claims. 
24. On September 12, 2014, I issued a subsequent Order regarding the Marshaling 
Requirement, clarifying further the Petitioners' burden of proof in light of the Utah Supreme 
Court decision in State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT I 0, 326 P.3d 645. In that Order, I explained that 
Petitioners were required to marshal all of the evidence in the administrative record to carry their 
burden of proof on any particular issue. 
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25. On September 17, 2014, after receiving briefs on the merits from all the parties, I 
heard oral argument to hear the merits of Petitioners' RAA, as required by the Utah Code. After 
reviewing and considering all of the facts and arguments presented in the briefing and at oral 
argument and pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5(12)(c), I hereby submit to the Executive 
Director the following Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order 
Regarding the Merits. 
LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS ADJUDICATION 
I. Standard of Review 
1. This permit review adjudicative proceeding is governed by Utah Code Section 19-
1-301.5, which requires the presiding ALJ to '"conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding 
based only on the administrative record and not as a trial de novo." Utah Code § 19-1-
301 .5(8)(a). Unlike many other administrative proceedings involving an ALJ, in a permit review 
adjudicative proceeding it is clear that the Utah Legislature intended to limit the ALJ's authority 
to a review of UDAQ's decision, thereby placing the ALJ in an appellate-like review role. There 
is to be no trial. There will be no witnesses. no examination or cross examination, and no 
findings of fact where disputed testimony is weighed and where witness credibility is at issue, as 
often occurs in other administrative adjudicative proceedings. Rather, all of the weighing of the 
evidence has already occurred at the UDAQ level. 
2. UDAQ prepared a written response to public comments in connection with the 
issuance of the Holly AO. [IR009174-9222]. The ALJ must "'review ... the director's 
determination, based on the record," culminating in a proposed dispositive action that includes 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended order. Utah Code § 19-1-301.5( l 2)(b )-
(c ). Because these proceedings are, by definition, limited to the issues raised during the public 
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comment period, UDAQ's written response to public comments plays a central role in evaluating 
whether UDAQ's conclusions satisfy applicable legal requirements. 
3. Petitioners have the burden of proof to demonstrate that the Director's 
determination to issue the Holly AO was in error. [Clarification Order at 4 ("Petitioners 
acknowledge that they have the burden of proof in this proceeding.")]; see also Taylor v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 2005 UT App 121, *1 (unpublished) ('~In the typical challenge to agency action, 
the party challenging the action carries the burden of demonstrating its impropriety." (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
4. The Director's determination can include factual findings, interpretations of law, 
and mixed determinations of law and facts. 
5. To carry their burden of proof with respect to their challenge of factual findings, 
the Petitioners must demonstrate that UDAQ's findings of fact are not supported by substantial 
evidence; otherwise, the ALJ must "uphold all factual technical, and scientific agency 
determinations that are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a whole." 
Utah Code§ 19-I-301.5(13)(b).2 Under Utah case law relevant to this proceeding, the ALJ's 
review on questions of fact is limited to determining if UDAQ's factual findings "were 
reasonable and rational," while giving "great deference" to UDAQ's factual findings and not 
"reweighing" the evidence. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2012 
2 While subsection (13)(b) expressly applies directly to the Executive Director's review, the standard of 
review that the ALJ is to apply to the record is not expressly stated in the Utah Code. Under a fair reading 
of the statute, it is clear that the ALJ is to apply the same standard as the Executive Director is required to 
apply. This conclusion is based on a reading of the permit review adjudicative proceeding statute as a 
whole. In the first instance, the ALJ's express duty and authority is to undertake a permit review 
adjudicatory proceeding and not a trial de novo on the merits, resulting in a recommended ruling for the 
Executive Director. In other words, the role of the ALJ is to "stand in the shoes" of the Executive 
Director and provide her with a recommended ruling on the merits. Thus, the ALJ is to apply the same 
standard ofreview to the administrative record as the Executive Director is required to apply. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 19-1- 301.5. 
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UT 73, ,r 11, 38 P.3d 291 (hereinafter Sierra Club v. BOGM) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 
While reviewing an agency's determination for substantial evidence, the ALJ should ""state the 
facts and all legitimate inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the agency's 
findings." Id. ,I 12. 
6. With respect to legal interpretations, the ALJ should grant "substantial discretion" 
to UDAQ in its interpretation of its governing statutes and rules. See Utah Code § I 9- l-
30 l.5( 14)(c)(i). In this case, the governing statutes and rules include the Clean Air Act, the Utah 
Air Conservation Act, and the applicable regulations under these statutes. UDAQ's legal 
interpretation of these statutes and rules may be overturned only if Petitioners show that such 
interpretation is a "clearly erroneous interpretation or application of the law." See, e.g., Sierra 
Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT 73, ,r 10; see also Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 2001 UT 112, ,r 18, 38 P.3d 291 (an agency's ''interpretation of the operative provisions 
of the statutory law it is empowered to administer" must be given deference). 
7. By contrast, UDAQ's general interpretations of the law, including constitutional 
questions, jurisdiction, and statutes unrelated to the agency, are granted little or no deference and 
are simply reviewed for correctness. Sierra Club, 2012 UT 73, ,I 9; see also Sevier Citizens v. 
Dept. ofEnvt. Quality, 2014 UT App 257, ,r 6 (where the statute under review was procedural, 
and where issue was interpretation of the statute itself that granted agency interpretive discretion, 
the court applied a traditional approach to standard ofreview and imposed a correctness standard 
3 Section 19-1-301.5, however, also vests the ALJ with the authority to supplement the 
administrative record. Utah Code Ann. § I 9-1-30l.5(8)(c)(iv) (providing that the ALJ "'may 
supplement the record with technical or factual information."). Based on these statutory 
provisions, if the ALJ determines that UDAQ has not addressed an issue or UDAQ's response 
to an issue is inadequate, the ALJ may request additional technical or factual information from 
the parties as opposed to recommending a remand of the AOs. 
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to the question of whether the failure to file a petition to intervene strips the agency of 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5(7)). 
8. Finally, when the agency has been granted discretion to interpret the statute or 
regulation at issue, mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ~ 39, 308 P.3d 461. Here, Section 
19-1-301.5( 14)(c )(i) expressly grants UDAQ "substantial discretion to interpret its governing 
statutes and rules." Agency decisions on mixed questions of law and fact must be upheld under 
this discretion standard if they are "rationally based" and set aside only "'if they are imposed 
arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the tolerable limits of reason." Assoc. Gen. 
Contractors, 200 I UT 112, ~ 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
II. Petitioners' Burden of Proof 
I. Petitioners, as the parties challenging UDAQ's decision to issue the Holly AO, 
carry the burden of demonstrating UDAQ's determinations were not supported by substantial 
evidence, were erroneous, or were an abuse of discretion. See Sierra Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT 
73, ~ 31; Associated Gen. Contractors, 200 I UT 112, ~ 34; Taylor, 2005 UT App 121, * 1 (Utah 
Ct. App 1993) (unpublished). 
2. A party with the burden of proof must ''fully identify, analyze, and cite its legal 
arguments" and "provide meaningful legal analysis" but may not '"dump the burden of 
argument and research" on the reviewing authority. W. Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, 
~ 29, 135 P.3d 874 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kennon v. Air Quality Bd., 
2009 UT 77, ~ 29, 270 P.3d 417 (declining to review a petitioner's challenge to an AO where 
the petitioners failed to adequately brief a claim). Moreover, a party's briefing is inadequate 
where the briefing "merely contains bald citations to authority without development of that 
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authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ~ 9, 194 
P.3d 903 (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Lamb, 2013 UT App 5, ~ 11,294 P.3d 
639. 
III. Petitioners' Duty to Marshal All Relevant Evidence 
1. This tribunal's statutory jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 requires 
this tribunal to conduct this proceeding based only on the administrative record and to uphold 
"all factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations that are supported by substantial 
evidence viewed in light of the record as a whole." Utah Code§ l9-l-301.5(14)(c) (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, there will never be a '"trial" on the merits. Rather, UDAQ undertook the 
adjudication of Holly's NO Is after receiving and considering, among other things, public 
comments. 
2. All of the evidentiary information upon which the Director could have relied is 
contained in the formal administrative record as defined by Utah Code Section 19-1-
301.5(8)(b ). For every issue raised in public comments, the Director provided a detailed 
written response, which also forms part of the administrative record. Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-
301.5(8)(b ). 
3. The Director's det~iled response to comments provides a specific record as to 
how the Director considered and resolved each public comment and also, in some instances, 
refers to and provides citation to other evidence in the administrative record upon which the 
Director has relied in reaching any given conclusion. Thus, while there is no trial on the merits, 
the Director's response to public comments provides a rather detailed '•roadmap" as to the 
factual and legal basis for the Director's decision to issue the Holly AO. 
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4. Because Petitioners have the burden of persuasion in this proceeding, the only 
way they can possibly carry that burden of proof it to convince the ALJ ( or, by extension, the 
Executive Director, the Utah Court of Appeals, or the Utah Supreme Court) that any disputed 
factual, technical, or scientific agency determination is not supported by substantial evidence 
taken from the administrative record as a whole. By extension, therefore, they must marshal all 
of the evidence relevant to each claim they assert. See, e.g., Nielsen, 2014 UT I 0, 142. In short, 
the Marshaling Requirement forms an inherent part of Petitioners' burden of proof in this 
proceeding. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court recently clarified that "'a party who fails to identify 
and deal with supportive evidence will never persuade an appellate court to reverse under the 
deferential standard ofreview that applies to such issues." Nielsen, 2014 UT 10,140 (emphasis 
added). 
5. In their briefing on the merits and at oral argument, Petitioners raised a number of 
objections to the Marshaling Requirement. These objections lack merit. 4 The Marshaling 
Requirement was properly imposed, either as an inherent part of Petitioners' burden of proof or, 
in the alternative, pursuant to the ALJ's statutory grant of authority to manage all non-dispositive 
aspects of these proceedings. 
6. The Utah Legislature has granted the ALJ the jurisdi~tion to "take any action in a 
permit review adjudicative proceeding that is not a dispositive action." Utah Code § 19-1-
30 I .5(9)(t). Although the Marshaling Requirement is not specifically adopted in the Utah Code 
or Utah Administrative Code as applied to these proceedings and Rule 24(a)(9) does not 
expressly apply here, an ALJ has the authorization to manage this proceeding in the most efficient 
4 The fact that Holly was able to marshal record evidence, point by point, in the manner that I had 
requested of Petitioners, provides further support for the conclusion that Petitioners' arguments against 
the Marshaling Requirement lack merit and should be rejected. 
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and effective way appropriate under the circumstances of this case.5 All of the policy reasons 
underlying Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply with full force to a pennit 
review adjudicative proceeding. 
7. In an analogous situation, the Utah Court of Appeals declined to undertake an 
independent review of a large record. Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 
(Utah App. 1990). There, the court noted that Rule 24(a)(9) was intended precisely "to spare 
appellate courts such an onerous burden." Id Hence, the court continued, ''[a]bsent 
exceptional circumstances, our review of the record is limited to those specific portions of the 
record which have been drawn to our attention by the parties and which are relevant to the 
legal questions before us." Id. The court noted that Rule 24(a)(9) was intended precisely "to 
spare appellate courts such an onerous burden." Hence, the court continued, "[a]bsent 
exceptional circumstances, our review of the record is limited to those specific portions of the 
record which have been drawn to our attention by the parties and which are relevant to the 
legal questions properly before us." Id. I have applied this same standard to my review of the 
administrative record in this proceeding, for the same reasons as stated by the Utah Court of 
Appeals. If this rule were not applied to the administrative record in a permit review 
adjudicative proceeding, an appellant on future appeal could potentially argue that the 
administrative law judge overlooked or failed to consider, under his or her independent review 
of the record, certain evidence ofrecord even though that evidence was not specifically drawn 
5 It is undisputed that should Petitioners appeal any issue arising from this proceeding to the Utah Court 
of Appeals~ Rule 24(a)(9) would apply to their briefs on appeal. Because the administrative law judge 
and the Executive Director are called upon to apply the same standard of review to the agency 
determinations as the Utah Court of Appeals, it stands to reason that the marshaling requirement should 
also apply at the ALJ and Executive Director levels of review. Moreover, Petitioners have been on notice 
of this procedural requirement from the outset of this proceeding and did not appeal the ALJ's Order 
Clarifying the Marshaling Requirement to the Executive Director. They cannot therefore show undue 
burden or prejudice. 
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to the attention of the administrative law judge. I find and conclude that the types of 
''exceptional circumstances" that may warrant deviation from this rule, as stated in Wright, do 
not apply to the present proceedings.6 
8. This conclusion finds further support in Utah case law in the cases cited below, 
subject to the clarification that in these cases, the potential for a procedural default upon 
failure to marshal the record is not an appropriate result, as held in State v. Nielsen. supra. 
However, to the extent that Utah case law regarding the burden of proof and marshaling does 
not deal with the procedural default issue rejected in State v. Nelson, it is still good law and 
should be considered as being relevant here. See, e.g., Simmons Media Group, LLC v. 
Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145, ~~ 46, 763 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (dismissing a claim where the 
appellant "does not identify and deal with the supportive evidence" (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Nebeker v. Summit County. 2014 UT App 137, ~ 46, 762 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 ("To 
prevail on such a challenge, the County must acknowledge the evidence that supports the 
findings and demonstrate 'a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of deference owed to factual 
findings"' (quoting Nielsen, 2014 UT 10 ~~ 41-42); Wachocki v. Luna, 2014 UT 139, ~ 11, n. 
6, 330 P.3d 717 (holding that because appellants failed to marshal the evidence, appellants did 
not carry their burden on appeal); W. Jordan City. 2006 UT 27, ~ 29; Heinecke v. Dep 't of 
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that parties fail to meet their 
burden to marshal the evidence when they leave "it to the court to sort out what evidence 
6 There is simply nothing in the Utah Code to suggest that the administrative law judge in a permit review 
adjudicative proceeding has an independent duty to comb through the entire Administrative Record to identify all 
relevant facts in support of a disputed factual, technical, and scientific agency determination. particularly where, as 
here, Petitioners are represented by experienced and competent legal counsel. To be sure, a more generous standard 
of briefing may apply to a permit review adjudicative proceeding where parties appear prose. Because no prose 
parties are involved in the instant proceeding, I will not speculate as to the potential applicability of the Marshaling 
Requirement in cases where parties are not represented by legal counsel. 
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actually supported the finding" and instead argued their "own position without regard for the 
evidence supporting the ... findings"). 
9. The duty to carry the burden of proof through marshaling must fall to Petitioners 
in this permit review adjudicative proceeding, because as a matter of longstanding 
administrative law, the party challenging any factual finding underlying an agency's 
determination is required to marshal "all" evidence supporting the agency's determination. 
Sierra Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT 73, ,r 12; see also Kennon, 2009 UT 77, ,r 27 ("When 
challenging factual findings, a party is obligated to marshal 'all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding."' (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9))); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. 
County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) (In an 
appeal of an agency action, "'the party challenging the finding ... must marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the finding ."). 
10. The duty to marshal the evidence in administrative appeals also applies to 
parties challenging an agency's determination on mixed questions of fact and law. Peterson 
Hunting v. Labor Comm'n, 2012 UT App 14, ,r 15, 269 P.3d 998; see also United Park City 
Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ,r 25, 140 P.3d 1200 ("Even 
where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a determination of 
the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the 
[appellants] also have a duty to marshal the evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
A party obligated to marshal the evidence must do so for each claim that the marshaling 
mandate applies. Sierra Club 2012, 2012 UT 73, ,r 30 & n.3 (holding that Petitioners 
failed to marshal one claim while determining that the same Petitioners marshaled 
another claim). At its core, the marshaling requirement demands that a party "marshal 
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, 
the ... findings are not support by substantial evidence." Id. ,r 30. To do so, the party 
may not ''"simply attack [the agency's] credibility."' 
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Associated Gen. Contractors. 200 I UT I 12, ~ 34 ( quoting Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. 
R.R., 200 I UT 77, ~ 36, 31 P.3d 557). 
11. In light of the Marshaling Requirement, the ALJ has ordered that Petitioners 
were not subject to a page limitation in their briefing on the merits. Rather, the only 
requirement has been that the briefing be of reasonable length. Thus, Petitioners have been 
afforded every opportunity to carry their burden of proof in this proceeding to convince the 
ALJ that any disputed factual, technical, or scientific agency determination is llJJ1. supported by 
substantial evidence taken from the administrative record as a whole. In order to meet that 
burden of proof, it will be necessary for Petitioners to bring to the tribunal" s attention all 
evidence from the administrative record that relates to any such disputed issue. 
IV. Preservation Standard 
I. Pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5( 10), "(a] person who files a request for 
agency action has the burden of demonstrating that an issue or argument raised in the requ_est for 
agency action has been preserved." Lacking such demonstration, the ALJ "shall dismiss, with 
prejudice, any issue or argum-ent in a request for agency action that has not been preserved." Id 
2. An issue or argument has been preserved for appeal if (a) the person raised it 
during the public comment period and it was supported with sufficient information or 
documentation to enable the director to fully consider the substance and significance of the issue, 
Utah Code § 19-1-301.5( 4)(a)-(b ); or (b) the issue was not reasonably ascertainable during the 
public comment period, id.§ 19-1-30l.5(6)(c). 
3. The failure to raise reasonably ascertainable issues or arguments relating to the 
proposed permit during the public comment period deprives UDAQ from considering all 
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possible issues prior to any issuance of an approval order and results in less effective agency 
process. 
4. The demonstration that each issue has been properly preserved must be found in 
the Petitioners' RAA at the outset of the case. See id; see also Utah Adm in. Code R305-7-
203(3)(h) (mandating that an RAA provide a showing on preservation). 
5. The failure to raise issues in the RAA frustrates the goals of the permit review 
adjudicative process by failing to place the respondents on notice of the specific claims. Such 
failure prevents UDAQ and Holly from assessing whether it should have supplemented the 
record in response to newly presented claims in the RAA. Moreover, by not raising issues in the 
RAA and waiting to reveal claims until the briefing, Petitioners prevented Holly from assessing 
the full risks of proceeding with construction under an AO subject to a permit challenge. 
6. Any claims not preserved in accordance with the statutory standard set forth 
above will be dismissed. 
7. Petitioners raised concerns in their RAA and then again in their Reply Brief about 
whether due process had been satisfied where Holly submitted additional information to UDAQ 
after the close of the public comment period and Petitioners were not given a second opportunity 
to submit comments on this additional material. 
8. First, Petitioners have waived this claim by not briefing it in their opening brief. 
Petitioners may not raise claims in their RAA and then wait to address such claims until their 
Reply brief. See e.g., Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ~ 9, 17 P.3d 1122 
(refusing to consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief). 
9. Even if Petitioners' claims regarding procedural due process were not waived and 
had merit, which is unclear in light of the fact that Petitioners do not adequately brief this issue, 
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fail to cite any case law, or quote from the due process clause of the Utah or United States 
Constitution, it is clear that Petitioners were afforded an opportunity to supplement the record 
and raise issues in the RAA relating to any new information submitted after the close of the 
public comment period. 
I 0. Petitioners were on notice that additional information had been submitted, as it 
was referenced multiple times in the response to comments document UDAQ issued in 
conjunction with the final Holly AO. Petitioners also had access to UDAQ's permitting file after 
the Holly AO was issued before the deadline for filing their RAA. 
11. Moreover, this tribunal has allowed arguments that were not reasonably 
ascertainable to be raised in the RAA, for the first time, in accordance with Utah Code Section 
19-l-30l.5(6)(c)(ii). and allowed the parties to supplement the record via motion in accordance 
with Section 19-1-301.5(8)(c). This tribunal has also waived any page limits to allow the parties 
the opportunity to fully develop any claims that arose either during the public comment period, 
or after. 
12. Petitioners are incorrect that their due process rights have been implicated in this 
case.
7 Any claims or issues that were reasonably ascertainable during the public comment period 
must have been raised in Petitioners' comments. Any claims that were not reasonably 
ascertainable during the public comment period could be included for the first time in the 
Petitioners' RAA but may not appear for the first time in Petitioners' briefing on the merits. 
· Petitioners have failed to demonstrate how, in light of this tribunal's treatment of the claims in 
accordance with 19-1-301.5, any procedural due process rights have been violated. 
7 To the extent Petitioners claim that permit review adjudication statute and rules violate the due 
process protections of the Utah and United States Constitutions, such claims are beyond the 
jurisdiction of the ALJ to decide in this permit review proceeding. See e.g., Nebeker v. Utah 
State Tax Comm 'n, 200 I UT 74, ~ 23, 34 P.3d 180. 
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V. Scope of Proceedings; Regulatory Background; and EPA Role 
I. The evidence Petitioners presented in this matter stands for the self-evident, 
general proposition that air pollution is harmful to human health and to the environment. [IR at 
009140-48; IR at 009139-45; IR at 009144-45; IR at 009145-47.] On that point, there is no 
disagreement. 
2. In enacting the Utah Air Conservation Act. the Utah Legislature declared: ''It is 
the policy of this state and the purpose of[the Utah Air Conservation Act] to achieve and 
maintain levels of air quality which will protect human health and safety. and to the greatest 
degree practicable. prevent injury to plant and animal life and property, foster the comfort and 
convenience of the people, promote the economic and social development of this state. and 
facilitate the enjoyment of the natural attractions of this state.'' Section 19-2-10 l (2). Utah Code 
Ann. 
3. The Utah Legislature further declared that the ··purpose·• of the Utah Air 
Conservation Act is to ·"(a) provide for a coordinated statewide program of air pollution 
prevention. abatement, and control: (b) provide for an appropriate distribution of responsibilities 
among the state and local units of government; ( c) facilitate cooperation across jurisdictional 
lines in dealing with problems of air pollution not confined within single jurisdictions; and ( d) 
provide a framework within which air quality may be protected and consideration given to the 
public interest at all levels of planning and development within the state.'' Section 19-2-101 ( 4), 
Utah Code Ann. 
4. Similarly, in enacting the Clean Air Act. the Congress found, among other things: 
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by 
urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, 
has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, including 
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injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of 
property, and hazards to air and ground transportation; [and] 
(3) that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or elimination, through any 
measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the source) and air 
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local 
governments .... 
42 U.S.C. § 740l(a). 
5. Congress also stated that the 44primary goal" of the Clean Air Act is to 44encourage 
or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions ... for pollution 
prevention." 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (c). 
6. In these proceedings, I am charged to conduct a permit review adjudicative 
proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code Ann., § 19-1-301.5 and Utah Adm in. 
Code R305-7. 
7. As a matter of law, any source's compliance with the permitting requirements set 
forth in the Clean Air Act and the Utah Air Conservation Act satisfies the public policy of 
protecting the public and the environment from the harms of air po11ution. 
8. The question before me in these proceedings is not whether air pollution is 
harmful but rather whether the Holly AO is in compliance with applicable laws, rules, and 
regulations. Based on the evidence in this record. the unavoidable conclusion is that the Holly 
AO is in compliance with the law, all as explained in more detail below. 
9. The conclusions reached in these proposed Findings and Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, to the effect that the Holly AO is in compliance with all applicable laws, rules, and 
regulations, notwithstanding Petitioners' objections, find additional support in the EPA 's 
independent review of the Holly AO and that agency's conclusion that the Holly AO may be 
issued. See EPA Comment Letters [IR004001-004005; IR007840-007841 ]. In Alaska Dep 't of 
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Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that EPA is entitled to review the reasonableness of state permitting authorities' BACT 
determinations under the PSD program and has authority to issue stop construction orders if it 
reasonably believes that a BACT designation is erroneous or unreasonable. The CAA also 
provides EPA with concurrent enforcement authority that is directly applicable to the present 
proceeding. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7477, 74 I 3(a)(5)(A) (describing the enforcement options available to 
the EPA when it finds that a state is not complying with any requirement of the CAA with 
respect to construction of a new source or modification of an existing source). See Jennifer A. 
Davis Foster, Note, EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology: The 
Supreme Court Determines the Proper Scope of Enforcement, 69 Missouri L. Rev., Issue 4, at I 
(Fall 2004). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that if in EPA's independent judgment, any of the 
objections and issues Petitioners have briefed on the merits were meritorious, EPA had an 
independent duty and authority to pursue such issues. EPA declined to do so even after being 
given the opportunity in connection with the Holly AO. 
10. In this permit review adjudicative proceeding, we have a somewhat unusual 
situation in administrative law where not one but two regulatory agencies with significant 
technical expertise and concurrent (and somewhat overlapping) legal jurisdiction have been 
involved in the procedural and substantive process that led to the issuance of the Permit. This 
situation provides a second layer of regulatory oversight to ensure that the applicable procedural 
and substantive requirements of the Clean Air Act, as adopted and enforced through the Utah Air 
Conservation Act in the spirit of"4cooperative federalism," have been met. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CLAIMS PETITIONERS 
FAILED TO BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
I. Petitioners' RAA contains a number of claims that Petitioners did not raise in 
their briefing on the merits. Those claims are listed in a Table of Waived Claims attached hereto 
as Appendix A, incorporated herein by th is reference. 
2. Both Holly and UDAQ pointed out in their briefing and at oral argument that 
Petitioners failed to brief these claims and therefore waived such claims. Petitioners did not 
rebut this argument and at oral argument conceded that this tribunal need not address claims they 
did not brief. 
3. Because Petitioners failed to brief these claims, they should be dismissed with 
prejudice on two separate and independent grounds: (a) waiver; and (b) failure to carry 
Petitioners' burden of proof. See, e.g., See Sierra Club v. BOGM, 20 I 2 UT 73, ~ 31; Kennon, 
2009 UT 77, ~ 29; W Jordan City, 2006 UT 27, ~ 29; Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, *2 
n.3 C'[A]rguments not raised in an appellant's initial brief; are waived."); Brown v. Glover, 2000 
UT 89, ~ 23, 16 P.3d 540 ("Generally, issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were 
not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the 
appellate court."). 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CLAIMS PETITIONERS 
BRIEFED ON THE MERITS 
Petitioners' remaining claims can be grouped into eleven independent claims, each of 
which will be addressed below. Before addressing the specific claims, I would like to make the 
following general findings of fact relating to the regulatory context, inasmuch as the general aim 
of many of Petitioners' comments go to the issue of the harms caused by air pollution. 
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I. UDAO Is Properly Regulating the Holly Refining Flares as Required by Subpart 
Ja. 
Petitioners' first specific argument on the merits goes to the interplay between the 
regulation of the Holly flares, as required by law, and the Holly AO at issue in this matter. 
Petitioners argue that the Holly AO is invalid because UDAQ did not "'properly regulate" the 
refining flares by explicitly listing and explaining every applicable provision of the regulation 
governing the flares (New Source Performance Standards ('"NSPS"), 40 C.F.R. Part 60, Subpart 
Ja ("Subpart Ja"). [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 4-12.] More specifically, Petitioners argue that 
"the Director has failed to specify in the AO - or elsewhere - the exact conditions of Subpart Ja 
that apply to the Holly Refining Flares and has failed to impose these conditions on the facility. 
Without particular AO terms and conditions that reflect the relevant Supbart Ja standards on the 
flares, the Heavy Crude Project will not meet the requirements of Utah Admin Code R307-401-
8(l)(b)(vi), Rule 307-401-8(l)(a) and Rule R307-401-8(5)." [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 4-5.] 
For the reasons set forth below, this argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
I. Holly's NOi acknowledges that Subpart Ja applies to the refinery generally and to 
the flares specifically. [See IR002866-87, Holly's July 2012 NOi ("The following Subparts are 
applicable to the proposed project ... Subpart Ja - Standards of Performance for Petroleum 
Refineries"); IR002868-69 ("The provisions of [ 40 C.F .R. Part 60 Subpart Ja] apply to the new 
FCCU and fuel gas combustion devices, including flares and process heaters.");8 IR002962 
8 When Holly submitted its NOi, Subpart Ja included all flares in its definition of "'fuel gas 
combustion device." See 40 C.F.R. § 60.I0la (2012). However, during Holly's permit review 
process, the regulation was revised to separate fuel gas combustion devices from flares. 40 
C.F.R. § 60.l0la (2013). Despite this change in the regulations, in Holly's NOi and the Source 
Plan Review, flares were grouped together with other fuel gas combustion devices and subject to 
the same emission requirements. See IR005871-72. 
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("Because the flare is located at a petroleum refinery, the flare must comply with the 
requirements and limitations presented in 40 C.F.R. Part 60 Subpart Ja.")]. 
2. Holly's NOT also incorporated emission limits derived from Subpart Ja for 
combustion devices. [IR002868-69, Holly's July 2012 NOI ('~Holly will comply with the 
following emission limitations ... Holly shall not burn in any new fuel gas combustion device any 
fuel gas that contains H2S in excess of 162 ppmv determined hourly on a three-hour rolling 
average basis and H2S in excess of 60 ppmv determined daily on a 365 successive calendar day 
rolling average basis.").] 
3. UDAQ independently recognized in the Source Plan Review that Subpart Ja 
applies to the Holly Refinery and that Holly is subject to the emission limitations contained in 
Subpart Ja. [IR00857 l-8572, Source Plan Review ("40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja: The provisions of 
this subpart apply to the new FCCU and fuel gas combustion devices, including flares and 
process heaters. Holly Refinery will comply with the following emission limitations ... Holly 
Refinery shall not burn in any new fuel gas combustion device any fuel gas that contains H2S in 
excess of 162 ppmv determined hourly on a three-hour rolling average basis and H2S in excess of 
60 ppmv determined daily on a 365 successive calendar day rolling average basis.").] UDAQ 
also made clear that Subpart Ja applies to the flares in its Response to Comments Memo. 
[IR009 I 83, Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross 
refinery generally and to both the North and South Flares.")]. 
4. UDAQ determined that Holly is required to comply with Subpart Ja whether or 
not such emission limits were contained in the Holly AO. [See IR0091'83, Response to 
Comments Memo ("Regardless of whether the requirements [ofNSPS] are in the AO, Holly 
Refinery must comply with all applicable subparts ... Holly Refinery is not in violation of any 
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federal limits."); IR009252, Holly AO (listing Subpart Ja in Section III, "Applicable Federal 
Requirements").] 
5. The EPA made no comments regarding issues with the applicability or 
enforcement of Subpart Ja as to the Holly Refinery generally or as to the AO specifically. [See 
IR00400 I, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-784 l, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
6. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5( 4) by raising 
the issue during the public comment period. [See IR007858-7860, Petitioners' Second Comment 
Letter.] 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
7. Petitioners assert that this issue is purely a question of law-whether UDAQ is 
required to explicitly outline and explain every applicable provision of Subpart Ja in the Holly 
AO. Petitioners concede that Subpart Ja applies to Holly's flares and other combustion sources, 
but argue that the AO is deficient because each applicable provision is not explained in detail in 
the Holly AO. 
8. The question of whether Utah law requires applicable NSPS provisions to· be 
listed in approval orders is a question of law that the agency has been given discretion to 
interpret and so shall be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Whether UDAQ correctly 
applied a particular NSPS provision and whether Holly is in compliance with NSPS are mixed 
questions of law and fact that are reviewed for reasonableness and whether there is substantial 
evidence in the record to support the determinations. Whether Holly is in compliance with 
subpart Ja is a question that is specifically handled by DAQ's enforcement section and therefore 
beyond the scope of these proceedings. 
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9. In their briefing, Petitioners failed to reference any of the specific evidence in 
Holly's NOi in which Holly recognized it was subject to Subpart Ja. 
I 0. Additionally, Petitioners' reference to other evidence in the record is relegated to 
footnotes and lacks any" description of the document being referenced. 
11. Because Petitioners have omitted multiple pieces of evidence from their analysis 
that show Subpart Ja does apply to the Holly Refinery, they have failed to meet their burden of 
proof on this~issue for the reasons described in more detail above. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
12. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' arguments should fail on 
the merits for the independent reasons discussed below. 
13. Subpart Ja is one of many NSPS the EPA has promulgated for particular types of 
new or modified sources that EPA has determined are major emitters of criteria air pollutants, 
such as petroleum refineries. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7411, Standards of Performance for 
New Stationary Sources (granting the administrator of EPA the authority to regulate certain 
sources). The applicability of a particular NSPS to a particular source is often specifically 
outlined in the text of the regulation applicable to that source category. See e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 
60.1 00a (defining modification for purposes of Subpart Ja applicability). The applicability of 
NSPS is evaluated separately from other Clean Air Act regulations such as the Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration Program ('"PSD"), which is implemented through individual pre-
construction permits like the Holly AO. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503 (setting forth the 
pre-construction permitting requirements). 
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14. Unlike the PSD program, the NSPS regulations apply to a source whether or not 
that source is undergoing a modification requiring pre-construction approval. See, e.g., 40 
C.F .R. § 60.1 (a) (defining NSPS applicability); id. § 60.2 (defining when 44Construction" or 
"modification" takes places for purposes ofNSPS applicability); Envt'l Defense v. Duke Energy 
Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 577-78 (2007) (recognizing the distinction between the NSPS and PSD 
regulations). Therefore, NSPS compliance and/or applicability determinations are not dependent 
upon inclusion of the NSPS regulation's language in the pre-construction permit. Compliance or 
non-compliance with NSPS is entirely separate from the PSD permitting process. 
15. The oversight of Holly's compliance with Subpart Ja is a matter for UDAQ's 
enforcement section. This is true regardless of whether the provisions of Subpart Ja are in the 
permit or not. [IR009 I 83, Response to Comments Memo ("Regardless of whether the 
requirements [ of NS PS] are in the AO, Holly Refinery must comply with all applicable 
subparts ... Holly Refinery is not in violation of any federal limits.").] 
16. If Holly were in violation of Subpart Ja, contrary to UDAQ's determination, the 
Clean Air Act provides Petitioners with a separate remedy in the form of a citizen suit under 
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (Clean Air Act citizen suit 
provision). Challenging compliance with Subpart Ja in this permit review proceeding is 
therefore misplaced. 
17. Petitioners also are incorrect in their assertion that R307-415 of the Utah 
Administrative Code requires all federally-applicable NSPS requirements to be included in the 
Holly AO. The regulations Petitioners cite apply only to Title V operating permits-not 
approval orders. The Title V operating perm it regulations are independent of the approval order 
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pre-construction permit regulations. Compare Utah Admin. Code R307-4 l 5 (Title V operating 
permit regulations), with id R307-401 (pre-construction approval order permit regulations). 
18. The purpose of Title Vis to consolidate all applicable federal and state regulatory 
requirements into one permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 71.l(b) ("'All sources subject to the operating 
permit requirements of title V and this part shall have a permit to operate that assures compliance 
by the source with all applicable requirements."). Thus, there is no legal requirement to include 
all applicable NSPS regulations in an approval order. 
19. Accordingly, Petitioners' arguments that the applicable provisions of Subpart Ja 
must be included in the Holly AO fail on the merits and should be dismissed. 
II. The North Flare is Subject to Subpart Ja. 
1. The Petitioners next contend that the Director erred in reversing his position 
regarding the applicability of Subpart Jato the North Flare. [Petitoners' Opening Brief at 12-
15.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. The Director determined that Holly must comply with all applicable subparts of 
the NSPS regulations and that Holly was not in violation of any federal limits. [IR009 l 83, 
Response to Comments Memo ("Regardless of whether the requirements [ofNSPS] are in the 
AO, Holly Refinery must comply with all applicable subparts ... Holly Refinery is not in violation 
of any federal limits.").] 
3. The Director determined that the North Flare was not being modified as part of 
this project and therefore was outside the scope of the permitting action. [IR009 I 83, Response 
to Comments Memo ("The North Flare is not being modified as part of the project proposed by 
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Holly Refinery in its NOi, so it is outside the scope of this permit action. NSPS Subpart Ja 
applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally and to both the North and South Flares.'").) 
4. According to undisputed evidence in the record, Holly's North Flare was subject 
to and in compliance with Subpart J and A of the NSPS regulations. [IR007999, Email 
Correspondence between Eric Benson and Camron Harry ("'Holly's North Flare was applicable 
and compliant with 40 CFR 60 Subpart A & J upon startup.").] 
5. A consent decree entered in 2008 between Holly and EPA required that Holly 
bring the North Flare into compliance with applicable NSPS standards. [See IR004800-4801, 
Consent Decree (requiring flaring devices to become NSPS compliant).] 
6. As of December 2008, Holly reported to the EPA that its North Flare was. in 
compliance with NSPS. [See IR007946, IR00795 l, Semi-Annual Progress Report to EPA and 
UDAQ re Consent Decree (reporting that "Performance tests for both North and South Flares 
[were] conducted December 10, 2008" and "[the] North Flare [was] subject to NSPS as of date 
of [Consent Decree] entry, eliminate all routinely-generated gas" and compliance status was 
"Complete .... [N]o routinely-generated gas sent to the flare.").] 
7. In connection with its independent review of the entire Holly AO, the EPA made 
no comments about the North Flare or Subpart Ja, compliance with the Consent Decree, or any 
of the other related issues raised by Petitioners here. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; 
IR007840-784 l, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
8. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising 
the issue during the public comment period. [See IR007858, IR007864, Petitioners' Second 
Comment Letter.] 
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C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
9. Petitioners' argument that the Director reversed his position relative to the North 
Flare is a question of fact and the Petitioners bear the burden to demonstrate that the Director's 
decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record and was an abuse of discretion. 
I 0. Petitioners, in their briefing, failed to marshal all of the evidence that supported 
the Director's ultimate conclusion that Subpart Ja applied to the North Flare and that Holly was 
in compliance with this Subpart. By contrast, Holly did marshal all of the evidence in its 
briefing. 
11. Nothing in the record supports the assertion that the Director changed his mind 
about the applicability of Subpart Ja. From the beginning of the project, all parties agreed that 
this NSPS provision applied to the Holly Refinery. 
12. Accordingly, Petitioners failed to satisfy their burden of proof for this claim. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
13. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
14. The legislative intent of a permit review adjudicative process is to allow for an 
evolving understanding of a project before any final decisions are made. The Director may, at 
the beginning of a project, take a position in light of the information in the record at the time but 
later reverse that position based on additional information presented during the public comment 
period or otherwise, such as information provided by the source upon request. The question that 
must be answered in this permit review adjudication proceeding is whether the Director's final 
decision to issue the Holly AO is supported by substantial evidence in the record. This question 
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remains the same whether or not the Director may have changed his mind during the permitting 
process. In fact, the entire point of the permitting process as defined by the Utah Legislature is 
to allow for well-informed administrative decisionmaking. To the extent that the Director may 
have reached a different view on any given point suggests that the process is working as 
intended. 
15. In this case, the Petitioners do not present any evidence that there was a reversal 
of position with respect to the applicability of Subpart Jato the North Flare. To the contrary, all 
of the evidence in the record supports the position that the Director ultimately took, which was 
that Subpart Ja applied to the North Flare. 
16. Petitioners argue that the North Flare was modified when all gases from the South 
Flare were routed to the North Flare and this modification triggered NSPS Subpart Ja 
applicability. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 13.] 
17. Regardless of whether the North Flare was modified, the record evidence 
demonstrates that Holly and the Director agreed that Subpart Ja applied for this project. 
[IR009 I 83; IR009 I 83; IR004800-480 I; IR007946, IR00795 I.] Therefore, any evidence that a 
modification may have occurred on the North Flare would only be superfluous, not 
contradictory. 
18. The EPA raised no procedural or substantive comments regarding with UDAQ's 
handling of Subpart Ja. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-784 I, EPA 
Second Comment Letter.] 
19. The substantial weight of the evidence supports the Director's ultimate 
determination that Subpart Ja applies to Holly's North Flare and Petitioners' arguments that the 
Director contradicted himself should be dismissed with prejudice. 
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III. A BACT Analysis Was Not Required for the North Flare. 
1. Petitioners argue that UDAQ erred in failing to perform or require a BACT 
analysis for the North Flare. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 15-16]. For the reasons set forth 
below, this argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. Holly did not propose any physical modification of the North Flare as part of the 
project approved in the Holly AO. [IR009183, Response to Comments Memo (''The North Flare 
is not being modified as part of the project proposed by Holly Refinery in its NOi, so it is outside 
the scope of this permit action. NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally 
and to both the North and South Flares."); IR009l 89, Response to Comments Memo ("Because 
neither the North Flare nor the SRU will undergo any physical change or experience an increase 
in emissions as a result of Holly Refinery's proposed project, the 'emission units' are not subject 
to the BACT analysis requirements in the PSD rules.").] 
3. UDAQ did not anticipate any increase in overall flare emissions as a result of the 
project. [IR00856 I, Source Plan Review ("there is no reason to assume that upset condition 
emissions will be any greater after the project is complete than before the project.").] 
4. The North Flare is already subject to and in compliance with NSPS requirements. 
[IR009183, Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross 
refinery generally and to both the North and South Flares.").] 
5. UDAQ determined that BACT for flares was compliance with Subpart Ja. 
[IR0085 l 6-17, Source Plan Review ("The only technically feasible control options for emissions 
of all pollutants from flares are: (I) equipment design specifications and good combustion work 
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practices ... ; and (2) flare gas recovery systems ... DAQ NSR recommends compliance with the 
requirements of 40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja as BACT.").] 
6. According to the record, prior to the authorization of this project, all of the flare 
gases were being routed to the North Flare. [IR08200, Holly's first revised netting analysis 
("'currently all gases are routed to the north flare").] 
7. The EPA raised no procedural or substantive comments regarding UDAQ's 
analysis regarding BACT for the North Flare. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; 
IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
8. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5( 4) by raising 
the issue during the public comment period. [See IR007858, IR007864, Petitioners' Second 
Comment Letter.] 
~ C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
9. Petitioners' claim that UDAQ erred in failing to perform a BACT analysis on the 
North Flare is a mixed question of law and fact. There is also a dispute regarding the correct 
interpretation of the regulations that trigger BACT, which is a question oflaw reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. The application of that law to the facts in this case triggers the mixed 
question standard of review in which the ALJ reviews the Director's determination for 
reasonableness. 
I 0. Petitioners failed to marshal all of the evidence related to their claim. 
11. Specifically. Petitioners failed to cite UDAQ's finding that BACT for flares is 
compliance with Subpart Ja and that the North Flare is already subject to NSPS requirements. 
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12. Accordingly, Petitioners failed to satisfy their burden of proof on this claim and it 
can be dismissed on this basis. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
13. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
14. In the briefing on this issue, Petitioners erroneously conflate the same definition 
of modification they cite in their NSPS arguments. However, a "modification" that triggers a 
BACT analysis is different than what is required to trigger NSPS applicability. See, e.g., Envt '/ 
Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561,577 (2007) ("The 1980 PSD regulations on 
'modification' simply cannot be taken to track the Agency's regulatory definition under the 
NSPS."). 
15. A modification for purposes of BACT applicability occurs when a person 
"intend[s] to make modifications or relocate an existing installation which will or might 
reasonably be expected to increase the amount or change the effect of, or the character of, air 
contaminants discharged." Utah Admin. Code R307-401-3( I )(a) (emphasis added). An 
"installation" is defined as "a discrete process with identifiable emissions which may be part of a 
larger industrial plant" and a "modification" is defined as "any planned change in a source which 
results in a potential increase of emission." Id. R307-100-2. 
16. Accordingly, for there to be a "modification" triggering BACT applicability, there 
must be (I) a planned change in an emissions unit that (2) is reasonably expected to increase the 
amount or character of the emissions. The federal regulations contain similar requirements. See 
40 C.F.R. § 52.210)(3) (BACT is required on units that experience a net emissions increase "as a 
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· result of a physical change or change in the method of operation in the unit."); 71 Fed. Reg. 
54,235, 54,240 (Sept. 14, 2006) C·We further note that our current rules do not require BACT or 
LAER at unchanged units .... "); Letter from Robert B. Miller, Chief of the Permits and Grants 
Section of the EPA to Lloyd Eagan, Director of the Bureau of Air Management in Wisconsin 
(Feb. 8, 2000) ("[W]here an emissions unit has not undergone a physical or operational change, 
BACT does not apply."). 
17. Here, UDAQ specifically found that Holly was not proposing any changes to its 
North Flare as part of the project. A shift of emissions from one flare to the other does not result 
in increased emissions, only redistributed emissions. In its NSPS regulations, the EPA discussed 
the analogous situation of two interconnected flares, stating "'that interconnections between flares 
will not alter the cumulative amount of gas being flared (i.e., interconnecting two flares does not 
result in an emissions increase relative to the two single flares prior to interconnection) .... 
Considering this, we agree that the interconnection of two flares does not necessarily result in a 
modification of the flare and we have specifically excluded flare interconnections from the 
modification provisions.... [W]e agree that connections that do not increase the emissions from 
the flare should not trigger a modification .... " 77 Fed. Reg. 56,422, 56,438 (Sept. 12, 2012). 
Petitioners' argument is not the law. 
18. Moreover, to the extent Petitioners are arguing that the re-route of gases to the 
North Flare constitutes a change in operation, such a change occurred well before Holly initiated 
the current black wax crude project. This is evidenced by the language Petitioners themselves 
quote which reflects that "currently all gases are routed to the north flare." [IR08200, Holly's 
first revised netting analysis (emphasis added).] 
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19. Without a change in operation or an increase in emissions for the North Flare, 
Petitioners' argument (that a "modification" of the North Flare was part of this project triggering 
a BACT analysis for the North Flare) is not supported by the record and should be rejected. 
20. Even if Petitioners could demonstrate by substantial evidence that Holly proposed 
to modify the North Flare, conducting a BACT analysis on the North Flare would be superfluous 
because the North Flare is already subject to Subpart Ja, which itself constitutes BACT for 
Holly's flares. [See IR008516-17, Source Plan Review ("The only technically feasible control 
options for emissions of all pollutants from flares are: (1) equipment design specifications and 
good combustion work practices ... ; and (2) flare gas recovery systems ... DAQ NSR recommends 
compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja as BACT."); see also IR009183, 
Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally 
and to both the North and South Flares.").] Petitioners' argument fails for this independent 
reason as well. G 
21. Finally, the record suggests that Petitioners' argument is ultimately moot because 
Holly is required by the recently-adopted PM2 s SIP to install flare gas recovery technology at the 
Refinery,9 which Petitioners do not contest is the most stringent pollution control device 
currently available for flares. 10 [See IR0085 I 6, Source Plan Review (referring to flare gas 
recover as "the top control technology").] This requirement is binding on Holly regardless of 
whether it is explicitly stated in the Holly AO. As such, even if Petitioners' argument were 
9 The Utah PM2.5 SIP requires "all major source petroleum refineries in or affecting a designated 
PM2.s non-attainment area within the State shall install and operate a flare gas recovery system." 
See Utah PM2.s SIP, Section IX, Part H, p. 43. 
1° Flare gas recovery is a system that captures gases that would otherwise be combusted in the 
flare and redirects those gases as fuel sources for other refinery operations. This reduces the 
emissions associated with flaring and is an economic use of excess fuel gas. 
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correct, there is no need for a remand regarding control technology on the North Flare because 
there are no additional pollution controls that could be required of Holly. 
22. Accordingly, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate with substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole that UDAQ erred in not performing a BACT analysis on the North Flare 
and this claim should be dismissed with prejudice on the merits. 
IV. 
1. 
Emissions From Holly's Flares Were Properly Calculated and Are Regulated in 
Accordance With the Unavoidable Breakdown Rule. 
Petitioners next argue that the emissions from the flares have not been properly 
calculated and that UDAQ has not been appropriately regulating the flares in accordance with the 
Unavoidable Breakdown Rule ("UBR"). [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 16-22.] For the reasons 
stated below, this argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. In the Holly AO, UDAQ imposed a number of emission limits that included 
emissions from the flares, thereby limiting the routine emissions from the flares. [See IR009225, 
Holly AO (''Previous exclusions from the AO emission caps will be removed therefore the AO 
emission caps will be source wide caps."); IR009240, Holly AO ("PM 10 Combustion Emissions 
Cap Sources ... Flares."); IR009247, Holly AO ('"PM 10 emissions from all combustion sources 
shall not exceed 47.5 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.13 tpd."); IR009245, Holly AO ("The 
emission of SO2 into the atmosphere from all sources (excluding routine turnaround maintenance 
emissions) shall not exceed 110.3 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.31 tons per day."); 
IR009245, Holly AO ("Emissions of SO2 shall be limited as follows ... All other sources 0.21 
(tpd) 74.9 (tpy)."); IR009245, Holly AO ("For all the above listed emission points a CEM shall 
be used to determine compliance as outlined in Il.B.3.e."); IR009247-48, Holly AO ("Total 24-
hour PM 10 emissions for the sources shall be calculated by adding the daily results of the above 
39 
ADJ011574 
PM 1o emissions equations for natural gas, plant gas, and fuel oil combustion. Results shall be 
tabulated for every day, and records shall be kept."); IR008568, Source Plan Review (discussion 
of inclusion of flares into SO2 and PM emission caps).] 
3. In response to Petitioners' comments that the emission estimates for the flares 
were inaccurate because they did not include upset emissions, UDAQ explained that Holly's 
emissions were capped and any exceedance due to an upset would constitute an exceedance of 
the cap. [IR009 l 87, Response to Comments Memo ("The commenter is correct that there are no 
limits on the flares. This is because the flares are in place as control device[s] for upset 
conditions. However Holly Refinery does have to comply with the requirements of 40 CFR 60 
Subpart Ja. The Commenter is incorrect that 'upset' conditions are not addressed ... 'the 
refineries were allowed maximum never-to-be exceeded daily limits of PM 10• SO2, NOx based on 
the apparent variability. Emissions were capped at these maximum levels from the sources that 
could have their emissions metered by fuel metering/and calculations and from the other sources 
that would be stack tested every 1-3 years."' (quoting Utah SIP§ IX.A.6.c.(2) (1991)).] 
4. The assumption in determining the PTE for the flares was that upset emissions 
would be zero because they are not part of normal refinery operation. [IR002852, July 2012 NOi 
("PM 10 and PM2.s emissions for the Woods cross refinery flares were assumed to be zero."); see 
also IR002857, July 2012 NOi ("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be 
zero.").] 
5. According to the evidence in the record, the PTE for the flares was calculated 
based on the purge gas flowing through the flare and planned startups and shutdowns, but did not 
include calculations for upset emissions. [IR003 I 75-76, July 2012 NOi (recognizing emissions 
from the flares of SO2 were estimated based on the assumption of 1700 scfh non-upset 
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throughput to the flare. This is the '"purge gas" amount that must run to the flare to keep it from 
backdrafting); IR009 I 96, Response to Comments ("'startup and shutdown emissions were 
included in the analysis"); IR008560-856 I, Source Plan Review ('"to be conservative and 
representative of potential increases in emissions from SU and SD, UDAQ and Holly Refinery 
have agreed to include these emissions in Step 1 of the PSD and NNSR applicability analysis"); 
IR008522, Source Plan Review ("To ensure proper flare operation, Holly Refinery will install 
flow meters and gas combustion monitors on the flare gas line."); IR0092 I 1 ("The combustion 
of flue gas through the pilot flame is accounted for in the emission calculations.").] 
6. According to the record, upset emissions from flares are unpredictable and 
uncontrollable because the flare is the safety valve for excess refinery gases generated in a period 
of malfunction. [IR0085 I 6, Source Plan Review ("The flare system at Holly Refinery provides 
for the safe disposal of hydrocarbon gases which are vented automatically from process units 
through pressure relief valves, control valves or are manually vented."); IR00856 l, Source Plan 
Review ('"Section 3.6 of the July 2012 NOi lists upset conditions for both the North and South 
Flares. These upset conditions (malfunctions) do not include normal process flow combustion at 
the flares and there is no reason to assume that upset condition emissions will be any greater 
after the project is complete than before the project. Although these emissions have not been 
included in the netting analysis, they are noted below for reference.").] 
7. The Holly AO does not contain exceptions for emissions due to malfunctions at 
the refinery; such excess emissions are subject to the UBR. [IR009 I 96, Response to Comments 
Memo ("All limits of the permit apply at all times, which include periods of startup, shutdown 
and malfunction. The IT A contains no exclusion for these events."); IR0092 I I ("Flare 
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emissions during malfunction/upset conditions are regulated through R307-107 (ITA Condition 
II .3).").] 
8. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA raised no 
procedural or substantive comments regarding with UDAQ's regulation of the Refinery Flares, 
including the UBR. [See IR00400 I, EPA First Comment Letter~ IR007840-7841, EPA Second 
Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
9. Petitioners have partially preserved this argument in accordance with Section 19-
1-301.5( 4). In their comments, Petitioners challenged the calculation of the PTE for the flares 
but said nothing about misapplication or noncompliance with the UBR. [See IR009056-9057, 
Sagady second comment letter.] 
I 0. Petitioners could have reasonably ascertained this issue as the UBR was 
specifically referenced in the IT A. [See IR008453.] 
11. The argument that the issue is preserved because UDAQ referenced the UBR in 
the Response to Comments Memo is misplaced. In the responses, UDAQ simply referenced the 
UBR in response to an entirely unrelated comment. [See IR0092 I 0-9211, Response to 
Comments Memo (referring to R307- I 07 in response to the comment that "nothing provided by 
the applicant's final revised notice of intent justifies the claimed 98% control efficiency claimed 
for VOC, HAP and CO Destruction efficiency from Applicant's open air flares").] 
12. UDAQ's unrelated response does not save Petitioners from the requirement to 
raise their issues and arguments in a way that gives UDAQ notice of the substance of the issue. 
13. To the extent Petitioners argue that the UBR has been violated by Holly or is not 
being enforced by UDAQ, the argument is beyond the scope of what was raised during the 
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comment period and is unpreserved pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5( 4). Accordingly, 
it should be dismissed. 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
14. The claims Petitioners assert (both preserved and unpreserved) regarding the PTE 
for the flares constitute mixed questions of law and fact. The questions of law involve the 
interpretation of the UBR and the regulations and guidance relating to how PTE for flares should 
be calculated-specifically, whether upset emissions must be included in such calculations. The 
application of those laws to the facts of this case and the calculations performed by Holly create 
a mixed question. Accordingly, a reasonableness standard ofreview shall apply. 
15. Petitioners have failed to meet their burden of proof for this claim because they 
failed in their briefing to marshal all of the relevant evidence from the record. 
16. Petitioners ignore multiple pieces of evidence that explain how Holly calculated 
the PTE for the flares in accordance with applicable guidance and the UBR. 
17. Having failed to meet their burden of proof, Petitioners' claim should be 
dismissed on this basis. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
18. Even if Petitioners had properly preserved all of their arguments regarding the 
PTE calculations of the flare emissions, and even had carried their burden of proof ( or to the 
extent marshaling is not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law)), Petitioners' 
claims fail on the merits for the independent reasons discussed below. 
i. UBR Application 
19. Petitioners claim that the UBR requires emission limits on sources of malfunction 
emissions. Nothing in the plain language of the UBR requires numeric limits on malfunction 
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emissions. Nor is there any other authority in support of requiring such a limit as part of the 
UBR. To the extent that Petitioners' arguments constitute a request for rulemaking, they must be 
rejected in these perm it review proceedings. 11 
20. In any event, such limits are impossible for malfunction emissions because such 
emissions are, by their very nature, unpredictable and uncontrollable. [See IR0085 I 6.] 
21. The UBR simply sets forth criteria that must be met in the event of excess 
malfunction emissions to allow UDAQ the enforcement discretion to forgo monetary penalties. 
See Utah Adm in. Code R307-107-1 to -3. 
22. Stated differently, the UBR assumes that malfunction emissions are violations of 
an applicable approval order but affords to UDAQ enforcement discretion regarding the 
imposition of fines and penalties if a source is otherwise in compliance with the other 
requirements of the rule, including monitoring and good combustion practices. Utah Adm in. 
Code R307-107-1 to -3 (requiring reporting of breakdown emissions and giving UDAQ 
enforcement discretion). 
23. The limit in the Holly AO for malfunction emissions from the flare is zero tpy, 
which is accounted for in the overall SO2 and PM emission caps. [See IR002857, July 2012 NOi 
("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be zero.").] Any violation of those 
limits due to an upset or malfunction subjects Holly to the enforcement discretion of UDAQ 
under the· UBR. 
11 Petitioners may not advocate for a rulemaking change in a permit review adjudicative 
proceeding. [See In the Matter of: South Davis Sewer District, Order (Remand to ALI with 
Directions on Determining Whether There is a Basis to Grant Friends Standing to Intervene), 
March 29, 2011, p. 11 ("a permitting proceeding is not the appropriate forum in which to 
advance adoption of new rules or challenge existing ones").] Such a request is only proper in a 
rulemaking proceeding under Utah Code Section 63G-3-10 I et seq. 
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24. Any enforcement action by UDAQ, however, would be an independent 
proceeding separate from this adjudication and not a valid basis to remand the AO. 
ii. Flare PTE 
25. Petitioners challenge the PTE calculations of SO2 and PM from the flares by 
arguing that the PTE inappropriately excluded upset and malfunction emissions. This argument 
fai Is for three reasons. 
26. First, the law does not require the inclusion of upset emissions in a PTE 
calculation for flares because such upset emissions are not considered part of normal operation. 
See Sierra Club v. Wyoming Dep 't of Envtl. Quality, 251 P.3d 310, 314 (Wyo. 2011) (holding 
that "hypothesizing the worst possible emissions from the worst possible operation is the wrong 
way to calculate potential to emit. .. PTE includes only emissions that occur during normal 
operations" thus "cold start" emissions and "malfunctions" were properly excluded from the 
plant's PTE); see also Alabama Power Co. v. Cost/e, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1141, 1158 (D. Colo. 1988) C"[P]otential to emit 
does not refer to the maximum emissions that can be generated by a source hypothesizing the 
worst conceivable operation. Rather, the concept contemplates the maximum emissions that can 
be generated while operating the source as it is intended to be operated and as it is normally 
operated."). 
27. Holly excluded malfunction emissions from its PTE calculations for the flares 
and, instead, calculated emissions based on the ··average non-upset throughput to [the] flare" and 
appropriate emissions factors. [See IR 003175.] 
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28. Second, Petitioners' arguments challenging the PTE calculations for the flares 
also fail because federally enforceable permit conditions in the Holly AO limit malfunction 
emissions to zero tons per year from the flares. 
29. PTE is defined as: 
the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its physical 
and operational design. Any physical or operational limitation on the capacity of 
the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and 
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted, 
stored, or processed, shall be treated as part of its design if the limitation or the 
effect it would have on emissions is federally enforceable. 
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(4) (emphasis added); Utah Adm in. Code R307-I O 1-2 (same definition). 
30. Holly assumed a limit of zero tpy for malfunction emissions, which it factored 
into its emissions totals for the SO2 and PM 10 emission caps in the Holly AO. [See IR002857, 
July 2012 NOi ("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be zero.").] The SO2 
and PM 10 emission caps, which include emissions from all combustion sources including flares, 
are federally enforceable operational limitations. [See IR009245, Holly AO (Section II.B.6.a, 
"The emission of SO2 into the atmosphere from all sources (excluding routine turnaround 
maintenance sessions) shall not exceed 110.3 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.31 tons per 
day."); see also IR009247, Holly AO (Section II.B.7.a "'PM 10 emissions from all combustion 
sources shall not exceed 47.5 tons per rolling 12-month period.").] 
31. If Holly exceeds its emission caps due to an upset or malfunction, Holly will be in 
violation of its permit and subject to enforcement by UDAQ. [ See IR009 I 96, Response to 
Comments Memo ('"All limits of the permit apply at all times, which include periods of startup, 
shutdown and malfunction.").] The UBR was put in place to deal with these very kinds of 
emissions. 
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32. Finally, the 240 tpy that Petitioners contend will be emitted every year as a result 
of upset emissions was a conservative estimate of what malfunctions could be-not what they 
actually are. [See IR003780.] 
33. In fact, the emission calculation documentation in the record demonstrates that 
actual recorded historic malfunction emissions from the flare averaged only 34 tpy of SO2 from 
both flares combined. 12 [Id.] 
34. An addition of 34 tpy of SO2 from the flares, even if such emissions were required 
for purposes of calculating PTE, would not have changed the conclusions of the netting analysis 
or made this project major for SO2 given that the netting analysis demonstrated a 150.69 tpy 
overall emission reduction in SO2. [See IR007574-7575.] 
35. For all of these independent reasons, Petitioners' arguments regarding the PTE for 
the flares fail on the merits and should be dismissed. 
iii. Reporting Requirements for the Flares 
36. Petitioners' final argument relating to the flares is that the Holly AO lacks limits 
or enforceable reporting requirements for its flares. The substantial weight of record evidence 
shows that this contention is unfounded. 
12 The prediction for malfunction emissions utilized three standard deviations of the average 
actual malfunction emissions to come up with the 120 ton per flare figure. [See IR003780] The 
actual total of SO2 emitted from the North and South Flares combined was: 
12.7 tons of SO2 in 2009 
25.5 tons of SO2 in 2008 
91.0 tons of SO2 in 2007 
19.7 tons of SO2 in 2006 
20.8 tons of SO2 in 2005 
Id. Accordingly, contrary to Petitioners· contention that 240 tons of SO2 from the flares will be 
emitted on a yearly basis, the highest emissions in any one given year was only 91 tons and the 
lowest was 12. 7 tpy. 
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37. Holly is required to perform continuous emissions monitoring ("CEM") of SO2 
emissions on all sources of SO2, including flares. [IR009245, Holly AO, ("For all the above 
listed emission points a CEM shall be used to determine compliance as outlined in II.8.3.e.").] 
38. Holly also is required to install ''flow meters and gas combustion monitors" on the 
South Flare gas line "to monitor flare combustion efficiency" [IR00925 l, Holly AO]; and Holly 
is required to calculate PM emissions from all PM sources based on the amount of fuel 
combusted, the totals of which are then added into Holly's emission cap for PM and reported to 
the state. [IR009245-47, Holly AO.] 
39. Finally, Subpart la-applicable to all Holly Flares-contains requirements for 
monitoring and recordkeeping. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.107a(a)(2) (requiring owners or operators of 
flares to install a continuous monitoring device to measure H2S in the fuel gases going to the 
flare); see also 40 C.F.R. § 60.108a (record keeping and reporting requirements). 
40. These multip.le record keeping and reporting requirements all apply to Holly's 
flares. Accordingly, Petitioners arguments regarding the flares all fail and should be dismissed 
with prejudice on the merits. 
V. The Record Demonstrates That Holly's Emissions Will Not Cause or Contribute 
to an Exceedance of the NAAOS. 
I. Petitioners next argue, at some length, that the Holly AO is insufficient to protect 
the short term National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") because it does not contain 
short term emission limits on all of Holly's emission sources. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 22-
34.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. UDAQ determined that its regulations did not require short term emission limits 
when there was no risk of exceedance of the NAAQS. [IR009 I 86, Response to Comments 
48 
ADJ011583 
Memo ("Where it is clear that a source would not cause or contribute to a NAAQS violation, 
there is no free-standing regulation requiring short-term emissions limits.").] 
3. Based on modeling information provided by Holly and reviewed by UDAQ's 
modeling staff, UDAQ determined there was no risk of any exceedance of the NAAQS from 
Holly's proposed project. [IR009190-9 I, Response to Comments Memo ("Holly Refinery's 
October 9, 2012 memo ... was based on a request by UDAQ for Holly Refinery to submit an 
initial impact analysis based on the July 2012 NOi. This analysis showed no impact on the 
NAAQS CO, PM 10, NO2, or SO2."); IR009209, Response to Comments Memo (""This modeling 
analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour SO2, concentrations would be 50.4 µg/m 3, much 
lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m 3").] 
4. Holly submitted its plans for modeling to UDAQ and those plans were approved 
by UDAQ's modeling staff. [IR0003 l-48, Modeling Protocol (prepared by MSI setting forth the 
plan for the modeling); IR00 1153-54, Letter from UDAQ to Holly (approving of the Modeling 
Protocol submitted for emissions impact modeling); IR00359 l-97, Tom Orth Memo (analyzing 
Holly's modeling and agreeing with results).] 
5. Holly's emission modeling analysis contemplated the maximum emissions that 
Holly could generate on a lb/hr basis, thereby ensuring that any short-term spikes in emissions 
were accounted for in the modeling and would not cause exceedances. [IR002993-96, July 2012 
NOi (explaining that emissions input for the modeling were measured in lb/hr); IR009209, 
Response to Comments Memo ('"This modeling analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour 
SO2, concentrations would be 50.4 µg/m 3, much lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m 3").] 
6. Malfunction emissions were not considered in the modeling analysis because 
federal and state guidance exclude malfunction emissions from the modeling protocols. 
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[IR0092 l 4, Response to Comments Memo ( explaining the application of Appendix W and that 
malfunction emissions need not be included in modeling).] 
7. The results of Holly's modeling efforts clearly demonstrated there would be no 
exceedance of the NAAQS, including short-term NAAQS. [IR003017, July 2012 NOi (Table 6-
15) (demonstrating no exceedance ofNAAQS).] 
8. UDAQ determined that Holly's permit application was complete in an email sent 
on July 19, 2014. [See IR003767, email from Camron Harry to Eric Benson, dated July 19, 2012 
("I am notifying you that I have now determined Holly Refinery's NOi is administratively 
complete.").] 
9. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two 
separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding short-term 
NAAQS protection or otherwise exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement discretion over 
the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure to protect the short-term NAAQS. [See 
IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
10. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5( 4) by raising 
the issue during the public comment period. [See IR00786l-7863, Petitioners' Second Comment 
Letter.] 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
11. Petitioners have not satisfied their burden of proof for this argument because they 
have failed to marshal all of the evidence that demonstrates the NAAQS will not be exceeded. 
12. While Petitioners cite some of UDAQ's reasoning in the response to comments, 
they failed to marshal the actual modeling evidence showing that short term emissions were 
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calculated on a lb/hr basis. This evidence supports UDAQ's determination that the short-term 
NAAQS were being protected regardless of whether there are short term emission limits in the 
Holly AO. 
13. Having failed to provide any contradictory evidence in the record, Petitioners 
cannot satisfy their burden of proof and their claims regarding the NAAQS fail. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
14. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
i. Short-Term Emission Limits Are Not Required for Minor 
Modifications 
15. Petitioners contend that short-term emission limits are always required to ensure 
protection of the short-term NAAQS. However, the one-hour NO2 and SO2 guidance documents 
Petitioners rely upon for this contention, [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 23-24], by their terms apply 
only to ''major" modifications. See Memorandum from Anne Marie Wood, Air Quality Policy 
Division, to EPA Regional Directors, General Guidance for Implementing the I-hour SO2 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard in Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permits, at 6 
(Aug. 23, 2010) ("We are issuing the following guidance to explain and clarify the procedures 
that may be followed by applicants for Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permits." 
(emphasis added)). 
16. Moreover, the guidance expressly states that it does not bind state permitting 
authorities. See Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Office of Air Quality Planning and 
Standards, to Regional Air Division Directors, at 2 (Aug. 23, 2010) (''This guidance does not 
bind state and local governments and permit applicants as a matter of law."). 
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17~ According to UDEQ's analysis, Holly'~ proposed project fell into the "major" 
category for CO and GHG emissions, not for NOx, SO2, or PM. [IR009186, Response to 
Comments Memo.] 
basis: 
18. Whether a modification is ''major" is determined on a pollutant-by-pollutant 
Applicability of the major NSR program must be determined in advance of 
construction and is pollutant-specific. In cases involving existing sources, this 
requires a pollutant-by-pollutant determination of the emissions change, if any, 
that will result from the physical or operational change .... Once a modification 
is determined to be major, the PSD requirements apply only to those specific 
pollutants for which there would be a significant net emissions increase. 
67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,188 & n. 5 (Dec. 31, 2002). Because the project is not major for NOx, 
SO2, or PM, the Director, as a matter of law, was not required to adhere to federal guidance or 
impose short-term emissions limits for these pollutants. 13 
13 Petitioners claim that the Utah Supreme Court has "·held that BACT emission limits must 
protect short term NAAQS," citing Sierra Club v. Air Quality Board, 2009 UT 76, 226 P.3d 719. 
[Petitioners' Opening Br. at 23-27.] Petitioners incorrectly interpret the Court's holding. In that 
case, the court simply observed in dicta ""the EPA has described the goals of BACT emission 
limitations in three-parts: (1) to achieve the lowest percent reduction, (2) to protect short-term 
ambient standards, and (3) to be enforceable as a practical matter." Id at 734. The court never 
evaluated or held this was a correct interpretation of the relevant regulations. Moreover, the fact 
that a goal ofBACT is to protect the short-term NAAQS does not mean that short-term limits 
must invariably be imposed as part of a BACT determination regardless of whether the project 
involves a major modification or poses any actual risk of an exceedance. EPA guidance 
indicates that while any BACT emissions limits are to be considered in determining whether the 
source will cause or contribute to a NAAQS violation, the BACT requirement is not an 
independent basis for imposing additional short-term emissions limits. See Memorandum from 
Anne Marie Wood, Acting Director Air Quality Policy Division to Regional Air Division 
Directors, at 7 (Aug. 23, 20 I 0) ("Once a level of control is determined by the PSD applicant via 
the Best Available Control Technology (BACT) top-down process, the applicant must model the 
proposed source's emissions at the BACT emissions rate(s) to demonstrate that those emissions 
will not cause or contribute to a violation of any NAAQS or PSD increment."). 
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19. Petitioners' reliance on In re: Mississippi Lime, PSD Appeal No. I 1-01 (Aug. 9, 
2011) as an alternate basis for the requirement for imposition of short-term emission limits in the 
Holly AO is also misplaced. The decision is inapplicable for two reasons. 
20. First, in Mississippi Lime, the permit applicant proposed to construct a facility 
that, unlike Holly's proposed expansion, would emit SO2 and NOx in quantities well above the 
significance thresholds so as to render the proposed facility subject to the PSD requirements for 
those pollutants. See IEPA, Project Summary at 4 (2010) (noting that '"Mississippi Lime's 
proposed lime manufacturing plant is subject to PSD for emissions of SO2, NOx and CO because 
the potential emissions of the plant are more than 100 tons/year"), available at 
http://www.epa.state.il.us/public-notices/20l 0/mississippi-lime-pdr/project-summary.pdf; see 
also Mississippi Lime, slip op. at l (noting that Mississippi Lime sought to construct a new lime 
manufacturing plant). 
21. Second, as the Director explained in his response to comments-which 
Petitioners do not contest-in Mississippi Lime, the permit was remanded to the state permitting 
authority "not simply because it failed to establish a limit, but because IEPA failed to provide ·a 
coherent, well-reasoned explanation of the decision' not to impose such a limit." [IR009 I 86, 
Response to Comments Memo.] 
22. By contrast, UDAQ has a well-reasoned explanation for why it did not impose the 
short-term limits requested by Petitioners-the modeling demonstrated there would be no 
exceedance of the short-term NAAQS. [IR0030l 7, July 2012 NOi (Table 6-15) (demonstrating 
no exceedance ofNAAQS).] 
23. Accordingly, Petitioners' argument that short-term limits were required in the 
Holly AO fails on the merits and should be rejected. 
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ii. Ho/Iv's Modeling Constitutes Substantial Evidence That the 
NAAOS Will Be Protected 
24. Although UDAQ and Holly were not required to conduct modeling to 
demonstrate compliance with the NAAQS because Holly proposed only a minor modification for 
NOx, SO2, and PM, see 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (a)(2)(ii) ('"The requirements of paragraphs G) through 
(r) of this section apply to ... the major modification of any existing major stationary source."), 14 
in an effort to be thorough, Holly conducted the modeling anyway. 
25. Before conducting any modeling, Meteorological Solutions Inc. ("MST"), Holly's 
technical consultant, developed a modeling protocol setting forth the procedure that MST would 
use to demonstrate that there were would be no exceedance of the NAAQS, including the short 
term NAAQS. This protocol was sent to the modeling staff at UDAQ, who approved of the 
protocol. [See IR00031-48, Modeling Protocol; IR00 1153; IR003593, Orth Modeling Memo 
("The applicant had an approved modeling protocol for using AERMOD in PSD modeling 
protocols.").] MST used the PTE calculations of all SO2 and NOx emission sources at the 
refinery for input into the model for the short-term modeling. [See IR000038 ("Maximum 
hourly potential to emit (PTE) emissions for existing and proposed sources will be input to the 
model."); IR00004 I (same).] 
26. PTE is defined as "the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a 
pollutant under its physical and operational design," taking into account enforceable emissions 
limits. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(b)(4), 51.165(a)(l)(iii), 51.166(b)(4). Using the maximum capacity 
of each unit, MST determined the total emissions the refinery could generate in one hour of 
operation measured in terms of lbs/hr. [See IR002993-96, July 2012 NOi.] Because PTE is 
14 See also Utah Adm in. Code R307-403-3 ("Every ... major modification must be reviewed by 
the director to determine if a source will cause or contribute to a violation of the NAAQS.") 
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based on maximum capacity, this calculation represented the maximum emissions that could be 
produced at the refinery in a one-hour period. These values were used in the model and, once the 
background concentrations were combined with the PTE emissions, the modeling results showed 
that there would be no exceedance of the NAAQS, including the short-term NAAQS. [See 
IR003017, July 2012 NOi (Table 6-15); IR003596. Tom Orth Memo (Table 3); see also 
IR009209 ('This modeling analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour SO2, concentrations 
would be 50.4 µg/m 3, much lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m 3 .•• Accordingly there is no need 
to impose 1 or 24-hour SO2 limits to protect the SO2 NAAQS.").] 
27. UDAQ's Orth Memorandum specifically found that "the proposed project's 
impacts, when combined with other industrial sources and ambient background, would comply 
with federal standards," including the one-hour NOx and SO2 NAAQS. In light of all of this 
record evidence, it was reasonable for UDAQ not to include any additional short-term emission 
limits in the Holly AO. 
28. Petitioners do not dispute that the modeling results showed no exceedance of the 
NAAQS. Instead Petitioners challenge the modeling itself. These challenges do not undermine 
UDAQ's approval of and reliance on the modeling analysis, particularly given the deference that 
UDAQ is due with respect to technical issues such as air quality modeling: "[Q]uestions 
pertaining to the appropriate pollutant emissions rates and other inputs to air quality models raise 
scientific and technical concerns that generally are best left to the specialized expertise and 
reasoned judgment of the permitting authority." In re: N. Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant, 
PSD Appeal No. 08-02, at 53 (EAB Feb. 18, 2009). 
29. First, Petitioners argue that DAQ's Orth Memorandum is unreliable because it 
states that "[t]his report outlines the methodology used in the dispersion modeling analysis of 
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emissions of criteria and HAP proposed in the NOi and the subsequent modeling results. It 
makes no determination with respect to compliance with the NAAQS or UDAQ- Toxic 
Screening Levels for HAPs or compliance thereof.'' [IR003591-92, Tom Orth Memo.] However, 
that language simply indicates that the Orth Memorandum, by itself, did not constitute a 
determination as to compliance with the NAAQS, as illustrated by the fact that the memorandum 
made only a "recommendation" as to what further steps to take. [IR003597, Tom Orth Memo.] 
It does not mean that the Director may not consider the Orth Memorandum in determining 
compliance with the NAAQS and whether short-term limits are required, as the Director did in 
the Response to Comments Memorandum. [ See IR009190-9 I, IR009209, Response to 
Comments Memo.] 
30. Second, Petitioners assert that the modeling analysis cannot be used because the 
modeling must be ''based on short term limits specified in the AO," and may not "merely 
estimate short term emission rates." [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 29-31.] However, the modeling 
done here was based on the maximum possible hourly emissions level based on the maximum 
capacity of each emissions unit as explained above, not an estimate of average short-term 
emission rates. [See IR002993-96, July 2012 NOi.] UDAQ acted within its discretion when it 
relied upon this modeling analysis. 
31. Third, Petitioners argue that the modeling is inadequate to demonstrate 
compliance with the short-term NAAQS because the modeling does not include upset emissions 
from the flares. [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 31-33.] In support of this argument, Petitioners rely 
on 40 C.F.R. § 51, Appendix W. for the proposition that such emissions must be modeled. 
Petitioners are incorrect. As UDAQ specifically explained in rejecting Petitioner's argument: 
The commenter references 40 CFR 51 Appendix W, Section 8. I .2(a) as reference 
that malfunction/upset emissions should be included in the modeling analysis. 
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However, the commenter neglected to include the following footnote from that 
same section: "'Malfunctions which may result in excess emissions are not 
considered to be a normal operating condition. They generally should not be 
considered in determining allowable emissions. However, if the excess emissions 
are the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or other preventable 
conditions, it may be necessary to consider them in determining source impact." 
[IR009214, Response to Comments Memo (quoting 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App'x W, § II.B.7.a. I .2(a) 
n.a).] UDAQ's explanation has not been rebutted by Petitioners. 
32. UDAQ' s interpretation of Appendix W is supported by a 2011 EPA guidance 
document providing additional clarification of the modeling requirements under Appendix W. 
See Memorandum from Tyler Fox, Leader Air Quality Modeling Group to Regional Air Division 
Directors, Additional Clarification Regarding Application of Appendix W Modeling Guidance 
for the I-hour N02 National Ambient Air Quality Standard (Mar. I, 2011 ). There, EPA stated 
that modeling for compliance with the I-hour NAAQS should only 
address emission scenarios that can logically be assumed to be relatively 
continuous or which occur frequently enough to contribute significantly to the 
annual distribution of daily maximum I-hour concentrations based on existing 
modeling guidelines, which provide sufficient discretion for reviewing authorities 
to not include intermittent emissions from emergency generators or 
startup/shutdown operations from compliance demonstrations for the I-hour NO2 
standard under appropriate circumstances. 
Id. at 2. 15 
33. In an attempt to fit within the language of Appendix W, Petitioners contend that 
Holly's malfunction emissions must be the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or 
15 EPA further clarified that "'we are concerned that assuming continuous operations for 
intermittent emissions would effectively impose an additional level of stringency beyond that 
intended by the level of the standard itself. As a result, we feel that it would be inappropriate to 
implement the I-hour NO2 standard in such a manner and recommend that compliance 
demonstrations for the I-hour NO2 NAAQS be based on emission scenarios that can logically be 
assumed to be relatively continuous or which occur frequently enough to contribute significantly 
to the annual distribution of daily maximum I-hour concentrations." Id at 9. The same logic 
applies to the I-hour SO2 standard. 
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other preventable conditions, and therefore should have been included in the modeling analysis. 
Petitioners argue that because EPA 's NSPS regulations relating to flares require a root cause 
analysis where a flare emits more than 500 pounds of SO2 in a 24-hour period, emissions over 
that level are necessarily the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or other preventable 
conditions. [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 33.] However, Petitioners cite no authority suggesting 
that the separate requirement to conduct a root cause analysis contained in the NSPS regulations 
somehow amounts to a determination that as a matter of law all upsets emitting more than 500 
pounds of SO2 are necessarily caused by preventable conditions for purposes of Appendix W. 
Petitioners cite no reason to conclude that, just because an investigation into the cause of all 
emission events over a certain size is required, all such emission events are necessarily caused by 
preventable conditions. Indeed, EPA recognizes that "the probability of successfully identifying 
a means to avoid future emissions from each root cause analysis performed is certainly less than 
100 percent," 72 Fed. Reg. 27,178, 27,197 (May 14, 2007), indicating that far from all emissions 
that trigger a root cause analysis would be caused by preventable conditions. [Petitioners' 
Opening Br. at 32-33.] Petitioners' argument finds no support in the record. The record 
evidence is to the contrary, recognizing that 
if SO2 modeling would have been required, then the malfunction emissions for 
SO2 would not have been included because they do not represent normal, 
controlled operations. The 120 tpy of SO2 from the flares due to malfunctions, as 
documented in the SPR Reviewer Note 5 (pp8 l-82), are based on Holly 
Refinery's historical data and do not predict future malfunctions. Nor do they 
result from poor maintenance or careless operation of the flare. 
[IR009214- l 5, Response to Comments Memo.] 
34. In light ofUDAQ's technical conclusion, it was well within UDAQ's discretion 
to determine that the malfunction emissions should not be included in the modeling analysis. 
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iii. Hollv Was Not Required to Model for PMz 5 
35. Petitioners raise one final challenge to Holly's modeling. Specifically, Petitioners 
argue the modeling did not address the revision of the annual PM2.s NAAQS that took place in 
January 2013. This argument does not relate to any purported need for short-term emissions 
limits but rather is a separate attack on the modeling analysis. 
36. For the same reasons as stated above, Holly's modification was not determined to 
be ""major" for PM2.s and therefore Holly was not required to do any modeling for PM regardless 
of whether the NAAQS were amended. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.2l(k)-(m)~ see also Utah Admin. 
Code R307-4 I 0-4. 
37. Additionally, Holly's application fell within the grandfathering provision of the 
revised PM2.s NAAQS and so did not need to be updated to address the revised NAAQS. In 
finalizing the PM2_5 NAAQS, EPA explained: 
To facilitate timely implementation of the PSD requirements resulting from the 
revised NAAQS, which would otherwise become applicable to all PSD permit 
applications upon the effective date of this final PM NAAQS rule, the EPA is 
finalizing a grandfathering provision for pending permit applications. This final 
rule incorporates revisions to the PSD regulations that provide for grandfathering 
of PSD permit applications that have been determined to be complete on or before 
December I 4, 2012 or for which public notice of a draft permit or preliminary 
determination has been published as of the effective date of today's revised PM2.5 
NAAQS. Accordingly, for projects eligible under the grandfathering provision, 
sources must meet the requirements associated with the prior primary annual 
PM2.s NAAQS rather than the revised primary annual PM25 NAAQS. 
78 Fed. Reg. 3,086, 3,249 (Jan. I 5, 2013). 
38. Holly's application was determined to be administratively complete on July I 9, 
2012, long before the PM2.s NAAQS modeling requirements became effective. [See IR003767, 
email from Camron Harry to Eric Benson, dated July 19, 2012 ("I am notifying you that I have 
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now determined Holly Refinery's NOi is administratively complete.").] Therefore, no additional 
modeling was required. 
39. In short, none of Petitioners' challenges to the modeling analysis itself succeed. 
Petitioners have failed to provide any evidence that would undermine the significant evidence in 
the record demonstrating there would not be an exceedance of the NAAQS. The modeling 
analysis demonstrated that Holly's project would not cause or contribute to any NAAQS 
violation, including the short-term NAAQS. EPA raised no comments about any of the 
foregoing issues in connection with its independent technical and legal review of the Holly AO. 
Therefore Petitioners' arguments fail on the merits and should be dismissed. 
VI. Holly and the Director Properly Calculated PM Emissions from the FCC Units. 
I. Petitioners next argue that the Director erred in failing to require Holly to count 
condensable emissions in determining compliance with the emission limits on the FCC Units. 
[Petitioners' Opening Brief at 34-36.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should ~e 
rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. UDAQ determined that condensable particle emissions would not be counted for 
compliance with FCC Unit limits, but would be included in inventory calculations. [IR009243, 
Holly AO ("The condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration, 
but shall be used for inventory purposes.").] 
3. The Utah PM 10 SIP, approved by EPA in 1994 (64 Fed. Reg. 68031 (July 8, 
1994)), excluded condensable PM emissions from compliance demonstration with the PM 10 
emission caps in the SIP. [IR007826, PM 10 SIP (attached as Exhibit L to Holly's Comment 
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Letter, ("The back half condensibles ar:e required for inventory purposes and shall be determined 
using the method specified by the Executive Secretary.").] 
4. UDAQ recognized that the language in the PM ,0 SIP controlled for purposes of 
drafting the Holly AO and excluded condensable emissions from all compliance limits for all 
PM 10 SIP cap sources-including the FCC Unit 25. [IR008569, Source Plan Review ('"Holly 
Refinery is listed in the PM 10 SIP. That document established several emission limitations, one 
of which is a cap on PM 10 emissions. At the time the SIP was written the cap on PM 10 emissions 
was established using only the filterable PM 10 emissions captured during stack testing. This 
limitation was then included in the AO (and subsequent revisions) issued to Holly Refinery. 
UDAQ has since agreed that all future particulate (PM 10 and PM2.s) limitations at all sources will 
also include the condensable fraction of particulate emissions (such as those found in the back 
half of a particulate sampling train or by reference test method 202). However, any limitation 
which is derived directly from the PM 10 SIP cannot be altered without similarly altering the SIP. 
Therefore, those limitations on SIP-listed sources will continue to retain the original ·filterable 
emissions only' language, with the condensable emissions being used only for inventory 
purposes. Such is the case with Holly Refinery's PM 10 cap emission limit. It is the intent of the 
Division to update these types of conditions once new SIP limitations are established in the 
PM2.s SIP.").] 
5. UDAQ specifically determined that it would not set PM2_5 limits on the new FCC 
Unit 25 because source wide limits of PM2.s were being set for Holly in the new PM2.s SIP that 
was being developed at the time UDAQ issued the Holly AO. [IR009 l 83, Response to 
Comments Memo ("UDAQ has not set a condensable limit on the FCC Unit 25 in this permitting 
action because UDAQ is currently developing a SIP for PM2 5• In this SIP, the contribution of 
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Holly Refinery to the valley airshed will be part of that evaluation and condensable limitations 
will be addressed."); IR009206, Response to Comments Memo ("PM2_5 condensable emissions 
will be addressed in the PM2.s SIP.").] 
6. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted 
two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding condensable 
emissions in determining compliance with the PM emission limits on the FCC Units or otherwise 
exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement discretion over the final Holly AO for any real or 
perceived failure regarding the same. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-
784 I, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
7. During the public comment period, Petitioners' comments were limited to 
challenging the PTE calculations for the new FCC Unit 25 and whether such calculations 
properly included condensable emissions. [See IR007857, WRA Second Comment Letter 
("Holly's Permit Application Underestimates the Increase in PM Emissions from the new 
FCCU").] 
8. Petitioners' challenge to the FCC Unit 25 emission limit and the exclusion of 
condensables was never raised in the comments notwithstanding the fact that this issue was 
reasonably ascertainable as the limit was included in. the ITA. [See IR008469, IT A 
("Condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration, but shall be 
used for inventory purposes").] 
9. Petitioners also appear to argue in their Opening Brief that the BACT analysis for 
the FCC Unit 25 was invalid because it did not address condensables. Petitioners failed to raise 
this argument during the comment period and therefore it was not preserved. 
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10. Because, Petitioners failed to preserve both of these arguments as required by 
Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5(4), they should be dismissed. 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
11. Even if Petitioners had preserved their claims, Petitioners have failed to meet their 
burden of proof. 
I 2. Whether condensable emissions are required to be included for purposes of 
compliance with emission limits is a question of law. Because this question of law is one with 
which UDAQ has been charged to administer, the ALJ must apply a clearly erroneous standard 
ofreview. 
13. Petitioners do not acknowledge the requirements of the PM 10 SIP. Although this 
is not an instance where marshaling is required, Petitioners' disregard of the PM 10 SIP 
requirements is fatal to their claim that condensable emissions must be included for compliance 
with the FCC Unit's limits. 
14. Petitioners have failed to point to any valid legal basis that undermines UDAQ's 
conclusion that the PM 10 SIP does not require condensables to be included for compliance with 
the PM emission limits in the Holly AO. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
15. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
16. The PM 1o SIP imposes a cap on all PM 10 sources at the Holly refinery including 
the new FCC Unit 25 but does not require condensable PM emissions to be calculated for 
compliance with that cap. [IR007826, PM 1o SIP (attached as Exhibit L to Holly's Comment 
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Letter ('The back half condensibles are required for inventory purposes and shall be determined 
using the method specified by the Executive Secretary."); IR009243, Holly AO ('"The 
condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration, but shall be used 
for inventory purposes."); IR008569, Source Plan Review (recognizing the PM10 SIP cap).] 
17. At the time the Holly AO was being considered, the PM 10 SIP was the only 
applicable PM SIP and any provisions in the Holly AO that conflicted with that SIP would have 
required a SIP amendment. [See IR008569, Source Plan Review ("any limitation which is 
derived directly from the PM 10 SIP cannot be altered without similarly altering the SIP"); 
IR007826; Attachment L to Holly's second comment letter (excerpt from PM 10 SIP stating '"[t]he 
back half condensibles are required for inventory purposes ... (t]he PM 10 captured in the front 
half ... shall be considered for compliance purposes").] 
18. Although the recently adopted PM2.s SIP now requires condensable PM emissions 
to be calculated for compliance purposes, such a requirement was not in place prior to the 
issuance of the Holly AO. Utah law is clear that permits are only required to incorporate 
regulatory requirements that exist at the time of permit issuance. [See, e.g., In the Matter of 
Petroleum Processing Plant Emery Refining, LLC, Order Returning Recommended Order Re 
Motions to Stay to Administrative Law Judge for Further Action, April 8, 2014 ("Emery Order") 
at 4 (limiting ALJ's review to the record before her and prohibiting consideration of a separate 
NOi that could be granted or denied sometime in the future.).] 
19. Petitioners' references to Federal Register notices and guidance requiring PM 
condensable emissions for compliance purposes are misplaced because such requirements had 
not yet become binding on Holly. See 73 Fed. Reg. 28321, 28334 (May 16, 2008) ( describing a 
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transition period for incorporation of condensable requirements into state implementation plans 
but only requiring such inclusion on major NSR projects). 
20. If EPA believed UDAQ erred in its handling of condensables in the Holly AO, it 
had the jurisdiction and obligation to raise that issue in connection with its independent review of 
the Holly AO. EPA declined to do so. [See IR007840-7841, EPA comment letter (raising no 
issues about permit limits or the inclusion of condensables for compliance purposes).] 
2 I. Petitioners also appear to argue that the BACT analysis for the new FCC Unit 25 
is invalid because it does not account for condensable emissions. This argument fails not only 
because Petitioners did not preserve it during the comment period but also because any emission 
control technology that reduces filterable emissions will necessarily control for condensable 
emissions, both being post-control components of Holly's emission sources. Petitioners do not 
present any evidence that an alternative emission control technology would more effectively 
control condensable emissions beyond that which Holly is already required to install. 
22. All of Petitioners' arguments regarding UDAQ's treatment of condensable PM 
emissions in the Holly AO fail on the merits and should be dismissed with prejudice. 
VII. Holly Properly Calculated and Included in its Netting Analysis VOC Emissions 
Reductions From its Cooling Towers. 
I. Petitioners next argue that Holly improperly claimed a 39.28 tpy VOC emission 
reduction from its cooling towers in the netting analysis it submitted to UDAQ. [Petitioners' 
Opening Brief at 36-41.] For the reasons set forth below, this argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. In 2009, Holly implemented a voluntary monitoring program in which it 
identified leaks in its cooling tower operation and fixed those leaks, thereby reducing emissions 
of VOCs from its cooling towers. [IR009203. Response to Comments Memo ('·The reduction in 
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VOC emissions reported in Holly Refinery's NOi was a result of a voluntary monitoring 
program of the cooling towers that identified leaks from the towers that Holly Refinery fixed, 
thereby reducing its VOC emissions.").] 
3. This monitoring program was made mandatory in the Holly AO on a going 
forward basis to ensure that the emission reductions Holly experienced by fixing its equipment 
remained at the reduced level. [IR007236, email from Mike Astin ( environmental manager for 
Holly) to Camron Harry (permit writer for UDAQ), dated March 26, 2013 ("For the cooling 
towers, we monitor the cooling water return lines monthly for volatile organics using the Texas 
El Paso method. If any leaks are identified, we use screening methods to identify the leaking 
heat exchanger and repair it."); IR009230; Holly AO (requiring that ''all cooling towers 
implement the Modified El Paso Method."); IR009244, Holly AO (requiring repair of any leaks 
detected "as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after identifying the 
leak ... [v]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").] 
4. Prior to implementing the leak detection and monitoring program, Holly utilized 
an "uncontrolled" emission factor to calculate emissions from its cooling towers. [IR009203, 
Response to Comments Memo ('·Prior to using the Modified El Paso Method, the AP-42 VOC 
'uncontrolled' emissions were the basis for refineries to report cooling tower VOC emissions.").] 
5. After implementation of the monitoring program made mandatory by the Holly 
AO, Holly utilized a "controlled" emission factor to calculate emissions from its cooling towers. 
[IR008558, Source Plan Review (""VOC emissions from cooling towers 4 through 8 were 
previously estimated using the uncontrolled emission factor listed in AP-42 Section 5.1 of 6 
lb/I 0"6 gal cooling water. In 2009, Holly Refinery began a voluntary daily monitoring program 
to detect VOC leaks into cooling water and to eliminate those leaks. In 2012, the monitoring 
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method was replaced with monthly monitoring using the Texas El Paso method. With continued 
use of regular monitoring, it is proposed to utilize the ·controlled' emission factor of 0. 7 lb/10"6 
gallons cooling water in AP-42 Section 5.1. This method will also be implemented for cooling 
towers 10 and 1 I . ").] 
6. It is the difference between the calculations with the "uncontrolled" and 
"controlled" emission factor that makes up the emission reduction that Holly included in its 
netting analysis. [Id.] 
7. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two 
separate comment letters to UDAQ. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-
7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.] While the Second Comment Letter requested more 
information regarding "the basis for the estimate of emissions reduced by converting from gas 
fired to electric motors for the compressors" [IR007840], the EPA raised no concerns about the 
netting issues raised by Petitioners here. Moreover, EPA's request for supplemental information 
on this issue was satisfied in UDAQ's response to comments. 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
8. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5( 4) by raising 
the issue during the public comment period. [See IR004214-42 I 6, Mark Hall First Comment 
Letter.] 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
9. Petitioners' claim that Holly incorrectly included a VOC emission reduction from 
its cooling towers is a mixed question of law and fact. The correct interpretation of the 
regulations governing when a source can utilize an emission reduction in a netting analysis is a 
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question of law. However, the application of those regulations to the facts in this case presents a 
mixed question to which the AU must apply a reasonableness standard ofreview. 
10. Because this is a mixed question of law and fact, Petitioners had the burden to 
marshal the relevant factual evidence that pertained to this claim. 
11. Petitioners failed to meet this burden by failing to reference the requirements in 
the Holly AO that make monitoring and leak repairs for the cooling towers enforceable permit 
conditions. This evidence undermines Petitioners' argument that the cooling tower emission 
reductions are not enforceable or creditable. 
12. Having failed to marshal this and other relevant evidence, Petitioners cannot 
satisfy their burden to prove that UDAQ acted unreasonably in accepting Holly's netting 
analysis. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
13. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
14. Petitioners challenge the creditability and enforceability of the VOC emission 
reduction from the cooling towers because they claim it resulted from a voluntary monitoring 
program and therefore was unenforceable. See 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (b )(3) (requiring decreases in 
actual emissions be creditable and enforceable in order to be included in a netting analysis); [see 
also Petitioners' Opening Br. at 36-37]. Petitioners also claim that Holly was precluded from 
including the emission reduction in its netting analysis because the State of Utah arguably relied 
upon the emission reduction for demonstration of attainment of the PM2s SIP. [Id] Both 
arguments fail on the merits. 
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i. Creditahilitv ofthe VOC emission reduction 
15. The UDAQ reasonably found that Holly's VOC emission reduction to be 
creditable because it resulted from a physical change to refinery equipment and will be 
maintained through an enforceable pennit condition in the Holly AO. [See (R009230; Holly AO 
(requiring that "all cooling towers implement the Modified El Paso Method."); fR009244, Holly 
AO (requiring repair of any leaks detected ··as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after 
identifying the leak ... [ v ]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").] 
16. Under applicable law, an emission reduction is creditable if ""(a) the old level of 
actual emissions exceeds the new level of actual emissions; (b) it is enforceable as a practical 
matter; [and] (c) it has approximately the same qualitative significance for public health and 
welfare as that attributed to the increase from the particular change." 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (vi)(a)-
( c ). The VOC emission reduction Holly claimed satisfies each of these three requirements. 
17. First, Holly's VOC cooling tower emissions were higher prior to Holly's physical 
repairs to the cooling towers. [See IR009203, Response to Comments Memo ("The reduction in 
VOC emissions reported in Holly Refinery's NOi was a result of a voluntary monitoring 
program of the cooling towers that identified leaks from the towers that Holly Refinery fixed, 
thereby reducing its VOC emissions.") (emphasis added); see also IR007236, email from Mike 
Astin (environmental manager for Holly) to Camron Harry (permit writer for UDAQ), dated 
March 26, 2013 ("For the cooling towers, we monitor the cooling water return lines monthly for 
volatile organics using the Texas El Paso method. If any leaks are identified, we use screening 
methods to identify the leaking heat exchanger and repair it.").] 
I 8. Petitioners argue that these emissions are merely estimated from emission factors 
and do not represent actual emission reductions, and therefore are not credible. Contrary to 
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Petitioners' arguments, however, the applicable regulations contemplate the calculation of 
emissions through emission factors. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(2 l )(i) (providing that emissions 
""shall be calculated"). The EPA-drafted preamble to the relevant regulation explains that 
emission factors may be used in calculating ""actual emissions." 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,195 
(Dec. 31, 2002) ('"When you calculate the baseline actual emissions for an existing emissions 
unit.. .you may select any consecutive 24 months of source operation within the past l O years. 
Using the relevant source records for that 24-month period, including such information as the 
utilization rate of the equipment, fuels and raw materials used in the operation of the equipment, 
and applicable emissionfactors, you must be able to calculate an average annual emissions rate, 
in tpy, for each pollutant emitted by the emissions unit that is modified, or is affected by the 
modification." (emphasis added)). 
19. 1 find that a '"calculation" of emissions from cooling towers would necessarily be 
an estimate based on operating hours, production rates, and types of materials. Holly's VOC 
calculation was based on these same factors. [See IR008558, Source Plan Review (noting that 
Holly used the "controlled' emission factor of 0.7 lb/l 0/\6 gallons cooling water as described in 
AP-42 Section 5. l )]; See also AP-42 5.1 Petroleum Refining emission calculation descriptions, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie l /ap42/ch05/final/c05s0 l .pdf (including in the emission 
calculation for cooling tower emissions the cooling water rate and refinery feed rate).] 
20. Prior to Holly's voluntary monitoring program and physical changes to its cooling 
towers to reduce and eliminate VOC leaks, Holly utilized the ""uncontrolled" AP-42 emission 
factor to calculate the VOC emissions from the cooling towers. [See IR009203, Response to 
Comments Memo ('"Prior to using the Modified El Paso Method, the AP-42 VOC "uncontrolled' 
emissions were the basis for refineries to report cooling tower VOC emissions.").] 
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21. After the units were repaired, Holly used the AP-42 "'controlled" emission factor 
which resulted in a calculated emission reduction. [IR008558, Source Plan Review ("VOe 
emissions from cooling towers 4 through 8 were previously estimated using the uncontrolled 
emission factor listed in AP-42 Section 5.1 of 6 lb/I QA6 gal cooling water. In 2009, Holly 
Refinery began a voluntary daily monitoring program to detect voe leaks into cooling water 
and to eliminate those leaks. In 2012, the monitoring method was replaced with monthly 
monitoring using the Texas El Paso method. With continued use of regular monitoring, it is 
proposed to utilize the 'controlled' emission factor of0.7 lb/JQA6 gallons cooling water in AP-42 
Section 5.1. This method will also be implemented for cooling towers 10 and 11.").] 
22. Where actual emissions are not easily measured-such as voe emissions leaking 
from cooling towers-calculation estimates can provide reliable information to satisfy 40 e.F.R. 
§ 52.21 (vi)(a)-(c). See 74 Fed. Reg. 55,670 55,679 (Oct. 28, 2009) (noting that certain historical 
inventory data based on the AP-42 factors and "the AP--42 emission factors are the best available 
data by which to estimate cooling tower emissions"). 
23. Second, the voe emission reduction from the cooling towers is enforceable 
because it was the result of a physical change to the refinery equipment, which must be 
monitored and maintained under the terms of the HollyAO. [IR009224, Holly AO (condition 
II.B.4.a Id; see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.2 I (b)(3)(vi)(b) (reduction is creditable if it is enforceable "at 
and after the time that actual construction on the particular change begins").] 
24. Holly is required, pursuant to the terms of the Holly AO, to continue monitoring 
for leaks from the cooling towers and must fix any discovered leaks in order to maintain the 
lower voe emission levels from the cooling towers. [See IR009230; Holly AO (requiring that 
"all cooling towers implement the Modified El Paso Method."); IR009244, Holly AO (requiring 
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repair of any leaks detected "as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after identifying the 
leak ... [v]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").] Any failure to do so 
subjects Holly to enforcement action by UDAQ-making these requirements, and the associated 
emission reduction, enforceable. 
25. Third, Holly has satisfied the qualitative significance requirement that Petitioners 
claim has been violated. EPA's NSR Manual states that ''[c]urrent EPA policy is to assume that 
an emissions decrease will have approximately tlie same qualitative significance for public 
health and welfare as that attributed to an increase" unless the state has reason to believe 
otherwise. [Petitioners' Reply Brief at 34 (emphasis added) (quoting EPA NSR Workshop 
Manual, 1990, A-38-39).] 
26. Holly's modeling demonstrates that there will be no violation of any NAAQS or 
PSD increments and overall, VOC emissions will be reduced. [See IR002980-3021, Holly's 
NOi, section 6.0; see also IR003591-3597, Tom Orth Memorandum; IR007575, UDAQ 
information sheet (indicating a -17.02 overall voe emission decrease from the project).] 
27. Consequently, UDAQ had no reason to believe that the qualitative presumption 
would not be met in this case, and Petitioners have not identified any contrary evidence. See, 
e.g., In re Inter-Power of N. Y, Inc., No. 92-8, 5 E.A.D. 130, 153-54 (EAB Mar. 16, 2014) 
(rejecting the argument that EPA should have conducted a health assessment to demonstrate that 
the qualitative significance of emissions was approximately the same, and holding that the 
burden was on the petitioner to '·document[] that [the source's] fuel change has increased its 
heavy metals emissions or created any health concerns. Accordingly, [petitioner] has not pointed 
to any record evidence" that indicates that this provision was not satisfied). Holly's inclusion of 
the voe emission reductions from the cooling towers therefore was proper. 
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28. Petitioners also argue that the 52.95 tpy VOC emission baseline referenced in the 
July 2012 NOi is inflated and, therefore, the emission reduction of 39.28 tons of VOC is inflated. 
Petitioners overlook that the emission spreadsheet they cite indicates that if 52.95 tpy was the 
VOC baseline, the associated emission reduction would have been 48.08 tons-not 39.28. 
(IR003059, July 2012 NOL] Holly had two different baseline calculations for VOC emissions 
because at different points in !he application process it used different baseline years for its 
netting calculations. [Compare IR003059, July 2012 NOi, with IR007300, Revised NOL] In its 
Revised NOi, Holly used 44.15 tpy as a baseline for VOC emissions, which resulted in the 
reduction of 39.28 tons ofVOC. [IR007300.] Had it used the higher baseline, the emission 
reduction would have also been higher, which means Holly's netted VOC reduction is 
conservatively low. All of these baseline totals are derived from emission inventory reports that 
Holly submitted to DAQ, and they were all calculated with AP-42 emission factors. [IR003059, 
July 2012 NOi (citing "VOC Baseline 2008-2009" inventory years; IR007300, Revised NOi 
(citing "VOC baseline 2008-2009" inventory years").] 
ii. Ho/Iv Was Not Required to Adiust Downward its Baseline VOC 
Emission Calculations 
29. Petitioners also challenge the VOC emission reduction on the basis that Holly 
should have adjusted downward its baseline VOC emission calculations because the El Paso 
monitoring method is required by a Maximum Achievable Control Technology ('"MACT") 
requirement under a National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants and has been 
relied upon by UDAQ as a Reasonably Available Control Technology ("RACT") requirement in 
the PM2_5 SIP to demonstrate attainment. 
30. Any requirements that are otherwise required to be imposed as MACT standards 
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act that result in emission reductions can still be used for 
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netting purposes unless the state has specifically relied upon the emission reduction in 
demonstrating attainment ofa NAAQS in a SIP. See 40 CFR § 52.21(b)(48)(ii)(b) & (c) ("[I]f 
an emission limitation is part of a maximum achievable control technology standard ... , the 
baseline actual emissions need only be adjusted if the State has taken credit for such emissions 
reductions in an attainment demonstration or maintenance plan."); see also Memorandum from 
John S. Seitz, Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, t<? Bob Hannesschlager, 
Acting Director, Multimedia Planning and Permitting Division, Region VI (Nov. 12, 1997) 
("'Since the MACT program is not designed to limit criteria or other pollutants regulated by NSR 
programs of parts C and D of title I of the Act, EPA 's policy is that actual emissions reductions 
of hazardous or other air pollutants that result from complying with MACT regulations codified 
at 40 CFR part 63 may be considered 'surplus' for purposes ofNSR netting and are not 
precluded from NSR netting as long as the reductions are otherwise creditable under NSR."). 
31. Petitioners argue that UDAQ relied upon the MACT standard of the Texas El 
Paso Method in the PM2.s SIP to demonstrate compliance. However, that assertion is misplaced 
because the PM2.5 SIP had not been formally adopted at the time UDAQ issued the Holly AO. 
Petitioners overlook that the regulation upon which they rely for this assertion provides only that 
emissions must be adjusted downward where such emissions "would have exceeded an 
emissions limitation with which the major stationary source must currently comply," with 
"currently comply" referring to the time of permit issuance. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(48)(ii)(c) 
(emphasis added). 
32. That Holly may have been on notice that the El Paso Method might subsequently 
be required as a RACT standard is irrelevant in this analysis and Petitioners cite no authority 
holding otherwise. 
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33. Accordingly, UDAQ acted reasonably in accepting Holly's netting analysis with 
the VOC emission reductions included therein. Petitioners' claims to the contrary should be 
dismissed with prejudice on the merits. 
VIII. The FCC Unit 25's PTE Was Accurate and its Emission Limits Are Adequate. 
I. Petitioners challenge the accuracy of Holly's PTE calculations for the FCC Unit 
25, arguing that the Holly AO is insufficient because it does not impose specific PM emission 
limits on the unit. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 41-46.] For the reasons stated below, this 
argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. The emissions from the FCC Unit 25 are limited by the maximum capacity of the 
unit of8500 barrels per day ("bpd"). [IR00281 I, July 2012 NOi ("A Fluid Catalytic Cracking 
Unit (FCCU) with a capacity of processing 8500 barrels per day will be constructed along with a 
45 MMBtu/hr feed heater. Emissions from the FCCU will be controlled by a wet gas 
scrubber."); IR002820, July 20 J 2 NOi ('"A Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU) from an idled 
New Mexico refinery will be relocated to the Woods Cross Refinery. This unit is capable of 
processing 8500 barrels of gas oil per day and is similar in size to the existing FCCU."); 
IR003078, July 2012 NOi ("'FCC Capacity Limit based on Equipment Specifications 8500 
bbls/day."); IR003 I 60, July 20 J 2 NOi ("New FCCU ... Capacity ... 8500 bbpd."); IR00849 J, 
Source Plan Review ("To process the additional bottom cut from the new crude unit (Unit 24), 
an additional Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit ('FCCU Unit 25') with a capacity of processing 8500 
barrels per day will be constructed."); IR009227, Holly AO ("Unit 4: Fluid Catalytic Cracking 
Unit (FCCU) 8,880 bpd annual average capacity"); IR009229, Holly AO ("Unit 25: FCCU 8,500 
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bpd annual average capacity"); IR009192, Response to Comments Memo (explanation for why 
the FCC Unit 25 em'issions are limited by the operational capacity of the unit).] 
3. The information relating to the capacity of the FCC Unit 25 contained in Holly's 
NOi was certified as accurate by the Plant Manager, Mike Wright. [IR007836, certification 
signature page (Mike Wright certified that the information provided for the approval order was 
accurate and complete.).] 
4. UDAQ determined that a coke bum rate of 6200 lb/hr was reasonable based on 
the data Holly provided. [IR009219, Response to Comments Memo (""Based on UDAQ's 
technical expertise and experience," UDAQ determined that "the 6200 lb/hr value is a fair and 
reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke bum in FCC Unit 25."); IR008052, November 7, 
2013 letter (Holly's emission calculations for PTE of the FCC Unit 25).] 
5. UDAQ also determined that Holly was subject to a PM emission cap that included 
the FCC Unit 25, and that any exceedance of the PTE calculated for the unit would subject Holly 
to enforcement for exceedance of the emission cap. [IR009208, Response to Comments Memo 
('"regardless of maximum throughput rates, the emissions are limited at the values established in 
IT A"); IR009219, Response to Comments Memo (explanation for why the PTE for the FCC Unit 
#25 was correct because the unit is subject to the PM emission cap and any exceedance of that 
cap would be a violation).] 
6. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted 
two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding UDAQ's PTE 
calculations for any FCCU or otherwise exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement 
discretion over the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure regarding the same. [See 
IR00400l, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
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B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
7. In their public comments, Petitioners only challenged the accuracy of the PTE 
calculations for Holly's FCC Unit 25. Specifically, Petitioners argued there was insufficient 
evidence to support the 6200 lbs/hr coke burn rate calculation, and that as a result, additional 
limits were needed for the unit. [See IR008598-8599, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.] 
8. In response to this comment, UDAQ requested that Holly provide additional 
documentation and calculations to support the 6200 lb/hr coke burn rate. [IR00802 I.] 
9. Holly responded by providing the calculations it used to determine the coke burn 
rate. [IR8022-8023; IR008052.] 
I 0. Petitioners argued differently in their Motion for Stay, that the 6200 lb/hr figure 
would not effectively limit PM emissions because emissions would increase if more coke was 
burned. 
11. In Petitioners' briefing on the merits, Petitioners challenge for the first time the 
accuracy of the maximum capacity of the FCC Unit 25, claiming that there was no evidence in 
the record to support the 8500 bpd figure. 
12. This maximum capacity was expressly stated in multiple places in the NOi and 
ITA. Any concern with the accuracy of the number was therefore reasonably ascertainable 
during the public comment period. [IR0028 I I, July 20 I 2 NOi ("A Fluid Catalytic Cracking 
Unit (FCCU) with a capacity of processing 8500 barrels per day"); IR00849 I, Source Plan 
Review (""To process the additional bottom cut from the new crude unit (Unit 24), an additional 
Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit ("FCCU Unit 25') with a cap9city of processing 8500 barrels per 
day will be constructed.").] 
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13. Accordingly, the only issue that has been adequately preserved by Petitioners is 
their challenge to the 6200 lb/hr coke burn rate and their assertion that additional limits are 
required for the FCC Unit 25. Their most recent challenge to the accuracy of the 8500 bpd 
capacity limit on the FCC Unit 25 has not been preserved in accordance with Utah Code Section 
19-1-301.5(4) and should be dismissed for the reasons described above. 
C. Findings and Conclusion on Burden of Proof 
14. Even if Petitioners had preserved their challenge to the accuracy of the 8500 bpd 
capacity limit on the FCC Unit 25, Petitioners have failed to satisfy their burden of proof. 
15. Whether the PTE emission calculations for the FCC Unit 25 are supported in the 
record is a highly technical factual issue that requires this tribunal to give deference to UDAQ in 
its review of the issue. Petitioners must demonstrate that UDAQ lacked substantial evidence in 
the record to support its decision that the PTE was calculated correctly. 
16. Accordingly, Petitioners carry a heavy burden of proof to marshal the evidence 
relating to this issue to allow this tribunal to adequately evaluate and weigh the evidence relating 
to the claims at issue. 
17. Petitioners have failed to meet their burden here by ignoring the relevant evidence 
in Holly's NOi explaining how Holly calculated the emissions that would be generated by the 
FCC Unit 25. Petitioners also provide no evidence contradicting Holly's certification that all of 
the numbers contained in the NOi were accurate. 
18. DAQ invited commenters, including Petitioners here, during the public comment 
period to provide technical evidence of alternate coke burn rates that commenters argued would 
be more appropriate. Neither Petitioners nor other commenters responded to DAQ's request. 
[IR0092 I 9, Response to Comments Memo ("The commenter makes general reference to the 
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'UOP yield estimates' and 'other more generic publications,' but provided no documents or 
primary data to support or detail to which estimate, if any, was used to derive the suggested 
range of coke burn estimates. Based on UDAQ's technical experience and expertise, the 6200 
lb/hr value is a fair and reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25. The 
commenter has not provided any specific technical information to UDAQ that would suggest a 
higher value is more appropriate.") 
I 9. Failing to carry their burden of proof on this highly technical issue, Petitioners' 
claims fail. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
20. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
21. The question of whether Holly and UDAQ correctly calculated the potential 
emissions for the FCC Unit 25 is a highly technical issue that requires this tribunal and any 
reviewing court to give deference to the agency because the agency, in its technical expertise, is 
in the best position to evaluate these issues. 
22. Holly based its conclusion that the new FCC Unit 25 would burn coke at a rate of 
6200 lb/hr on empirical data it obtained from the FCC Unit 4 that was in current operation at the 
refinery. [IR008052.] UDAQ requested and reviewed Holly's calculation information and was 
satisfied that it justified the coke burn rate. [IR0092 I 9, Response to Comments Memo (""Based 
on UDAQ's technical expertise and experience," UDAQ determined that ··the 6200 lb/hr value is 
a fair and reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25."); IR008052, 
November 7, 2013 letter (Holly's emission calculations for PTE of the FCC Unit 25).] 
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23. The 6200 lb/hr figure was a conservative estimate. The original calculations 
showed a rate of 5653.964 lb/hr, and the FCC Unit 4 is a larger unit than the new FCC Unit 25. 
[IR008052; see also Holly AO at IR009227-009229 (The FCC Unit 4 processes 8,880 barrels per 
day ("bpd") while the proposed FCC Unit 25 can only process 8,500 bpd).] 
24. Petitioners are incorrect in their assumption that because the rate is not included 
as a limit in the Holly AO that Holly will exceed the PM limit of 0.301b/1000 lbs of coke burned. 
The FCC Unit 25 emissions will not exceed the PTE because there is a finite capacity limit on 
the FCC Unit 25 that acts as a physical limitation on the amount of PM that can be emitted. 
25. Even were this not the case, the refinery is limited to an overall PM 10 emission 
cap of 47.5 tpy and O. l 3 tpd for combustion sources. [See IR0092 l 9, Response to Comments 
Memo.] "If these limitations are not met, the refinery will be out of compliance until it remedies 
the problem with additional control equipment or redesign of the system until it meets these 
limits." [/d.] Gi,;j 
26. Petitioners have failed to point to any evidence in the record that undermines the 
reasonableness of UDAQ's reliance on the calculations Holly provided. 
27. Petitioners' only challenge to the PM cap that limits emissions from the FCC Unit 
25 is the contention that EPA generally disfavors source wide cap limits. This assertion is 
without merit. 
28. In the PM1o SIP that EPA approved, UDAQ specifically noted that due to the 
significant variability of emission sources at a refinery, emission caps are appropriate. [See 
IR07768, PM 1o SIP language attached to Holly Comment letter as Exhibit I, (because ~·there was 
significant variability from day to day and from year to year ... the refineries were allowed 
maximum never-to-be exceeded daily limits of PMIO, SO2, NOx based on the apparent 
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variability").] This is true even though EPA generally disfavors source wide caps. In this case, 
EPA recognized an exception to the general approach in approving such caps in the PM'° SIP. 
29. In light of the highly technical nature of this issue, UDAQ must be afforded the 
greatest degree of deference in its conclusions regarding the evidence in the record supporting 
the FCC Unit 25's PTE calculations. See Utah Code§ 19-1-301.5(14). Lacking any evidence 
that would undermine UDAQ's conclusions, 16 Petitioners' challenge to the PM emission 
calculations fail. 
IX. Holly is in Compliance with Title V. 
l. Petitioners next argue that the Holly AO may not be issued if Holly is not in 
compliance with Title V of the Clean Air Act. Petitioners make three distinct arguments related 
to this claim: (I) Holly's Title V application is not complete because the AO and Source Plan 
review lack certain Title V requirements; (2) Holly has not adequately supplemented its Title V 
application; and (3) not all applicable parts of Subpart Ja are included in the Holly AO in 
violation of Title V regulations. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 46-5 l . ] For the reasons stated 
below. these arguments should be rejected. 
16 For the first time in their Reply Brief, Petitioners appear to suggest that that the Holly AO is 
purportedly deficient because the Director's use of PM10 modeling as a surrogate for PM2.s 
modeling was invalid. Specifically, Petitioners assert that the FCC Unit 25 must contain a 
separate PM2_5 limit to ensure its emissions will not contribute to a NAAQS violation. 
[Petitioners' Reply Brief at 42.] Even were it permissible to raise a new argument in a Reply 
Brief, Petitioners never raised any concerns about this alleged surrogate policy in their comment 
letters; thus the issue is not preserved. Moreover, Holly is now subject to a source wide emission 
cap in the PM2.s SIP that will limit its PM2 s emissions. [Utah PM2.s SIP, January 8, 2014, p. 21 
(setting a source wide PM2.s limit of 47.6 tons per rolling 12-month period).] UDAQ was 
reasonable in determining that its regulation of Holly's PM2 s sources in the PM2.s SIP would 
limit Holly's emissions and that a separate limit in the Holly AO was unnecessary. 
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A. Findings of Fact 
2. Holly's predecessor-in-interest received a letter from UDAQ in 1995 that stated 
Holly's operating permit application was administratively complete, which provides Holly with 
an application shield from Title V enforcement action. [IR007725, Letter from UDAQ to the 
Phillips 66 Company, Holly's predecessor in interest (stating that "the Operating Permit 
application for Phillips Refinery (application #47) has been reviewed and determined to be 
complete in accordance with Utah Administrative Code (UAC) R307-15-5( 1 )(b)," that "the 
above site is shielded from enforcement action for operating without a permit until a permit is 
issued," and that additional information would be requested if needed).] 
3. UDAQ recognized that Ho11y had a Title V application shield letter in its response 
to Petitioners' comments regarding Title V. [IR009175, Response to Comments Memo (Holly 
submitted at UDAQ's request "a July 29, 1995 letter from UDAQ indicating that a complete 
Title V Permit application had been received [and it] has been included in the record."); 
IR009184, Response to Comments Memo C"ln any event...Holly Refinery is operating under an 
application shield ... [t]he Title V application is currently pending.").] 
4. UDAQ also recognized that Petitioners pointed to no statute or regulation that 
would preclude Holly from receiving an approval order without first obtaining a final Title V 
permit. [IR009184, Response to Comments Memo ("UDAQ does agree that Holly Refinery is a 
major source and is thus bound by R307-415, but the commenter has not referenced regulations 
that prevent a major source without a Title V permit from obtaining an AO, nor is UDAQ aware 
of such a regulation.").] 
5. UDAQ determined that Holly was still subject to all applicable federal regulations 
regardless of whether Holly was in receipt of a final Title V permit. [IR008571, Source Plan 
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Review ("Title V of the Clean Air Act of 1990 applies to Holly Refinery as a major source. The 
absence of a Title V permit does not negate the requirements of Holly Refinery, it is still subject 
to all AO conditions and federal regulations that would be included in the Title V permit.").] 
6. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted 
two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding non-
compliance with Title V or otherwise exercise EPA 's broad oversight or enforcement discretion 
over the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure regarding the same. [See IR00400 I, 
EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.] 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
7. Petitioners did raise a Title V issue during the comment period that focused on the 
allegation that Holly was illegally operating without a Title V permit. [See IR007860-786 I, 
Petitioners' Second Comment Letter ("Holly Refinery is illegally operating and will continue to 
do so until it receives a valid Title V permit.").] 
8. However, this is a much different claim than what Petitioners advocate in their 
briefing on the merits-that somehow Holly's approval order and supporting documentation 
turned into a Title V application that is insufficient, leaving Holly in violation of Title V of the 
Clean Air Act. 
9. This new argument was also not raised by Petitioners in their RAA even though 
the source plan review signature page they rely upon in the briefing was available for Petitioners 
to review. [See IR007834-7835 (attached to Holly's Second Comment Letter).] 
IO. The relief requested in the RAA was simply that the Director must issue a Title V 
permit for Holly prior to authorizing the expansion project-not that Holly's Title V application 
was incomplete or insufficient. [See RAA at 38.] 
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11. To the extent Petitioners' arguments extend beyond their initial contention that 
Holly is allegedly illegally operating without a valid Title V permit, such arguments have not 
been adequately preserved and should be dismissed on this basis. 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
12. The question of whether Holly is in compliance with Title V and whether UDAQ 
properly interpreted the Title V statute and rules to allow UDAQ to issue the Holly AO presents 
a mixed question of law and fact. The questions regarding interpretation of the Title V rules and 
regulations are questions of law. The application of that law to th is specific case presents a 
mixed question of fact and law that must be reviewed under a reasonableness standard. 
13. Petitioners are required to marshal all of the relevant evidence on this issue to 
allow this tribunal to adequately evaluate whether there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support UDAQ's decision to issue the Holly AO. 
14. Petitioners have failed to satisfy their burden of proof for this claim. In fact, 
Petitioners' fail to reference the only piece of record evidence related to Title V compliance: 
UDAQ's letter to Holly's predecessor expressly stating that the refinery is in compliance with 
Title V. [ See IR007725.] 
15. Petitioners also fail to identify any final determination on Holly's pending Title V 
application that would restrict UDAQ's ability to issue Holly its approval order. 
16. Lacking this evidence, Petitioners cannot satisfy their burden of proof and their 
claims regarding Title V must fail. 
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D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
17. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
18. Petitioners argue that before the Director may issue Holly an approval order, he 
must purportedly determine whether Holly is in compliance with Title V. See Utah Admin. 
Code R307-401-8(1 )(b)(x) (an approval order may only be issued if"the proposed installation 
will meet the applicable requirements of ... all other provisions of R307"); [see also Petitioners' 
Opening Br. at 47]. 
19. Petitioners assert that Holly is in violation of Title V because its Title V 
application is not complete and it has violated its duty to supplement its application ··as 
necessary to address any requirements that become applicable to the source." Utah Admin. Code 
R307-415-5b. In support of this assertion, Petitioners rely on the fact that, as part of Holly's 
approval order application, Holly signed an optional signature page allowing the information in 
the Source Plan Review to be included in Holly's pending operating permit application. [See 
IR007836, SPR signature page.] Because this signature page signifies that the AO application is 
an update to Holly's Title V application but lacks certain Title V requirements, Petitioners argue 
that Holly's Title V application is legally deficient. 
20. Petitioners similarly argue that by omitting the Subpart Ja requirements in the 
Holly AO, Holly also has violated the application requirements under Title V. On these bases, 
Petitioners assert that UDAQ may not issue an approval order to Holly while it is in violation of 
the Title V permit application requirements. 
21. These arguments fail for four reasons. 
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22. First, any arguments related to Title V compliance or the sufficiency of Holly's 
Title V application is outside of this tribunal's jurisdiction. The Executive Director of DEQ has 
made clear that an ALJ's jurisdiction is limited to the administrative record before him or her and 
the particular permit under review. [See Emery Order (limiting ALJ's jurisdiction to the record 
before her and prohibiting consideration of an NOi application that could be granted or denied at 
some point in the future.).] Any other permits or applications for permits that Holly may have 
submitted-all of which involve separate administrative records-are beyond the scope of these 
proceedings. Id. More important, Petitioners do not point to any final Title V permit decision 
that could be reviewed by this tribunal even if it had jurisdiction to do so. 
23. Second, even if I had jurisdiction, it is clear from this record that Petitioners have 
not presented any evidence or authority that renders invalid the application shield letter issued to 
Holly's predecessor-in-interest. [See IR007725.] This shield remains in place until the 
permitting authority takes action on the entire Title V permit application, which it appears has 
not yet occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 766 lc(d) ("if a part 70 source submits a timely and complete 
application for permit issuance (including for renewal), the source's failure to have a part 70 
permit is not a violation of this part until the permitting authority takes final action on the permit 
application"); see also 40 C. F .R. § 70. 7(b) (same); see also Utah Adm in. Code. R307-4 I 5-
5a(3 )( e) (same). This means every approval order that Holly has received is an update to its Title 
V permit application. The Holly AO is no exception and does not independently give rise to a 
cause of action under Title V's separate rules or regulations. 
24. Third, even if I had jurisdiction, this argument fails as a matter of law: Nothing in 
the Title V statute or applicable regulations contains any time period for supplementation of the 
Title V application. See Utah Admin. Code R307-415-5b. That Holly continues to provide 
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information to EPA and UDAQ regarding NSPS compliance (which is a Title V requirement) 
effectively evidences that Holly's Title V permit application is being updated on an ongoing 
basis. [See IR004 l 38-59, Exhibit 7 to Petitioners' first comment letter (containing a compliance 
report, sent to the EPA and UDAQ, including compliance demonstration for NSPS 
requirements).] Thus, Petitioners' reliance on the signature page as evidence of an incomplete 
Title V application is without merit. 
25. Fourth, even if I had jurisdiction, Petitioners' argument that UDAQ's failure to 
recite the entire Subpart Ja regulation in the Holly AO violates Title V is incorrect. [Petitioners' 
Br. at 10-11.] As previously explained, UDAQ is not required to recite the entire 43-page 
Subpart Ja regulation in the Holly AO. In any event, the record demonstrates that Subpart Ja 
does apply and that Holly is in compliance with all federal requirements. [See IR007725.] 
26. For all of these reasons, Petitioners' claims regarding Title V fail on the merits 
and should be dismissed with prejudice. 
X. The Record Supports the Use of the NEI Emission Factors in Holly's Emission 
Calculations. 
1. Petitioners next argue that the Director erred when he authorized the use of the 
NEI emission factors to calculate PM emissions from certain of Holly's heaters and boilers. 
[Petitioners' Opening Brief at 51-58.] For the reasons discussed below, this argument should be 
rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. Holly submitted to UDAQ two independent expert reports explaining why the 
NEI emission factors were more accurate and better predictors of emissions than the AP-42 
emission factors-namely, because of the newer dilution testing methodology that was used to 
develop the NEI emission factors. [IR007238-58, First Glen England Report ('~England I") 
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(explaining why the NEI emission factors more accurately predict PM2.s emissions from gas 
fired heaters and boilers); IR008024-44, Second Glen England Report ("England II") (same).] 
3. Because the NEI emission factors were untested at the Holly refinery, UDAQ 
imposed stack testing requirements to verify the accuracy of the emission factor calculations. 
[IR0092 l 5-l 6, Response to Comments Memo (explaining that UDAQ imposed stack testing 
requirements to verify the accuracy of the NEI emission factors, reviewed the Glen England 
Reports and maintained the original conclusion that use of the NEI emission factors was 
appropriate); IR0092 l 7, Response to Comments Memo (explaining that Holly was subject to a 
stringent emission limit for its heaters and boilers that matched the NEI emission factor 
calculations and that Holly is subject to stack testing requirements to verify compliance).] 
4. UDAQ also imposed an emission limit of 0.0005 l lb/MMBtu in Section 11.B.7.a.2 
of the Holly AO. [IR009248, Holly AO.] 
5. UDAQ only imposed this limit on Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers. [IR008558-
59, Source Plan Review (explaining use ofNEI emission factors for NSPS sources); IR009218, 
Response to Comments Memo (explaining use ofNEI emission factors for NSPS sources).] 
6. Presumably at the request of Mark Hall, a commenter on the draft Holly AO, EPA 
staff members sent emails to an undisclosed Gmail account discussing the accuracy of the NEI 
emission factors and the ability of EPA to approve new emission factors generally. [IR008911-
8922; IR009043.] Neither the attachments to these emails nor the complete emails were 
included with the comments. [Jd.] 
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B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
7. Petitioners preserved some aspects of their argument regarding their challenge to 
the NEI emission factors in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising the issue during the public 
comment period. [See IR008584-8595, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.] 
8. Petitioners did not, however, preserve the argument that§ 7430 of the Clean Air 
Act precluded the use of the NEI emission factors. 
9. Section 7430 of the Clean Air Act was not cited anywhere in the comments 
submitted during the public comment period but was reasonably ascertainable because it was 
codified in the U.S. Code during the public comment period. 
IO. Petitioners did not raise this substantive argument until their briefing on their 
request for a stay in this proceeding. 
11. Accordingly, any arguments relating to§ 7430 of the Clean Air Act are 
unpreserved and should be dismissed. 
12. In their Reply Brief, Petitioners, argued for the first time that the § 7430 claim 
was made in response to additional information submitted to UDAQ after the close of the public 
comment period and was therefore not barred by the preservation rules found in Utah Code 
Section 19-1-301.5( 4). Petitioners asserted than any prohibition to their ability to address 
information submitted after the close of the public comment period would be a violation of their 
due process rights. 
13. Petitioners' due process argument relating to their ability to assert the § 7430 
claim was not briefed until the Reply. Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are rejected 
in appellate contexts. See e.g., Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ,r 9, 17 P.3d 
1122 (refusing to consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief). Accordingly, this 
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tribunal will not entertain Petitioners' due process arguments briefed for the first time in their 
Reply Brief. GJ 
14. Additionally, even if such an argument were properly before this tribunal, the 
only information Holly submitted after the close of the public comment period relating to the 
NEI emission factors was the second Glen England Report, in which Mr. England-expanded on 
his prior report (submitted before the public comment period) explaining why the NEI emission 
factors were the most representative factor for determining emissions from Holly's new heaters 
and boilers. [See IR008024-44.] 
15. Petitioners' § 7430 argument is not directed at this second Glen England report 
and does not address any of the technical findings contained therein. Instead, as Petitioners 
admit, the § 7430 argument is purely a legal argument relating to whether UDAQ could use 
emission factors other than the AP-42 factors, officially approved by EPA. 
16. Therefore, in light of the fact that the § 7430 argument has nothing to do with the 
Glen England Report and is a purely legal argument that was reasonably ascertainable during the 
public comment period, the claim has not been adequately preserved, and no due process rights 
have been infringed. 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
17. Even if Petitioners' claims had all been adequately preserved, they have failed to 
meet their burden of proof. 
18. Petitioners' claim that UDAQ erred in relying on the NEI emission factors to 
calculate the PTE for Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers presents a mixed question of law and 
fact. Whether UDAQ is legally authorized to use an emission factor other than AP-42 is a 
question of law and UDAQ has been given discretion to interpret this law, requiring the 
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application of a clearly erroneous standard of review. The question of whether UDAQ was 
reasonable in accepting the NEI emission factor data is a highly technical mixed question of law 
and fact that is reviewed for reasonableness. 
19. Although Petitioners reference, in a footnote, the Glen England Reports, they do 
not analyze any of the information contained in those reports. Instead, Petitioners focus on a 
paper that Glen England published in 2004, which discusses generally the NEI emission factors 
as well as several emails from EPA staff discussing the adequacy of the NEI emission factors. 
20. Petitioners also focus their argument on the assertion that UDAQ is prohibited by 
Section 7430 of the Clean Air Act from using any emission factors not specifically approved by 
EPA. 
21. Petitioners have failed to adequately marshal all of the relevant evidence for this 
highly complicated issue. Accordingly, they have not satisfied their burden of proof to challenge 
Holly's use of and UDAQ's acceptance of the NET emission factors. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
22. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
23. Petitioners advance multiple arguments as to why the use of the NEI emission 
factors to calculate emissions from Holly's heater and boilers was improper. Each of these 
arguments fails for the reasons discussed in detail below. 
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i. There is No Legal Requirement that UDAO use AP-42 Emission 
Factors 
24. Petitioners argue that the law mandates UDAQ use AP-42 emission factors to 
calculate PM emissions from Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers. This argument fails for three 
reasons. 
25. First, nothing in Utah's minor source permitting regulations and nothing in the 
federal PSD/NSR regulations requires the use of AP-42 emission factors. In fact, those 
regulations do not mention the AP-42 factors at all. 
26. While EPA has identified the AP-42 factors as one method of estimating potential 
emissions under the PSD/NSR program, the AP-42 factors are not the only authorized method. 
EPA also has sanctioned numerous other methods, including "emissions from technical 
literature." [EPA New Source Review Workshop Manual, Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting, draft dated October 1990 ("EPA 
Puzzlebook"). The NEI emission factors are "emissions from technical literature" that Holly 
used to calculate potential PM2_5 emissions from its gas fired heaters and boilers. 
27. Moreover, the AP-42 factors themselves caution that they are not to be 
mechanically applied, but may be superseded by more specific or appropriate technical 
information. As EPA has advised: 
Before simply applying AP-42 emission factors to predict emissions from new or 
proposed sources, or to make other source-specific emission assessments, the user 
should review the latest literature and technology to be aware of circumstances 
that might cause such sources to exhibit emission characteristics different from 
those of other, typical existing sources. Care should be taken to assure that the 
subject source type and design, controls, and raw material input are those of the 
source(s) analyzed to produce the emission factor. This fact should be 
considered, as well as the age of the information and the user's knowledge of 
technology advances. 
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EPA, Introduction to AP-42, 4 (Jan. 1995), available at www.epa.gov/ttnchie I /ap42/c00s00.pdf. 
In this fashion, EPA delegates to the relevant permitting authority discretion to detennine how to 
calculate emission rates. 
28. Second, Petitioners' argument that the NSPS regulations mandate the use of AP-
42 is also misplaced because the NSPS program is entirely separate from the PSD program and 
regulations from one program cannot dictate action in the other. See, e.g, Envtl. Defense v. Duke 
Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 577 (2007) (recognizing the definitions of "modification" under the 
PSD and NSPS programs are distinct and the ""PSD regulations on 'modification' simply cannot 
be taken to track the Agency's regulatory definition under the NSPS"). 
29. Finally, Petitioners' argument that 42 U.S.C. § 7430 prohibits the use of the NEI 
emission factors because EPA has not specifically approved such factors also fails. 
30. The plain language of this statute contradicts Petitioners' argument because 
Section 7430 applies only to emission factors used "to estimate the quantity of emissions of 
carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and oxides of nitrogen from sources of such air 
pollutions."17 42 U.S.C. § 7430 (emphasis added). The statute says nothing about the use of 
emission factors to estimate the quantity of PM2_5 and PM 10-the only emissions for which Holly 
used NEI factors to estimate emissions from its heaters and boilers. 
31. In any event, Section 7430 does not dictate that UDAQ use any specific emission 
factors in a permitting proceeding, but requires EPA to update emission factors, saying nothing 
17 Consistent with the plain language of the statute, EPA has repeatedly explained that this 
provision applies only to "the emission factors used to estimate emissions of volatile organic 
compounds (VOC), carbon monoxide (CO), and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) from area and mobile 
sources," not to emission factors for PM2_5 and PM 10• 67 Fed. Reg. 56289 (Sept. 3, 2002); 62 
Fed. Reg. 45802 (Aug. 29, 1997). 
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about when such factors must be used. UDAQ retains discretion to decide which emission 
factors are appropriate, in its expert technical opinion. 
32. As EPA has explained in evaluating the use of emission factors generated under 
Section 7430: 
These procedures are not a means for individual facilities to obtain EPA approval 
of a site-specific emission factor or to determine the appropriateness of applying a 
published EPA factor to a specific facility. EPA does not approve site-specific 
factors or judge the appropriateness of its factors for specific facilities. The 
responsibility for such decisions continues to be that of the State or local 
regulating authority, as well as the facility operators themselves. 
EPA's published emission factors are intended to provide an affordable method of 
estimating emissions where no better data are available. They are best used to 
characterize the total emissions loading of a large geographic area containing 
many individual facilities. Therefore, these factors attempt to represent a typical 
or average facility or process in a given industry. EPA recognizes that other 
methods of obtaining emissions estimates may be more accurate than industry-
average emission factors, and encourages the use of better methods whenever the 
source and/or the State or local regulating authority is able to support those 
methods. 
Public Participation Procedures for EPA Emission Estimation Guidance Materials, at 2 (May 
1997) (second and third emphasis added). 18 
33. EPA has specifically recognized that state permitting authorities may use other 
methods without obtaining approval under§ 7430, so long as the permitting authority "is able to 
support these methods." Id. 
34. UDAQ had substantial evidence in the record to support its decision to use the 
NEI emission factors as set forth in section ii. below. 
18 Available at http://tinyurl.com/EPA-guidance. 
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35. Petitioners have failed to establish any valid legal basis mandating the use of AP-
42 emission factors for estimating PTE for pennitting purposes. Therefore this claim fails on the 
merits. 
ii. It Was Reasonable for UDAOtoAccept Holly's Use ofthe NE/ 
Emission Factors 
36. UDAQ did not abuse its discretion by following EPA 's instruction and looking to 
alternative methods of calculating emissions in this case. As noted above, the determination of 
which emission factors to use falls squarely within the discretion ofUDAQ. That determination 
is entitled to substantial deference, particularly given its technical nature. See, e.g., Utah Code 
§ 19-1-301.5(13)(b); accord In re: N Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant, PSD Appeal No. 08-02, 
at 53 (EAB Feb. 18, 2009) ('·[Q]uestions pertaining to the appropriate pollutant emissions rates 
and other inputs to air quality models raise scientific and technical concerns that generally are 
best left to the specialized expertise and reasoned judgment of the permitting authority."); In re: 
Newmont Nev. Energy Inv., LLC, TS Power Plant, 12 E.A.D. 429, 444 (EAB 2005) ("[W]e 
accord broad deference to permitting authorities with respect to issues requiring the exercise of 
technical judgment and expertise."); Utah Dep 't of Admin. Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 658 
P.2d 60 I, 610 (Utah 1983) (""[A] court should afford great deference to the technical expertise or 
more extensive experience of the responsible agency."). 
37. Before explaining why UDAQ's acceptance of the NEI emissions factors is 
reasonable, supported by substantial evidence, and does not constitute an abuse of discretion, it is 
necessary to provide some brief background regarding PM and emission factors generally. 
38. Particulate matter (PM) is comprised of a complex mixture of extremely small 
particles and liquid droplets. [Utah PM2_5 State Implementation Plan, adopted December 4. 2013 
(4"2013 SIP"), § 1.1.] PM 10 is particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 10 microns or 
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less. 40 C.F.R. § 51.50. PM2_5 is particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 2.5 
microns or less. Id. 
39. There are two types of PM emissions: primary and secondary. The type on which 
Petitioners focus in their challenge, primary PM, is comprised of particles that are directly 
emitted from a source as a solid or liquid ("filterable PM") or vapor that immediately condenses 
after discharge to form solid or liquid PM ('"condensable PM"). See 40 C.F .R. § 51.50. 
According to EPA's AP-42 emission factors, condensable PM accounts for 75% of PM 
emissions from the type of natural gas combustion sources at issue here. [See AP-42 
Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors (1998); see also England II at IR008029.] 
40. An emission factor attempts to estimate the quantity of a pollutant released into 
the atmosphere with an activity associated with the release of that pollutant. 47 Fed. Reg. 
52723-01, 52724 (Oct. 14, 2009). EPA's AP-42 emission factors were "initially developed for 
emission inventory purposes only"-i.e., to assist national, regional, state, and local regulatory 
authorities with making air quality management decisions and developing emission control 
strategies. Id. at 52723, 52725. Since then, however, EPA has recognized the AP-42 emission 
factors have been "used for many other air pollution control activities for which they were not 
designed," including permitting and enforcement. Id. 
41. Various testing methods have been developed for calculating primary PM2_5 
emissions (both filterable and condensable). The AP-42 factors on which Petitioners rely were 
originally developed almost twenty years ago using a ''stack test impinger method," which draws 
a gas sample through a heated filter and then a series of iced '"impingers." [England I at 
IR007240.] As explained in the England Reports, the problem with this method is that cooling 
the sample with chilled water causes emissions-and particularly SO2 emissions-to condense 
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and particulate out as "pseudo-particulate" matter. Although the gas emissions would not 
condense to form particulate matter under normal operating conditions, the AP-42 factors 
nevertheless measure this pseudo-particulate matter as primary PM2_5• [England II at IR008027-
8029; England I at IR007240, IR007242.] 
42. EPA has recognized this same problem with the stack test impinger method. EPA 
has observed, for example, that "sulfur dioxide (S02) gas (a typical component of emissions 
from several types of stationary sources) can be absorbed partially in the impinger solutions and 
can react chemically to form sulfuric acid. This sulfuric acid 'artifact' is not related to the 
primary emission of [condensable particulate matter] from the source, but may be counted 
erroneously as [condensable particulate matter]." 75 Fed. Reg. 80,118, 80,121 (Dec. 21, 2010). 
EPA also has acknowledged "that S02 in particular, and perhaps other gaseous compounds, can 
react with the collecting liquids used in the [stack test impinger] method to form materials 
(artifacts) that would not otherwise be solid or liquid or would not condense upon exiting the 
stack." 72 Fed. Reg. 20,586, 20,653 (Apr. 25, 2007). 
43. The Glen England Reports explain that this problem is particularly acute for gas-
fired sources. EPA developed its test methods for sources such as coal-fired boilers, which emit 
PM concentrations at much higher levels than gas-fired sources, and EPA has never evaluated 
the performance of these methods for gas-fired sources. [England II at IR008029, IR008034.] 
These measurement errors caused by the hot filter/iced impinger methods "are so significant 
when applied to gas-fired boilers and heaters ... that they partially or completely obscure the true 
emission level." 19 [England II at IR008029.] 
19 In addition to being based on flawed test methods which measure artifacts that do not actually 
constitute particulate matter, the relevant AP-42 PM2.s factors are based on limited data. The 
AP-42 PM2.s factors are based on only 11 tests of four emissions units for condensable 
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44. The NEI factors, by contrast, were developed using a newer ''dilution method." 
Unlike the old stack test methods, dilution-based testing does not create artificial pseudo-
particulate matter because the gas sample is cooled with filtered air, similar to what happens to 
emissions in the course of actual operations. According to the England Reports, this results in 
much more representative and accurate PM2.s measurements. [England II at IROO8O27, 
IROO8O3O-8O32; England I at IROO7241.] 
45. EPA has recognized the benefits of this newer testing method, observing ''that a 
dilution sampling method for measuring direct PM2.5 eliminates essentially all artifact formation 
and provides the most accurate emissions quantification." 12 Fed. Reg. 20,586, 20,653 (Apr. 25, 
2007) ( emphasis added). In fact, EPA has expressly identified certain applications "where 
dilution sampling provides advantages over the standard test methods," and actively 
"encourage{dl sources that encounter these situations to request that the regulatory authority ... 
use this method to approve the use of dilution sampling as an alternative to the test method 
specified for determining compliance." 75 Fed. Reg. 80118-01, 80132 (emphasis added). 
46. In this case, EPA raised no objection to use of the NEI emission factors during the 
public comment period.20 [See Response to Comments at 43 (noting that "during the public 
comment period, EPA did not object to the use of(the NEI] emission factors").] Nor has EPA 
particulate matter (which forms the majority of PM2_5 emissions). [England II at IROO8O39.] 
These tests were not performed by EPA, but by contractors on behalf of individual facilities or 
industry trade associations. [England II at IROO8O35.] Moreover, the measurement uncertainty 
of the AP-42 PM2.s factors for gas-fired sources is greater than the average estimate of emissions. 
[England II at 4.] The England Reports describe these and a number of other flaws with the AP-
42 PM2.s factors that are not reiterated in detail here. [See England II at 3.] 
20 While EPA did ask for more information as to the basis for the reduction of PM 10 and PM2_5 
potential-to-emit numbers in Holly's second netting analysis, [see IROO784O-7841 ], UDAQ 
addressed this inquiry in its Response to Comments, explaining that the calculations were "based 
on the 2006 EPA-published National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Information." [IROO9l 76] 
Subsequent to this direct identification of the use ofNEI emission factors, EPA has raised no 
further questions concerning the netting analysis or otherwise challenged Holly's AO. 
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challenged the issuance of the AO. EPA also has raised no objection to UDAQ's recent 
authorization of the NEI factors for purposes of calculating PM2_5 under UDAQ's PM2.s State 
Implementation Plan. [See Utah SIP § I.X.H.11 (k)(i), dated January 8, 2014 ("SIP Part H") at 
60.] 
47. In arguing that UDAQ must use the AP-42 emission factors, Petitioners do not 
defend the accuracy of the AP-42 factors on a technical basis. Nor do they address any of the 
criticisms, expressed by both EPA and the England Reports, about the inaccuracies of the stack 
test impinger methods on which the AP-42 factors are based. 
48. The fact that AP-42 factors have been used in the past does not mean that UDAQ 
must continue to rely on those same factors for the Holly AO. UDAQ's determinations-
including the "technical" and "scientific" questions such as what emission factors are to be 
used-are to be made on the basis of the evidence provided to UDAQ and placed in the 
administrative record in a particular permitting action. Utah Code § 19-1-301.5( 13)(b ). Holly 
provided UDAQ with data regarding the flaws in the AP-42 PM2_5 factors and outlining the 
superior accuracy of the NEI PM2_5 factors. UDAQ evaluated this evidence and "determined that 
the NEI emission factors can be used." [IR0092 I 6, Response to Comments Memo.] Prior use of 
the AP-42 PM2_5 factors does not undermine this conclusion.21 
21 Petitioners' claim that the May 2011 RTI International Emission Estimation Protocol for 
Petroleum Refineries endorses the use of the AP-42 emission factors and does not identify the 
NEI PM2_5 data. [See IR008661, attachment F to Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.] However, 
the purpose of the protocol was not to identify the absolute level of PM2_5 emissions from each 
refinery, but to require the tested refineries to use the same emissions factor so that their relative 
emissions could be compared. In responding to comments on the protocol, EPA explained that 
"it is important that default emission factors are consistent between different reporters so we can 
properly compare the results." [Summary of Comments and Responses, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0682 (Feb. 2, 201 I), Appx. V of Holly's Opposition to Motion for Stay, also available at 
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HO-OAR-20 I 0-0682-0028.] In any event, the 
protocol itself states that the ··emission factors in AP-42 are the recommended default emission 
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49. Based on the substantial evidence in the record providing technical support for 
UDAQ's decision to accept use of the NEI emission factors and the emission calculations based 
on those factors, and given the lack of contradictory technical evidence, Petitioners cannot meet 
their burden to demonstrate that UDAQ acted unreasonably. 
iii. The NEI PM2_ 5 Emission Factors are Based on Sound Technical 
Data and Petitioners' Reference to Other Information Does Not 
Undermine the Data. 
50. The majority of the technical data supporting the NEI emission factors is found 
in the England Reports, which state that "[t]he NEI PM2.5 emission factors were derived by 
EPA staff from data contained in GE EER's comprehensive test reports published from 2002-
2004," along with ··detailed supporting test data." [England II at IR008032.] 
51. This testing program "included extensive quality assurance measures," and more 
comprehensive data than is provided in the compliance tests used to developed the AP-42 
factors. [England II at IR008034-8035.] These results have been subject to peer review and 
have been corroborated by other independent scientific studies. [England II at IR008032.] The 
NEI test data is also quantitatively superior when it comes to condensable particulate matter 
emissions, which form the majority of PM2.s emissions: the AP-42 factors were based on 11 test 
runs of four units, while the NEI factors were based on 20 test runs of six units. [England II at 
IR008039, IR00804 l .] 
52. The cautionary statements regarding the NEI emission factors upon which 
Petitioners rely ''do not suggest in any way that those factors are insufficiently supported by data 
or should not be used." [England II at IR008033.] The AP-42 PM emission factors are 
accompanied by similar language explaining that the emission factors are based on limited data 
factors," not that the AP-42 factors are the only permissible emission factors. [IR008715 
(emphasis added).] 
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and may not be accurate. [England II at IR008029-8030.] Such cautionary language is generally 
found in all instances where emission factors are used. 
53. The boiler sampling data and performance guarantees from the John Zink 
Company are an incomplete compilation of data that is not explained, nor relatable to Holly's gas 
fired heaters and boilers. The boiler standards were provided to UDAQ on a one-page sheet of 
test results, without the full test reports or any explanation as to the testing methodology or 
nature of the emissions sources. [See IR008586, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.] 
Additionally, two of the four boilers did not bum natural gas during their tests and so are not 
analogous to the gas-fired sources at issue here. [England II at IR008030 n.1.] The emissions 
from the remaining two sources vary widely, resulting in "very low" confidence in the average. 
[England II at IR008040.] Accordingly, this data does not undermine use of the NEI emission 
factors. 
54. The Zink guarantees were similarly provided without context or explanation. 
Without the testing data, it is impossible to verify that these factors were not based on the same 
flawed test methods as the AP-42 factors. Moreover, the Zink guarantees are not emission 
factors or estimates, but rather guarantees provided by a commercial manufacturer that emissions 
will not exceed a certain level. Equipment manufacturers have an incentive to guarantee 
emissions that are conservatively high so that the commercial risk associated with failing to meet 
the guarantee is low. [England II at IR008034 ("'If PM guarantees are not met during 
performance tests on a new unit, tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in customer payments 
may be at stake.").] 
55. In weighing the evidence in the record, as this tribunal must do in accordance 
with Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5, it is clear that the use of the NEI emission factors is 
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supported by the majority of sound scientific evidence in the record and UDAQ was therefore 
reasonable in its acceptance of the NET factors. 
56. 
iv. UDA O Was Reasonable in its Reliance on Enforceable Emissions 
Limits in the Holly AO in Determining the Potential to Emit for 
Ho/Iv's Heaters and Boilers. 
Petitioners argue that emission limits on Holly's heaters and boilers cannot be 
used to limit the facility's potential to emit and so UDAQ erred in its determination that Holly's 
project was minor for PM25• This tribunal disagrees. 
57. The AO imposes an enforceable limit on PM2.5 emissions from each of the 
emissions units for which the NET emission factors were used in an amount equal to the NET 
emission factors. [IR009248, Holly AO (providing that ·~[t]he emissions of PM 10 from the 
following NSPS Boilers and heaters shall not exceed 0.0005 l lb/MMBtu").] 
58. The methodology used in this case to determine whether the proposed 
modification was "major" for PSD/NSR purposes was a comparison of the refinery's potential to 
emit after the expansion project versus its baseline actual emissions before the expansion. See 40 
C.F .R. § 52.21 (a)(2)(iv)(d). [See also TR008560, Source Plan Review (noting that Holly has 
used the potential to emit methodology to determine the projected increases from the expansion 
project).] Under this method, the estimated potential emissions are compared to the baseline 
emissions; if the difference between the two exceeds a certain quantity, the modification is 
deemed "major" for that pollutant. 
59. "'Potential to emit" is defined as 
the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its physical 
and operational design. Any physical or operational limitation on the capacity of 
the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and 
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted, 
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stored, or processed, shall be treated as part of its design if the limitation or the 
effect it would have on emissions is federally enforceable. 22 
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(4) (emphasis added); Utah Adm in. Code R307-l O 1-2 (same definition).23 
60. The emissions limit imposed on the NSPS boilers and heaters is an enforceable 
limitation in the Holly AO. [See IR0092 l 8, Response to Comments Memo C'If the stack testing 
indicates that Holly Refinery cannot comply with these emission factors, it would be out of 
compliance with its AO .... ")]; see also 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80, 190-91 (Dec. 31, 2002) 
(explaining when an emissions limitation is enforceable). Accordingly, the potential to emit of 
these emissions units was properly limited to 0.00051 lb/MMBtu - the same level as established 
by the NEI emission factors. 
61. UDAQ was reasonable in relying on this limiting factor in its determination that 
Holly's project would only be a minor modification for PM. 
62. Ultimately, none of Petitioners' arguments challenging Holly's use of the NEI 
emission factors undermines' UDAQ's reasonable decision to accept Holly's emission 
calculations based on those factors. Petitioners' arguments on this claim all fail on the merits 
and should be dismissed with prejudice. 
XI. The Emission Reductions From the Decommissioning of the Propane Pit Flare 
Were Properly Included in Holly's Netting Analysis. 
22 The term "federally" in this definition is interpreted as meaning "practically enforceable" by a 
federal, state, or local entity. 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,191 (Dec. 31, 2002). [See also 
Memorandum from John S. Seitz re: Release of Interim Policy on Federal Enforceability of 
Limitations on Potential to Emit, at 3 (Jan. 22, 1996).] 
23 Petitioners suggest that the NSPS regulations provide a definition for calculating ''potential to 
emit." This is incorrect. The NSPS rules nowhere use the concept of "potential to emit" to 
determine whether a modification has taken place. Instead, the NSPS definition of modification 
is based on whether there has been a change in the hourly emissions rate, while the PSD 
regulations are based on total annual emissions. See Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. at 577-78. 
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1. Petitioners final argument is that Holly inaccurately calculated the emission 
reductions from its decommissioning of the propane pit flare and should not have included such 
emissions in its netting analysis. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 60-61 ]. For the reasons stated 
below, this final argument should be rejected. 
A. Findings of Fact 
2. The emission reductions that Holly claimed from its decommissioning of the 
propane pit flare came from actual emission inventory information submitted to UDAQ in 2008 
and 2009 and were not re-calculated specifically for purposes of this project. [IR0092 t 8, 
Response to Comments Memo ("flare emissions came from the UDAQ inventory record for 
reported actual emissions from 2008-2009 based on 259 MMBtu/hr and actual throughput 
data").] 
3. The historic modifications to the propane pit flare to bring it into compliance with 
NSPS did not affect the baseline calculations or the AP-42 emission factor calculations. 
[IR007337, Revised NOi ('~Compliance with NSPS affects neither the AP-42 emission factor 
calculation, which is based on the amount of propane used, nor the baseline calculations.").] 
4. None of Holly's modifications to the Propane Pit Flare affected overall emissions. 
Therefore Holly was free to take credit for the emission reductions when the flare was 
decommissioned. [IR009182, Response to Comments Memo ("Because compliance with 40 
CFR 60 Subparts A & J did not affect emissions, reductions from the removal of this propane pit 
flare are creditable reductions.").] 
5. In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two 
separate comment letters to UDAQ. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-
784 I, EPA Second Comment Letter.] While the Second Comment Letter requested more 
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information regarding (a) "the basis for the estimate of emissions reduced by converting from 
gas fired to electric motors for the compressors" [IR007840] and (b) the netting calculations 
relating to the new benzene saturation unit #23 and applying a boiler #5 NOx limit [IR00784 I], 
the EPA raised no concerns about the netting issues raised by Petitioners in their final argument 
on appeal. Moreover, EPA's request for supplemental information on this issue was satisfied in 
UDAQ's response to comments. , 
B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation 
6. Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising 
this issue during the public comment period. [See IR007857 Petitioners' Second Comment 
Letter.] 
C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof 
7. The issue of whether Holly accurately estimated reduction of PM emissions from 
the removal of its propane pit flare presents highly technical factual questions. It also presents 
legal questions about what data may be used for reduction purposes in a netting analysis. 
Accordingly, this issue is a mixed question of law and fact and UDAQ's decision to include the 
emission reductions in the netting analysis will be analyzed under a reasonableness standard. 
8. Petitioners failed to marshal all of the evidence pertaining to this issue-namely 
the 2008 and 2009 emission inventory data. Petitioners merely question the final calculations 
without presenting any conflicting evidence or analyzing the evidence in the record. 
9. Accordingly, Petitioners have not met their burden of proof on this claim and it 
fails on that basis. 
D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits 
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I 0. Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is 
not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits 
for the independent reasons discussed below. 
11. Petitioners argue that the propane pit flare emissions were overestimated based on 
Holly's use of AP-42 emission factors. Petitioners contend the emission reduction must be 
overestimated because based on the calculated reduction, the propane pit flare would have been 
burning every day of the year. 
12. Petitioners submit no evidence in support of this contention. Specifically, 
Petitioners do not address the fact that the emission reduction was based on the 2008 and 2009 
historic emission inventory data that Holly submitted to UDAQ as required by Utah Admin. 
Code R307- l 50. 
13. Part of this calculation involved the use of AP-42 emission factors to calculate the 
emissions from the flares because emission factors are necessary where emissions are generated 
from an open flame. [See IR007337, Revised NOT, (""Baseline emissions for the flare at the 
propane pit were calculated based on the AP-42 emission factors for flares.'').] 
14. For purposes of netting, the regulations expressly provide that the historical 
inventory information may be used as a baseline for calculating emissions increases and 
decreases. See 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (b )( 48)(ii). 
15. That Holly used NEI emission factors to calculate emissions from its heaters and 
boilers is irrelevant to the question of whether the flare emissions were properly calculated with 
AP-42 factors. Petitioners have pointed to no statute or regulation that would require Holly or 
UDAQ to re-calculate historic inventory information every time new emission factors are 
developed. 
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16. Petitioners' claim that there is no evidence in the record to support these historic 
emission calculations also fails because all parties, including Petitioners, agreed to exclude the 
emission inventory calculations from the record given the volume of those files. [See Holly's 
Surreply at 28; see also UDAQ's Surreply at 33.] If Petitioners thought there was an error in the 
calculations, the information could have been made available to them for their review. 
Petitioners may not now argue, without having asked to review the calculations, that the lack of 
such evidence supports their claim. 
17. Petitioners have failed to present any evidence that would undermine the 
significant deference afforded to UDAQ in its review of highly technical emission calculations 
and review of netting analyses. Moreover, Petitioners have presented no technical evidence that 
undermines the accuracy of the historical inventory information. Accordingly, Petitioners' 
challenge to the propane pit flare emission calculations fails on the merits and should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED ORDER 
I. Based on the foregoing, Petitioners have not met their burden to demonstrate that 
UDAQ erred in issuing the Holly AO. 
2. Further based on the foregoing and having satisfied my charge to undertake a 
permit review adjudicative proceeding in connection with this matter in accordance with Utah 
law, I recommend that the Executive Director deny Petitioners' Request for Agency Action and 
affirm UDAQ's issuance of the Holly AO. 
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DATED this 1 I th day of March, 2015. 
BRET F. RANDALL 
Administrative Law Judge 
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APPENDIX A 
Table of Waived Claims Petitioners Raised in Their RAA But Failed to Brief on the Merits 
RAAPage Description of Waived Claim Claim# in 
Number Briefs 
27-29 "The AO Does Not Adequately Address Co Emissions and CO 8 
BACT" 
29-30 "The Director Failed to Respond to Public Comments as Required by 9 
Law" 
43-44 "It is Impossible to Verify the Facility's SO2 Potential to Emit" 17 
47-48 "The BACT for the South Flare is Inadequate" 20 
50 "The AO Does Not Comply with the Federally Enforceable PM 1o 24 
SIP" 
51 "There is No Adequate Basis in the Record for the AO as the Record 25 
Does Not Reflect Independent Analysis of the Assertions and 
Calculations Made in the NOi" 
51-52 "There is Insufficient Information and Analysis in the Record to 26 
Support the AO" 
53 "The Netting Analysis is Insufficient and Does Not Support the 28 
Finding that the Expansion Project is a Minor Modification" 
53-55 "The Holly Refining NOi is Incomplete for its Failure to address 29 
Hydrogen Sulfide, Total Reduced Sulfur and Sulfuric Acid Aerosal 
as Required NSR-Regulated Pollutants" 
55-57 "The AO is Not Based on PM Emissions During Emission 30 
Characterization, Project Related Emission Increases, Netting and 
Net Increase Calculations and in the Required BACT 
Determinations; the Refinery Onsite Road Network is an Emission 
Unit Not Listed in the AO Approved Installations and Holly 
Refining Plans to Increase Site-Road-Related PM, PM IO & PM2.5 
Emissions Through a Physical Change or Change in the Method of 
Operation of this Emission Unit" 
59-60 "Table 3-4 and 3-5 NO2 Reference [is incorrect]" 32 
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60-61 "'Facility Configuration and Operations in Compliance with Holly 33 
Refining's Notice of Intent" 
61-62 "Holly Refining's NOi Contains Significant Errors on the Matter of 34 
the Specific Start of the Contemporaneous Period" 
62-63 "The AO is Based on an Improper Characterization of the 35 
Contemporaneous Period" 
63-65 "The AO is Unlawful Because the Director Failed to Require and 36 
Base his Permitting Analysis on the Necessary Process Flow 
Diagrams and New Source Review Forms" 
65-67 "The Evaluation and Characterization of Contemporaneous Emission 37 
Increases is Inadequate" 
67-69 "The Section 2.3.1 "Fuel Gas" Process Support Group Analysis and 38 
Related Section 3 Emission Tables Do Not Show an Adequate 40 
C.F.R. §52.21 (b)(3)(i)(b) Determination of Contemporaneous 
Creditable Emission Increases and Decreases" 
69-70 "The Section 2.3.2 Disclosure of Cooling Tower Changes Fails to 39 
Provide Sufficient Information to Determine Contemporaneous 
Creditable Emission Increases from Non-Modified Portions of 
Existing Cooling Towers" 
70 "The Section 2.3.3 Disclosure Concerning Flares Does Not Provide 40 
Sufficient Information to Determine Contemporaneous Creditable 
Emission Increases at Non-Modified Flare Emission Units" 
70-71 "The Section 2.3.6 Discussion of Wastewater Treatment and the 41 
Refinery Wastewater Sewer System Does Not Provide Sufficient 
Information to Determine Contemporaneous Creditable Emission 
Increases" 
74-75 "Holly Refining's Section 3 Emission Increase and Net Emission 43 
Increase Tables Contain Erroneous Specification of Volatile Organic 
Compound and Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions from Cooling 
Tower #11" 
76-77 "'VOC Emissions and Waxy Crude Handling, Transfer and Storage" 45 
78 "'Holly Refining Erroneously Claimed VOC Emission Reduction 46 
from Removal of a Floating Roof' 
I I 1 
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79-81 "The Director Fails to Enforce Notice of Intent and Compliance 48 
Report Certification by Holly Refining" 
81 "Condition II.B. I .b in the AO is Too Vague to be Enforceable" 49 
81 '"The AO Production Rates During Compliance Stack Tests Are 50 
Insufficient" 
81-82 'The AO Fails to Contain a Section Addressing the Regulatory 51 
Status, Method of Emission Control and Monitoring-Inspection-
Recordkeeping-Reporting Requirements for Tank Sources ofVOC 
and HAP" 
83-84 "The AO Fails to Enforce Specific Requirements of the July, 2008 53 
EPA Consent Decree Covering PM Emission Limitations for FCCU 
Unit 4 and Fails to Require Sufficient Monitoring Necessary to 
Assure Compliance with PM Emission Requirements from FCCU 
Units 5 and 25" 
84-86 "The AO Fails to Provide a Best Available Control Technology 54 
Emission Limitation for PM, PM 10 or PM2.5 to Control Emissions 
from FCC Unit 4" 
86-87 "Setting NOx Emission Limitations for 4FCCU and 25FCCU 55 
Catalyst Regenerator Exhaust Must be Explained and Justified on the 
Record to Eliminate Error and Ambiguity" 
87-88 "The AO Omits Oxygen Corrections for NOx and SO2 Emission 56 
Limitations that are Stack Flue Gas Concentration Limits" 
91-93 "The Record Does Not Include Maximum Potential to Emit for Short 59 
Term SO2 Emissions from the FCC Unit 25 Wet Scrubber Exhaust 
Vent Compliance Determination Point that are Associated with 
Sulfur Recovery Unit/SRU Incinerator Outages" 
93-94 "The AO Fails to Contain Oxygen Monitoring and Wet Scrubber Outlet 60 
Volumetric Flow Rate Determination at FCC Units 4 & 25 Wet 
Scrubber Controlled Vent Stacks" 
95-96 ''The Director Eliminated a Previously Established PM Limits for 62 
FCC Unit 4 Without Replacing Such a Limit with a Revised BACT 
Determination" 
96-97 "Holly Refining Has Not Demonstrated that the 15% Opacity Limit 63 
for 25 FCCU Constitutes a BACT Visible Emission Limitation" 
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97-98 "The Director Must Regulate the FCC 34" Flue Gas Bypass" 65 
98-99 "Nothing Provided by Holly Refining's Final Revised Notice of 66 
Intent Justifies the Claimed 98% Control Efficiency Claimed for 
VOC, HAP and CO Destruction Efficiency from the Open Air 
Flares" 
99-100 "The Record Fails to Address All Parts of the Existing and Proposed 67 
Flare Gas System and Failed to Carry Out a "Top Down" Best 
Available Control Technology Analysis" 
100-102 "The AO May Not Dismiss Flare Gas Recovery Systems as a BACT 68 
Requirement Without Considering Prevailing Industry Practice in 
Favor of Such Systems at Larger Refineries" 
104-105 ''Flare Opacity Limitation is Not a BACT Limitation" 71 
106-107 "The AO Fails to Adequately Address the SRU Incinerator" 73 
107 "The AO Fails to Adequately Address the Controlled Refinery 74 
Process Wastewater Sewers" 
107-108 "Neither the Approval Order Nor Holly Refining's Final Revised 75 
Notice of Intent Contain Any Limitation on Cooling Tower Water 
Total Dissolved Solids" 
108-109 "The AO Fails to Incorporate a VOC BACT Determination and Fails 76 
to Address EPA Consent Decree Requirements for LOAR Programs 
at Holly Refining's Facility" 
109-110 "Condition 11.B.l.d Should Require Continuous Total Sulfur 77 
Analyzer" 
111-112 "The Director Must Address the Heater/Boiler NOx CEM 79 
Requirement" 
1 15 "Utah Physicians Reserves the Right to Respond to Any Argument 81 
Data and/or Analysis Which Was Not Available at the Beginning of 
the Public Comment Period" 
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ADDENDUME 
Order Adopting Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommended Order on the Merits 
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
DIVISION OF WATER QUALITY 
In the Matter of: 
Approval Order No. DAQE-AN101230041-13 
Holly Refining & Marketing Company -
Woods Cross, LLC 
Heavy Crude Processing Project 
Project No. N 10123-0041 
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
RECOMMENDED ORDER ON THE MERITS 
Date: March 31, 2015 
On March 11, 2015, the administrative law judge issued a Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits (proposed dispositlve action) in the above 
referenced Division of Air Quality permit review adjudicative proceeding, conducted in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §19-1-301.5 and Utah Admin. Coder. 305-7. When an 
administrative law judge submits a proposed dispositive action, I may adopt, adopt with 
modifications, or reject the proposed dispositive action; or return the proposed dispositive 
action to the administrative law judge for further action as required. Utah Code Ann.§ 19-1-
301.5(13)(a). I am required to uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations 
that are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a whole. Utah Code Ann. § 
19-1-301.5(13)(b). 
Having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on 
the Merits and the accompanying record, I am satisfied that the factual, technical, and scientific 
agency determinations are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a 
whole. 
ADJ011651 
WHEREFORE, I adopt the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order 
on the Merits. For the reasons stated therein, I affirm the Division of Air Quality's decision to 
issue the approval order described above and I order the dismissal with prejudice of each of the 
Petitioners' arguments. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of this final order may be sought in the Utah Court of Appeals in 
accordance with Sections 636-4-401, 63G-4-403, and 636-4-405 of the Utah Code Ann. and the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by filing a proper petition within thirty days after the date of 
this order. 
DATED this~ day of71kt--tcl; , 2015. 
AMANDA SMITH 
Executive Director 
Utah Department of Environmental Quality 
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ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
ON THE MERITS via email on the following: 
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Joro Walker 
Charles R. Dubuc, Jr. 
WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES 
joro.walker@westernresources.org 
rob.dubuc@westernresources.org 
Christian C. Stephens 
Marina V. Thomas 
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Shane R. Bekkemellom, 
Administrative Legal Secretary 
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